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Since 1957 when the first satellite was launched into space the United 
Nations has attempted, through its Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space, to provide regulations governing the actions of States in the 
environment. The Treaty of Principles Governing the Activities of States 
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies, 1967, was the first attempt at such regulation. However, 
this treaty, which purported to lay down principles governing man's future 
use of outer space, has, it is suggested, shown itself to be inadequate. 
The principal reason for this is that when it was drafted the United 
Nations did not envisage how the use of space would develop, and there- 
fore its provisions have failed to regulate for man's present or future 
presence in this environment. The result of this is that those States 
involved in space exploration have, by state practice, produced rules of 
conduct to fill in the omissions and short comings of the Outer Space 
Treaty. Further, in certain areas, the practice of these States has gone 
so far as to subvert the principles laid down in this treaty. 
The object of this work is to examine the mechanisms by which state 
practice has developed and how it has suborned the provisions of the 
Outer Space Treaty. Further, it attempts to examine how state practice 
is continuing to undermine other outer space treaties, more particularly 
the Agreement Governing Activities of States on the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies, 1979. The thesis has also examined how national atti- 
tudes are preventing the United Nations from concluding new agreements 
which, it is suggested, give rise to the development of state practice. 
The effect of the rise of state practice would tend to reduce the role of 
the United Nations from a law making one to that of a mere monitoring 
agency. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
2. TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS II 
3. INDEX OF SOURCES 
I CASES IV 
11 TREATIES V 
III GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS XI 
IV UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS xiii 
4. INTRODUCTION 1 
5. CHAPTER ONE: SOVEREIGNTY IN SPACE 15 
6. CHAPTER TWO: STATE PRACTICE AND THE MOON 
TREATY WITH REFERENCE TO THE 
OUTER SPACE TREATY 1767 85 
7. CHAPTER THREE: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MILI- 
TARY ACTIVITIES IN SPACE 125 
8. CHAPTER FOUR: REMOTE SENSING AND DIRECT 
TELEVISION BROADCASTING IN 
RELATION TO STATE PRACTICE 170 
9. APPENDIX 1: TREATY OF PRINCIPLES GOVER- 
NING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES 
IN THE EXPLORATION AND USE 
OF OUTER SPACE, INCLUDING THE 
MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL 
BODIES, 1967 230 
10. APPENDIX 11: AGREEMENT GOVERNING THE 
ACTIVITIES OF STATES ON THE 
MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL 
BODIES, 1979 236 
11. APPENDIX III: TEXT OF DRAFT PRINCIPLES WITH 
RESPECT TO REMOTE SENSING OF 
THE NATURAL RESOURCES OF 
THE EARTH AND , ITS ENVIRON- MENT AS CONTAINED IN THE 
REPORT OF THE LEGAL SUB- 
COMMITTEE ON THE WORK OF ITS 
1980 SESSION 245 
12. BIBLIOGRAPHY 
I BOOKS 249 
11 ARTICLES 251 
III COLLECTIVE WORKS 263 
11 
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS 
A. B. A. J. American Bar Association Journal 
A. B. M. Anti-Ballistic Missile 
A. D. I. Z. Air Defence Identification Zone 
A. J. I. L. American Journal of International Law 
A. S. A. T. Anti-Satellite Weapons/Systems 
B. F. S. P. British and Foreign State Papers 
C. A. D. I. Z. Canadian Air Defence Identification Zone 
CMND United Kingdom Command Papers 
COMSAT Communications Satellite Corporation 
COPUOS Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
COSPAR Commiteee on Space Research, International 
Council on Scientific Unions 
DA PAM United States Department of Army Pamphlet 
D. B. S. Direct Broadcast Satellite 
D. T. B. Direct Television Broadcasting 
Ed Editor 
E. R. T. S. Earth Resource Technology Satellite (Now known 
as Landsats) 
F. O. B. S. Fractional Orbital Bombardment System 
G. A. O. R. General Assembly Official Records 
I. C. B. M. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
I. C. J. International Court of Justice 
I. F. R. B. International Frequency Registration Board 
I. L. M. International Legal Materials 
INTELSAT International Telecommunication Satellite 
Consortium 
I. T. U. International Telecommunications Union 
MOORE "DIGEST" Digest of International Law 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
III 
N. W. U. L. REVIEW North-Western University Low Review 
P. C. I. J. REP Permanent Court of International Justice Reports 
RES Resolution 
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty 
S. P. O. T. Satellite Probative D'Observation De La Terre 
SYM POSIUM (1959) U. S. Congress. Senate. Special Committee on 
Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Space Low; 
A Symposium. 85th Congress, 2nd Session. 
Washington (1959). 
SYMPOSIUM (1961) U. S. Congress. Senate. Special Committee on 
Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Legal Problems 
of Space Exploration; A Symposium. 87th 
Congress, Ist Session. Washington (1961). 
T. I. A. S. Treaties and Other International Agreements 
U. C. L. A. LAW REVIEW University of California Law Review 
U. K. MISC. United Kingdom Miscellaneous Papers 
U. K. T. S. United Kingdom Treaty Series 
U. N. United Nations 
U. N. DOC United Nations Document 
UNDRO United Nations Disaster Relief Organisation 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation 
U. N. G. A. United Nations General Assembly 
U. N. T. S. United Nations Treaty Series 
U. S. T. United States Treaty Series 
W. A. R. C. World Administrative Radio Conference 
IV 
INDEX OF SOURCES 
I CASES 
Aerial Incident of 27th May, 1945; 41.1 42 
I. C. J. Pleadings (1959), p. 154 
I. C. J. Reports (1959), p. 127 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case; 180 
I. C. J. Rep. (1952), p. 93 
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case; 19,21,45,87,203 
I. C. J. Rep. (1951), p. 116 
Behring Sea Fisheries Arbitrations; 87 
Moore "Digest", (1893), para. 172 
Moore "Digest" (1902), para. 173 
Chrysler Corporation v Brown; 184 
440, U. S. 281, (1979); 65 American Bar 
Association Journal, (1979), pp. 1092-3 
Corfu Channel (Merits) Case; 39,41,137 
I. C. J. Rep. (1949), p. 4 
Eastern Greenland Case, The; 29,31,32 
P. C. I. J. Rep. Series A/B No. 53, (1933). 
Garcia v U. S.; 4 United Nations 41,42 
Reports of International Arbitral 
Awards, (1928), p. 119 
Grisbadarna Case, The, (NORWAY v 20 
SWEDEN); The Hague Court 
Reports (1909), p. 130 
Island of Palmas Arbitration, The, 21 
United Nations Reports of Inter- 
national Arbitral Awards, (1928), p. 829 
Lotus Case, The, (FRANCE v 62,154,203 
TURKEY (1927) ); P. C. I. J. Rep. 
Series A, No. 10, p. 25 
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions 110 
Case (GREECE v U. K. (1924); 
P. C. I. J. Rep. Series A, No. 2, p. 12 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases; 21,62,203 
I. C. J. Rep. (1969), p. 3 
Sei Fujii v The State of California; 152 
38 CAL. (2d) (1952), p. 217 
South West Africa Cases; 2nd Phase, 138 
I. C. J. Rep. (1966), p. 6 
V 
I 
11 TREATIES 
1907 Hague Convention (IV) 134 
Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land 
(Command 5030; U. K. T. S. 9 
(1910) ) 
1919 Paris Convention 17,30,32,40,42,50,78 
(Command 670 (1920); 
11 L. N. T. S. 173 (1922) 
1944 Chicago Convention 18,30,32,34,40,42,50,76, 
(Command 8742; T. I. A. S. 1591, 78 
15 U. N. T. S. 295) 
1945 Charter of the United Nations 144,175 
(145 B. F. S. P., p. 805) 
Art 1 (2) 174 
1 (3) 174,175 
33 48 
51 47,48,155,158 
Statute of the In 421,61.. 203 
International Court of Justice 
1956 Statute of the International 1461 147 
Atomic Energy Agency 
(T. I. A. S. 3873; 276 U. N. T. S. 
Ser 3; U. S. T. 1093) 
1958 Geneva Convention on the 86 
High Seas (Command 1929; 
450 U. N. T. S. 82; U. K. T. S. 5 
(1963) ) 
Geneva Convention on the 21,45 
Territorial Sea and Contiguous 
Zone (Command 1958; 
516 U. N. T. S. 205; 
8 U. K. T. S. 39 (1964) 
Geneva Convention on the 20,21 
Continental Shelf 
(Command 2422; 
499 U. N. T. S. 311; 
U. K. T. S. 39 (1964) 
1959 Antarctica Treaty 22,87,88,146,147 
(Command 1535; T. I. A. S. 4780; 
402 U. N. T. S. 71; 
12 U. S. T. 794 (1959) 
1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons 126 
Tests in the Atmosphere, 
in Outer Space and Underwater 
(Command 2245; T. I. A. S. 5433; 
480 U. N. T. S. 43; 14 U. S. T. 1313; 
U. K. T. S. 3 (1964) ) 
vi 
Final Acts of the Extra- 67 
ordinary Administrative Radio 
Conference to Allocate 
Frequency Bands for Space 
Radio Communication Purposes 
(T. I. A. S. 5603; 15 U. S. T. 887) 
1967 Treaty on Principles 12, 22,24, 43, 52,56,59, 60, 
Governing the Activities of 62, 64,72, 76, 77,7 8,80, 81, 
States in the Exploration and 82, 83,88,89,91, 93, 101, 
Use of Outer Space, Including 103, 110, 116, 117, 118, 125, 
the Moon and Other 130, 138, 141, 145, 147, 148, 
Celestial Bodies 150, 151, 153, 156, 157, 160, 
(T. I. A. S. 6347; 3 U. S. T. 2410) 161, 162, 165, 166, 167, 168, 
169, 170, 171, 174, 175, 176, 
182, 183, 206, 207, 211.. 212, 
213, 230 
Art 1 (1) 24., 63,73,74,75, 99, 119, 
125, 126, 138, 140, 147, 148, 
149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 
157, 174, 176, 207, 210, 213 
Act 1 (2) 55, 57,63, 73, 74,75 , 99, 119, 125, 348, 153, 174, 176, 207, 
210, 213 
Art 2 55, 63,73,74, 75,76,82, 89, 
92, 105,106, 110, 112, 119, 
125, 126,148, 176, 177, 207 
Art 3 144, 148,174,21 3 
Art 4 (1) 6,79,126,127, 128, 129, 133, 
134, 135,137, 138, 139, 140, 
141, 142,145, 153, 155, 156, 
157, 158,159, 160, 163, 164, 
165, 167,168 
4 (2) 6,79,126,128, 134, 135, 138, 
140,143,144, 145, 146, 147, 
148,152,153, 154, 155, 156, 
157f 158., 159, 160, 163, 164, 
165,167,168 
6 91,108,116,153,212 
Art 12 106 
1968 Agreement on the Rescue 14,44,45,78,80,81,175 
of Astronauts, the Return of 
Astronauts, and the Return of 
Objects Launched into 
Outer Space (Command 3887; 
T. I. A. S. 6599; 19 U. S. T. 7570) 
vii 
1969 Vienna Convention on the 136,137,138,147,154 
Low of Treaties 
(Command 4818; 63 A. J. I. L. 
875 (1969) ); 
U. N. DOC. A/CONF 39/27, 
(May 23rd 1969) 
1971 Final Acts of the World 68 
Administrative Radio Con- 
ference for Space 
Telecommunications 
(RES. No. SPA 2-1 
(GENEVA 1971) ) 
Agreement Regarding a 201 
Joint Program in the 
Field of Experimental 
Remote Sensing from 
Satellites and Aircraft 
(U. S. A. /CANADA) 
(Extended November 6th 1780; 
T. I. A. S. 8247) 
1972 Convention on Inter- 14,78,81,108,175 
national Liability for Damage 
Caused by Space Objects 
(T. I. A. S. 7762; 24 U. S. T. 2389) 
Treaty on the Limitation of 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems 
(T. I. A. S. 7504; 23 U. S. T. 3435) 
1973 Memorandum of Understanding 201 
Between Brazilian Institutio 
De Pesquisas Espaciais and 
the United States' National 
Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (T. I. A. S. 7600; 
24 U. S. T. 89 8) 
(Extended March 1976; 
T. I. A. S. 8391: 
Extended Ma 1976; 
T. I. A. S. 8393ý 
International Tele- 25,54,56,57,59,68,69,72 
communications Convention 
(T. I. A. S. 8572) 
1975 Convention on Registration 14,50,78,108 
of Objects Launched into 
Outer Space 1975 
(T. I. A. S. 8480 28 U. S. T. 695) 
Art 1 
Art 2 
Art 2 (2) 
Vill 
Memorandum of Understanding 203 
Concerning Direct Access by 
a Chilean Ground Station 
to Data Generated by NASA 
LANSAT Satellites and 
Availability to the National 
Aeronautics and Space 
Administration of the Data 
so Acquired 
(I. L. M. VOL. XV, No. 1 
(January 1976) ) 
Memorandum of Understanding 203 
Concerning Direct Access by 
a Zairian Ground Station to 
Data Generated by U. S. 
Earth Resources Technology 
Satellites (E. R. T. S. ) and 
Availability to the National 
Aeronautics and Space 
Administration of the Data 
so Acquired 
(I. L. M. VOL. XV, No. 1 
(January 1976) ) 
1977 Protocols Additional to the 134 
Geneva Conventions of 
August 12th 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International 
Armed Conflict of June 1977 
(Command 6927; 
U. K. MISC. 19 (1977) 
Final Acts of the World 70 
Administrative Radio Con- 
ference for the Planning of 
the Broadcasting Satellite 
Service 
(RES. NO. SAT-7 
(GENEVA 1977) 
1978 Memorandum of Under- 201 
standing Concerning Access by 
an Indian Ground Station to 
NASA's LANDSAT Satellites 
and Availability to the 
National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration and 
others of Data Acquired, 
with Related Note 
(I. L. M. VOL. XVII, No. 3 
(May 1978); T. I. A. S. 9074) 
(Extended April Wth, 1982) 
1979 
ix 
Memorandum of Understanding 
Concerning the Use of the 
European Space Agency's 
EARTHNET System to 
Receive and Process the 
National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration's 
LANDSAT Data 
(Extended June 17th, 1982; 
I. L. M. XXI, No. 5 (1982) ) 
Strategic Arms Limitation 
Treaty 11 (Unratified) 
(SALT 11 79 Dept. 
State Bull 23 (1979) 
Agreement Governing the 
Activities of States on the 
Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies 
(18 I. L. M. 1434 (1979); 
G. A. RES. 34/68; 
U. N. DOC. A/34/664) 
Art 1 
Art 3 
Art 4 (1) 
Art 6 (2) 
Art 7 (1) 
Art 11 (1) 
Art 11 (2) 
Art 11 (3) 
Art 11 (5) 
Art 11 (6) 
Art 11 (7) 
Art 11 (8) 
Art 12 (1) 
Art 14 
Art 15 
201 
131,156,160 
12,72,78,88,89,90,105, 
110,111,1124r 114,115,117, 
119,122,123,162,163,164, 
170,236 
107,162,165 
162 
98,99,112 
102,118,120 
89,92 
92,103,104,106,112 
93,95,98,102,119 
94,98 
6,7,91,93,94,95,97,98, 
99,100,101,102,103,111, 
116,117,119,120 
95,99 
ill 
92,116 
112,114 
x 
1980 Convention on Prohibitions 139 
or Restrictions on the Use 
of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May be 
Deemed to be Excessively 
Injurious or to have 
Indiscriminate Effects 
(I. L. M. VOL. XIX. No. 6 
(November 1980) ) 
1981 Agreement Relating to the 201 
Establishment and Operation 
of a LANDSAT System 
(U. S. A. INDONESIA) 
(I. L. M. VOL. XX., No. 6 (1981) 
1982 Convention on the Law 6,7,46,90,100,114,115 
of the Sea 
(I. L. M. VOL. XXI. No. 6 
(November 1982); 
U. N. DOC. A/CONF. 62/122) 
xi 
110 (11) (1947) U. N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY 21 llf 230 
ANTI-PROPAGANDA 
RESOLUTION OF 1947 
217 (111) (1948) UNIVERSAL DECLARATION 210,215 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
1472 (XIV) (1959) INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION 1,2 
IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF 
OUTER SPACE 
1721 (XVV) (1961) INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION 2,49,62,63 
IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF 
OUTER SPACE 
1803 (XVII) (1962) U. N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESO- 179l 180,181 
LUTION ON PERMANENT 
SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL 
RESOURCES 
1884 (XVIII) (1963) QUESTION OF GENERAL AND 138,230 
COMPLETE DISARMAM ENT 
1962 (XVIII) (1963) DECLARATION OF LEGAL PRIN- 60,62,63, 
CIPLES GOVERNING THE 1381 230 
ACTIVITIES OF STATES IN THE 
EXPLORATION AND USE OF 
OUTER SPACE 
2453 (XXIII) (1968) N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESO- 213 
LUTION FOR THE ESTABLISH- 
MENT OF A WORKING GROUP 
ON DIRECT BROADCASTING 
2574D (XXIV) (1969) MORATORIUM ON THE EXPLOITA- 97 
TION OF THE SEA BED AND 
OCEAN FLOOR 
2600 (XXIV) (1969) U. N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESO- 188 
LUTION REQUESTING THE 
COMMITTEE ON THE PEACEFUL 
USES OF OUTER SPACE TO 
STUDY INTERNATIONAL CO- 
OPERATION IN THE FIELD OF 
REMOTE SENSING 
2749 (XXV) (1970) DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES 90,91 
GOVERNING THE SEA BED AND 
OCEAN FLOORI AND THE SUB- 
SOIL THEREOF, BEYOND THE 
LIMITS OF NATIONAL 
JURISDICTION 
3281 (XXX) (1975) U. N. CHARTER OF ECONOMIC 181 
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES 
x1l 
37/92 PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE USE 226 
BY STATES OF ARTIFICIAL 
EARTH SATELLITES FOR 
INTERNATIONAL DIRECT 
TELEVISION BROADCASTING 
xill 
IV UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS 
1958 A/3818 (1958) 2 
A/3902 (1958) 2 
A/4009 (1958) 2 
A/C 1/S. R. 995 (1958) 2 
1959 A/4141 (1959) 2 
1962 A/AC. 105/C. 2/L. 1 (1962) 130 
1963 A/C. 1/S. R. 1346, December 5th 1963 62 
A/AC. 105/C. 2/S. R. 20, April 22nd 1963 62, 63 
A/AC. 105/C. 2/L. 6 (1963) 130 
1966 A/AC. 105/C. 2/S. R. 63 (1966) 149 
A/AC. 105/C. 2/S. R. 65 (1966) 148 
A/AC. 105/C. 2/S. R. 66 (1966) 148 
1967 A16695, August 18th 1967 90 
1968 A/7221, September 10th 1968 129 
1969 A/AC. 105/62 (1969) 74 
1970 A/AC. 105/83 Annex 111 (1970) 207 
A/AC. 105/2/7, (1970) 51 
A/AC. 105/C. 2/L. 73, June 26th 1970 182, 188 
A/AC. 105/C. 2/L. 71, July 3rd 1970 114 
1971 A/AC. 105/66 (1971) 202 
A/AC. 105/95 July 19th 1971 188 
1972 A/8730 (1972) 214 
A/8771 (1972) 214 
A/AC. 105/C. 1/S. R. 176 (1972) 204 
1973 A/AC. 105/101 (1973) 93, 109 
A/AC. 1051109 (1973) 214 
A/AC. 105/111, February 1973 185, 188,189 
A/AC. 105/115, April 2nd 1973 188 
A/AC. 105/117 Annex 11 (1973) 208 
A/AC. 105/C. 2 (XI) WORKING PAPER 97 
(1973) 
1974 A/AC. 105/122 (1974) 182 
A/AC. 105/125 (1974) 204 
A/AC. 105/127 (1974) 209, 211 
A/AC. 105/133 Annex IV, June 1974 183, 185,189 
A/AC. 105/C. 1/1047 (1974) 178, 189 
A/AC. 105/C. 2/L. 97 (1974) 99 
A/AC. 105/C. 2/L. 99 (1974) 178, 183,185 
A/AC. 105/W. G. 3/L. 4 (1974) 209, 211 
A/AC. 105/W. G. 3(v)/CRP. 1 (1974) 209, 211,212 
A/AC. 105/W. G. 3(v)CRP. 1 and 215 
CORRI (1974) 
A/AC. 105/W. G. 3(v)/CRP. 2 (1974) 216 
A/AC. 105/W. G. 3(v)/CRP3 (1974) 209, 211 
xiv 
1975 A/AC. 105/147 Annex 11 (1775) 
A/AC. 105/147 Annex III, 
March 11th. 1975 
A/AC. 105/C. I. /W. G. /L. 6, 
November 28th, 1975 
A/AC. 105/C. 2/L. 103. February, 1975 
A/AC. 105/C. 2/S. R. 233 (1975) 
A/AC. 105/PV. 146 (1? 75) 
A/AC. 105/PV. 155 (1975) 
208 
190 
189 
180 
187 
172,187 
1976 A/AC. 105/164 (1976) 36,77 
A/AC. 105/171, May 28th, 1975 190 
A/C. 1/31/3 (1976) 204 
A/AC. 105/C. 1/L. 76,3rd. March, 1976 51 
A/PV. 2059-2093 (1973) 215 
1977 A/32/20, August 9th 1977 193 
A/105/195, March 1st 1977 191 
A/AC. 105/196 Annex, April 11th 1977 96 
A/AC. 105/203 (1977) 54,67 
A/AC. 105/204 (1977) 173,193 
A/AC. 105/C. 1/L. 94, February 15th 1977 192 
A/AC. 105/C. 1/L. 95, February 15th 1977 191 
A/AC. 105/C. 1/L. 96 (1977) 204,204 
A/AC. 105/C. 2/2/7, (1977) 51 
A/AC. 105/C. 2/L. 107 (1977) 191 
A/AC. 105/C. 2/S. R. 281 (1977) 57 
A/AC. 105/C. 2/A. R. 269 (1977) 219 
1978 A/AC. 105/216, March 6th 1978 178,193 
A/AC. 105/218 Annex 11 (1978) 217 
A/AC. 105/218 Annex 111 (1978) 194,195 
A/AC. 105/219, May 15th 1978 96,178 
A/AC. 105/C. 2/S. R. 295 (1978) 178,182,183 
A/AC. 105/C. 2/S. R. 296 (1978) 58 
A/AC. 105/C. 2/S. R. 298 (1978) 59 
A/AC. 105/C. 2/7/ADD. 1 (1978) 58 
1979 A/34/20, August 14th 1979 195 
A/AC. 105/240 (1979) 77 
A/AC. 105/240 Annex 1, 195 
April 10th 1979 
A/AC. 105/L. 112 (1979) 77 
AAC. 105/C. 2/1-121 (1979) 51 
A/AC. 105/C. 2/S. R. 316, (1979) 52 
A/AC. 105/L. 113/ADD. 5 (1979) 168 
A/AC. 105/PV. 190 (1979) 5,121 
A/AC. 105/PV. 199 (1979) 68 
A/AC. 105/PV. 203, July 3rd, 1979 97 
A/SPC/34/S. R. 19, November 1st, 1979 gif 96f 98 
CD/9, March 26th 1979 166 
SM A/WP/5 (1979) 167 
1980 A/RES/35/16 (1980) 4 
A/35/20, August 7th, 1980 196 
A/AC. 105/267, February 15th, 1980 195 
A/AC. 105/271 (1980) . 82,219 
xv 
A/AC. 105/271 Annex 1 (1980) 
A/AC. 105/271 Annex 11 (1980) 
A/CONF. 62/WP. 10/REV. 3, 
August 27th, 1980 
WG/DBS/1980/W. P. 4 (1980) 
1981 A/36/20 (1981) 
A/36/20 Annex 11 (1981) 
A/AC. 105/228 Annex IV, April 20th 1981 
A/AC. 105/288 Annex I, April 20th 1981 
A/AC. 105/288 Annex 11, April 20th 1981 
A/AC. 105/C. 2/L. 131, April 3rd, 1981 
WG/RS (1981)/WP. 2 (1981) 
v UNITED NATIONS PRESS RELEASES 
1978 OS. 224, April 15th, 1978 
OS. 852, April 15th, 1978 
U. S. U. N. 107 (79) 
U. S. U. N. 140 (82) 
217,221,222, 
196,200,245 
118 
219 
199, 224,227 
223, 224,225 
223, 224,225, 
83, 197,199 
225 
223, 224,225, 
197, 199 
59 
59 
101 
227 
225 
227 
227 
-1- 
INTRODUCTION 
For the past twenty-five years since the launch of Sputnik I in 1957 the 
world community within the United Nations has -been -charged with - pro- 
viding legal regulations for the greatest technological challenge the world 
has seen - man's conquest of space. Indeed, this technological challenge 
has, in its turn, given birth to great political, legal and social challenges, 
which the United Nations has attempted to meet. As is the case in all 
large organisations with widely divergent views some aspects of outer 
space have been dealt with highly successfully, others less so. However 
this may be an indication of the fact that general agreements may be 
arrived at comparatively easily, whilst those dealing with specific issues 
are only likely to be concluded after difficult,,. protracted negotiations 
seeking to reconcile nationalistic arguments. 
The body charged with facing the challenges of outer space is the Com- 
mittee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), which was 
established by the United Nations under Resolution 1472 (XIV) of Decem- 
ber 12th 1959. However this was not without a certain degree of dis- 
agreement, which in future years would be seen all too often, though to 
be fair there were times when remarkable successes were achieved through 
co-operation between the two leading space nations, the U. S. S. R. and the 
U. S. A. 
Originally the first discussion on outer space was contained in a debate on 
disarmament in 1957, followed a year later by a special item on outer 
space being put before the General Assembly which resulted in an Ad 
Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space being created (1). 
P. JANKOWITSCH, "Contributions of the United Nations Committee 
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: An Overview". 5 Journal of 
Space Law, (1977), p. 7. 
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Both the U. S. S. R. and the U. S. A. set out their respective positions regar- 
ding the use of outer space to this body. The U. S. S. R. wished to place 
limitations on military activity in space, whilst the U. S. A. was somewhat 
broader in its approach and sought to create a base for international co- 
operation (2). However, though negotiations took place for the rest of 
1958 with a view to creating a permanent committee, no agreement was 
reached. The U. S. S. R. then decided to withdraw from the Ad Hoc Com- 
mittee and at the some time withdrew their proposal (3), resulting in the 
United States' proposal being adopted (4). The effect of this was to 
reduce the report of the committee to a document containing mere 
recommendations for an outer space regime based on co-operation (5). 
According to J. J. Hahn the Ad Hoc Committee, realising that no ground 
could be made without a leading space nation being a participant, framed 
its proposals in such a way as to encourage the U. S. S. R. to take part in 
any future proposals of the General Assembly (6). 
Shortly after the presentation of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, the 
General Assembly decided that there was a need for a permanent organi- 
sation to consider any questions relating to outer space. The result of 
this decision was the setting up of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space (7), although this committee was only actually made 
permanent in 1961 (8). In 1962 two sub-committees, the Scientific and 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
13 U. N. GAOR, 1 Annexes (Agenda Item 60), at 1, U. N. DOC A/3818 
1958) (U. S. S. R. Proposal); 13 U. N. GAOR, 1 Annexes (Agenda Item 
60), at 4, U. N. DOC A/3902 (1958) (U. S. A. proposal). 
U. N. DOC A/C VS. R. 995, (1958), p. 15. 
13 U. N. GAOR, I Annexes (Agenda Item 60), p. 6, U. N. DOC A/4009 
(1958) 
14 U. N. GAOR, I Annexes (Agenda Item 25), p. 1, U. N. DOC A/4141 
(1959) 
J. J. HAHN, "Developments Towards a Regime for Control of Remote 
Sensing from Outer Space", 12 The Journal of International Law and 
Economics, (1978), p. 429. 
U. N. G. A. Res 1472 (XIV), December 12th 1959. 
U. N. G. A. Res 1721 (XIV), December 20th 1961. 
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Technical Sub-Committee and the Legal Sub-Committees, were set up in 
recognition of the interdependence of the legal implications of space 
exploration and exploitation with the technical means of achieving these 
activities. Undoubtedly these two sub-committees have played a large 
part in helping the full committee "to encourage continued research and 
disseminate information on research, and to study the legal problems 
arising from the exploration of Outer Space" (9). This piece of work will 
concentrate more on the activities of the Legal Sub-Committee rather 
than the Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee, because of the legal 
nature of the research. 
The Outer Space Committee first met in 1962 when it was stated by its 
first chairman, Ambassador Franz Matsch, that the Committee would 
proceed by consensus rather than voting. However this was subject to the 
understanding that the General Assembly rules of procedure, making voting 
possible, would nevertheless continue to apply (10). The committee has 
used the consensus system since this date. The reason for such a depar- 
ture from the normal voting system was that any agreement had to have 
the backing of both the U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R., the two leading space 
nations, and the only ones involved at that time in space exploration, since 
otherwise any agreement would quickly become ineffective and unworkable. 
Originally the Ad Hoc Committee was composed of 18 members, the 
majority of whom could be said to be western nations and thus the Soviet 
Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia refused to take part in the early 
meetings of the Committee. However in 1959 the United States and the 
U. S. S. R. came to an understanding that the Ad Hoc Committee might be 
enlarged to 24 and subsequently four more states from the Socialist bloc 
9. JANKOWITSCH, (1977), p. 7. 
10. Ibid. Note also P. DEMBLING and D. M. ARONS, -"The Evolution of 
the Outer Space Treaty", 33 Journal of Air Law and Commerce, 
(1967), p. 419. 
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were added, along with Austria and Lebanon. Since that date the mem- 
bership has been continually enlarged as an increasing number of states, 
realising the importance of space exploration, have desired to take part in 
the formulation of space low and policy. Eventually, on November 3rd 
1980, the General Assembly adopted a resolution that the President of the 
General Assembly would appoint not more than five new members to 
COPUOS (11). The result of this was to increase the Committee from 48 
to 53 members. The effect of the Committee increasing in this manner 
has been to give less developed countries a substantial say in the evolution 
of law and policy relating to outer space, even though they may not be 
actively involved in space exploration. Thus the most technologically and 
scientifically advanced states cannot dominate the formulation of law and 
policy to the same extent as perhaps they were able to do in the early 
years of COPUOS. This is particularly true when one considers that the 
whole procedure within COPUOS is dominated by the consensus system. 
Indeed, this might explain the tendency for the gradual loss of momentum 
in reaching agreement on issues relating to outer space over the years 
from 1973 to the present day. 
Since the consensus system was brought into use in 1962 the increase in 
the number of members has inevitably rendered total agreement more 
difficult to achieve. It is alleged that the consensus process has resulted 
in "a very patient, low key, and deliberate means for obtaining a maximum 
clarification of competing positions and for the final selection of words 
and phrases marking out the intended agreement" (12). Further R. F. 
Stowe has assessed the consensus process in the following manner: - 
11. U. N. DOC A/RES/35/16,3rd Nov. 1980. 
12. C. Q. CHRISTOL, The Modern International Law of Outer Space, 
Pergamon Press, (1982), p. 17. 
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"No decisions or recommendations are made if objection is 
raised by any of the members. The extensive debates which 
often result from this procedure are a small and worthwhile 
price to pay for the reliability, thoroughness and widespread 
acceptability of the Outer Space Committee's work. The 
consensus procedure has in the long run proved to be one of 
the most efficient and effective, if not widespread, means to 
develop international low" (13). 
However this efficiency should be measured against the protracted nego- 
tiations and disagreements which have taken place in, for instance, the 
five areas of space law discussed in this work, i. e. sovereignty in space, 
armaments in space, the legal. status of space and other celestial bodies, 
remote sensing and direct broadcasting by satellite. Thus, if one considers 
the question as to the upper limit of national sovereignty, it may be seen 
that discussions have now been taking place for some twenty years or 
more without a solution being found. Further if one examines the problem 
associated with the drafting of the Moon Treaty it may be found that the 
COPUOS itself become so impatient with its own lack of progress that the 
Chairman, at the beginning of the 22nd session on June 18th 1979, stated: - 
"Indeed the end result of the work was not altogether en- 
couraging, and we have to face this fact squarely ... Progress by the Sub-Committee on the outstanding issues will take 
place only as Member States display an active desire and, let 
me say, a stronger political will to achieve the necessary 
compromises ... In this connection the time might even have 
come for us to reassess our respective positions in order to 
see whether we cannot really bridge this gap. And if, in all 
honesty, we find ourselves unable to do so, the time might 
also have come to devote our energies - at least for the time being - to other important areas of concern which devote our 
attention" (14). 
Clearly it must be taken from this speech that the consensus system is 
not "the most efficient and effective" method since it is likely to lead to 
excessively protracted negotiations that are hide-bound by discussions on 
13. R. F. STOWE, "Statement, International Space Law", Hearings before 
the Sub-Committee on Space Science and Applications of the House 
Committee on Science and Technology, 94th Congress 2nd Session 
1976, p. 39. 
14. U. N. DOC A/AC 105/P. V. 190, June 18th 1979, p. 7-8. See also text 
of Chapter 2 of this work. 
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minutae without necessarily producing clearly defined terms. One ex- 
planation for these difficulties is that COPUOS by -enlarging- its member- 
ship to the present figure has lost a great deal of its homogeneity, which 
has resulted in States with little or no active interest in space exploration 
attempting to impose restrictions on States heavily committed to such 
activities. Thus, for instance, the equatorial States in the 1976 Bogota 
Declaration attempted to claim sovereignty over the geostationary orbit 
(15). Further examples of such activities may be seen in the terminology 
of the 1979 Moon Treaty in which Article XI (1) states that the "Moon 
and its natural resources" are to be "the common heritage of mankind" and 
that there is to be "an equitable sharing by all States Parties in the 
benefits derived from these resources" (16), indeed such clauses may also 
be found in the Convention on the Low of the Sea, 1982. 
However it must be said that the consensus system does allow agreements 
to be arrived at which have the support of all the members of COPUOS 
since the process undoubtedly encourages a collective judgement (17). 
Further if agreements were reached on the basis of a simple majority then 
clear difficulties would arise if the major space nations find themselves 
having to comply with an international agreement with which they disagree 
or consider unworkable. Nevertheless the effect of the laborious and 
time-consuming consensus process tends to undermine the philosophy of its 
use, in that it gives rise to the development of state practice. The 
effect of this is to suborn existing agreements whilst the consensus 
15. See Chapter 1 below for the discussions on this. 
16. Article XI Paragraph 7(d), 
17. E. GALLOWAY, "Consensus As a Basis for International Space Co- 
operation", Proceedings of the 20th Colloquiurn on the Law of Outer 
Space (1978), p, 106. Publisher: The Proceedings of the Colloquia on 
the Low of Outer Space of the International Astronautical Federation 
contain a great deal of material on the subject of the low of outer 
space. Over the years since their start in 1958 the proceedings 
have been published by several publishers and for this reason any 
footnotes referring to these proceedings will only refer to the parti- 
cular colloquium in which that article occurred. The current 
publisher of - these proceedings is the American Institute of Aero- 
nautics and Astronautics. 
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process itself would tend to hinder the development of new ones. This 
process tends to take two forms. Firstly, the long drawn out deliberations 
based on low key negotiations has in the past produced terms which have 
been given little or no definition and are open to widely differing inter- 
pretations. Instances of this can be seen in the conflicting interpretations 
of the term "exclusively for peaceful purposes" in Article IV Paragraph 2 
of the Outer Space Treaty (18), or as to the meaning of "celestial bodies" 
in Article IV Paragraph 1 of the above treaty (19), or further, as to the 
meaning of the term "equitable sharing" in Article XI Paragraph 7(d) of 
the 1979 Moon Treaty (20). In these and other terms to be found in 
current space law legislation -definition is 
lacking, leaving states to place 
their own interpretations on such terms, which may or may not give 
effect to the spirit behind the individual term, but either way may be 
considered a technically correct interpretation. Perhaps the most impor- 
tont example of this tendency for inadequate definition may be seen by 
examining the arguments concerning the term "common heritage of man- 
kind", where the Moon Treaty has purported to introduce into international 
law a new type of territorial status and yet has not seen fit to define 
what it is (21). 
To some extent it may be regarded as Utopian for every term in an 
agreement to be defined and yet strictly speaking if the consensus system 
is as effective as it is claimed to be then there is no reason why the 
COPUOS cannot spend at least part of its generally protracted negotia- 
tions devoting itself to defining main terms. Clearly such an approach 
could save considerable time in preventing disagreements and preventing 
the practice of States from reducing the effectiveness of these not 
18. See Chapter -3/. 19. Ibid. 
20. See Chapter 2. 
21. Ibid. Though the "common heritage of mankind principle was first 
discussed in the negotiations on the Law of the Sea, the Moon 
Treaty was the first treaty to contain the principle. 
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unimportant agreements. Considerable difficulties do exist in attempting 
to achieve this since in some areas of outer space law, notably in the 
areas of remote sensing and direct satellite broadcasting, agreements 
need to be concluded within the near future and any further negotiations 
on definitions of terms, which could prove extensive, may considerably 
delay those agreements from coming into operation. Nevertheless, unless 
the COPUOS attempts to solve this problem the polysemous character of 
the law will entitle a party to a dispute to rely on an interpretation that 
best serves its own position by way of auto-interpretation (22). With 
regard to the use of auto-interpretation Bin Cheng has summed up its 
position as follows: - 
11... as a restraint on international behaviour, auto-interpre- 
tative law can hardly be regarded as effective - for its 
proper operation depends heavily, in each case, on the good 
will of the parties, or their relative power position. At 
times, it verges on lawlessness" (23). 
There would appear to be a growing disenchantment with the way nego- 
tiations within the COPUOS tends to produce "soft" international law. To 
this extent A. Bueckling has expressed his hope that: - 
11... the tendency to conceal unsolved legal problems under 
beautiful legal phrases will be put to an end, and that the 
generalised concepts will be replaced by more specific and 
substantial legislation which might gradually coalesce into a 
body of rules" (24). 
Moreover he further, and more specifically, states that: - 
"Space law in its present codification tries to give rules for 
the behaviour of states in space in the form of generalised 
formula. Time and time again it becomes apparent how 
difficult it is to provide adequately phrased rules for, and to 
systemize in legal language, the extremely complicated subject 
matter created by the technological explorations in outer 
space and the resulting multitude of conflicting interest. 
22. B. CHENG, "On 
International Law: 
(1982), p. 211. 
23. Ibid. at p. 212. 
24. A. BUECKLING, 
Provisions of the 
p. 17-18,22. 
the Nature and Sources of International Law", 
Teaching and Practice, edited B. CHENG, Stevens 
"The Strategy of Semantics and the 'Mankind' 
Space Treaty", 7 Journal of Space Law, (1979), 
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Therefore, when in the search of compromise, generalised 
formulas are resolved to in order to accomrrodate such basic 
principles as the exploration and use of outer space ... "For the benefit and in the interests of all countries", "For peace- 
ful purposes ... "; "... without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality; " ... and in the interest of ... "pronnoting international co-operation and understanding"; with due regard 
to the corresponding interests of all other states parties to 
the Treaty, it becomes evident that the law is bound to go 
off course on the ocean of facts" (25). 
On this basis therefore it is apparent that the CCPUOS by way of its 
"soft" legislation produced by compromise, lack of definition and, moreover 
lc. ck of enforcement is allowing the way open for state practice to suborn 
its own international agreements and, conceivably, its negotiations. The 
effect of this may be to create a secondary system of rules based on that 
state practice and possibly giving rise to a system of customary inter- 
national law. While it may be argued that this always arises anyway 
because of treaty interpretation, the loose terminology used in certain 
treaties relating to outer space gives states greater opportunities to avoid 
their strict international obligations. 
The second aspect of the consensus process within the COPUOS that gives 
rise to state practice is the very fact that negotiations tend to be pro- 
tracted. One effect of this is that while the COFUOS is debating a 
technological function that might be subject to an international agreement, 
sometimes for many years, the technology to carry out that function will 
become available. Immediately therefore there might come into an 
operation a system of state practice which pre-empts the agreement and 
may in fact render the whole, or more likely, part of it defunct or 
superf luous. Mcre often than not however if such an event occurs the 
COPUOS will still proceed with discussions for the setting up of an 
international agreement on a multilateral basis. However there would 
appear to be a trend occurring that where states have the technology to 
25. Ibid. at p. 17. 
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carry out certain activities and those activities become subject to pro- 
tracted negotiations within the COPUOS, which may or may not restrict 
those activities in some way, they are entering into bilateral agreements 
with States. Thus, they may carry on with those activities in a way 
which is suitable to both themselves and the other party to the agree- 
ment. Normally the other state participating in the bilateral agreement 
will gain some benefit from entering such an agreement which they would 
not normally receive under a multilateral agreement. This type of dev- 
elopment of international space law is taking place particularly in the field 
of remote sensing from space where there appears to be a growing 
disillusionment with the ability of the United Nations and the COPUOS in 
particular to produce a multilateral agreement (26). By the successful 
negotiation of bilateral agreements it is possible to proceed incrementally 
towards the setting up of a coherent body of law by way of state practice 
which in turn may lead to the successful conclusion of a multilateral 
agreement (27). 
It is clear that with such a large number of states involved in the nego- 
tiations within COPUOS the negotiations are likely to be protracted since 
there are significant ideological differences between many of the states 
involved in the negotiations, particularly between East and West. With 
this regard states will take a stance that furthers their own sphere of 
influence or protects their own ideological position. Thus, for instance, 
with regard to remote sensing the U. S. A. adopts a free dissemination role 
whereas the U. S. S. R. wishes to prevent such an approach because of an 
ostensible threat to national sovereignty. Similarly with regard to direct 
satellite broadcasting the U. S. A. adopts a freedom to broadcast role 
26. S. P. KRAFFT, "In Search of a Legal Framework for the Remote 
Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space", 4 Boston College Inter- 
national and Comparative Low Review, (1981), p. 474. 
27. IBITT7 
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whereas the U. S. S. R. seeks a protectionist approach in order to prevent an 
undermining of its spheres of ideological influence. It is however clear 
that the approach of the U. S. S. R. to remote sensing, for instance, is only 
its formal ideological approach since it is apparent that it is willing to 
disseminate information to those who fall within its sphere of influence. 
By such an approach there tends to develop a dual system of law - one 
pertaining to the formal agreement negotiated within the COPUOS and one 
established by state practice. The overall effect of this within the 
COPUOS is that it tends to produce a politically charged atmosphere 
rendering efficient negotiation impossible. 
With the increase in the number of states within the COPUOS a third 
force has emerged on the outer space front - the under-developed nations. 
These states have in the past attempted to change existing law within the 
COPUOS by organising into power groups - such as the equatoral states in 
producing the Bogota Declaration. As individuals though their views must 
be consulted even though they have no or little interest in the develop- 
ment of outer space, bar the amount of aid it brings in developing their 
own states. The problem with these states is, according to Bueckling, 
that they are 
11... often unstable and subject to wavering political alle- 
giances. They guard their newly-formed sovereignty with 
extreme jealousy and are suspicious of any intrusion into what 
they perceive as rightfully theirs" (28). 
If that statement is an accurate reflection of these states then it is easy 
to understand that complex negotiations between a large number of states 
a proportion of which might be considered unstable or unduly jealous of 
their positions is unlikely to be as efficient as a small homogeneous body. 
The effect of such an approach is bound to lengthen negotiations and lead 
28. BUECKLING, (1979), p. 22. 
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to disillusionment, which can only lead to a breakdown of the law making 
function. 
With regard to remote sensing these states have taken a restricted data 
stance within the COPUOS, alongside Russia and France, and thus their 
position appears to fall into line with Bueckling's assessment of them 
above. However these states are clearly very poor and are desperate for 
foreign aid and, thus, several of them have entered into bilateral agree- 
ments with the United States to aid remote sensing of both themselves 
and other states in exchange for aid. Such states therefore contribute to 
a growth of state practice which is completely contrary to their formal 
negotiating position with the U. N. 
One further feature of the consensus system which gives rise. to protracted 
negotiations is the fact that a state may adopt a position that will tend 
to lengthen negotiations in order to prevent agreement. The reasoning 
behind such an attitude may occur if a state has not yet developed a 
particular technology, in which case it may wish to delay proceedings until 
it has developed its own technology. Such an attitude has been expressed 
of the peculiar position of France with regard to advancing the restricted 
data approach in -the remote sensing negotiations (29). 
It would appear therefore that the proceedings within the COPUOS have 
tended to promote the growth of state practice, which in its turn tends to 
subvert the negotiations within that body and to suborn the principles 
contained in the main space treaties - the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and 
the M oon Treaty of 1979. To some extent this lost point was inevitable, 
at least with regard to the Outer Space Treaty. The reason for this is 
that this treaty laid down a base for the legal order of the space environ- 
ment at a time when man was only just beginning his long adventure into 
29. KRAFFT, (1981), p. 468. 
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space and therefore it could not be foreseen what developments were 
likely to take place. It is perhaps harder to understand why the COPUOS 
has devoted so much time and energy in producing a second treaty, the 
Moon Treaty, on the basis of predicting what form man's exploration of 
the moon will take, particularly when such activity is likely to be decades 
away and more immediate problems, such as direct satellite broadcasting, 
are now a reality requiring regulation. 
This work has confined itself to five main areas in analysing the rise and 
the effect of the development (or potential development) of state prac- 
tice. These areas have been chosen on the basis that they tend to be 
considered the most controversial issues at this moment; though this should 
not be interpreted as stating that other areas of discussion in the COPUOS, 
for instance nuclear power sources in space, are irrelevant and incon- 
sequential. 
Undoubtedly the procedures within the COPUOS need some adjusting since 
it must begin to react more quickly to developments in space in order to 
produce a coherent system of law. Further it should confine itself to the 
more immediate questions rather than to act as fortune-teller in order to 
develop new agreements which may be considerably out of tune with state 
practice when the activity in question becomes feasible. Additionally, it 
must attempt to mould itself into a homogeneous unit so that rational, 
coherent legislation might be produced. Conversely the difficulties within 
the COPUOS and its sub-committee have been summed up by E. Galloway, 
when referring more particularly to the Legal Sub-Committee, as follows: 
"The conclusions which may be drawn from experience with 
negotiations on unresolved issues before the Legal Sub-Com- 
mittee are that (1) issues require different amounts of time 
to resolve; (2) when positions are taken on the basis of 
different political systems, the conflicting assumptions are 
more difficult to reconcile in an agreed text; (3) while it is 
more difficult to get agreement in a large committee, a 
difficulty that increases with size, the increise in the 
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"Committee's membership from 39 to 47 is not the basic 
cause of lack of consensus on the pending issues; (4) when 
divergent views are rooted in different political and cultural 
philosophies, lack of agreement cannot be blamed on the 
METHOD of reaching that agreement whether it is by 
unanimous voting, majority voting, or consensus. It is the 
SUBSTANCE of the goal that is at stake and not the par- 
liamentary mechanism by which the destination is to be 
reached" (30). 
It is unlikely that anything would be gained by adopting an approach other 
than the consensus system since it is all too apparent that a system of 
voting that went against one of the major space powers could put the 
legal development of space almost back to 1958 when the U. S. S. R. with- 
drew from the Ad Hoc Committee. Additionally it should be borne in 
mind that the COPUOS has had its successes, notably, the Agreement on 
the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of 
Objects Launched into Outer Space, April 22nd 1968 (31), the Convention 
on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, March 
29th 1972 (32); and the Convention of Registration of Objects Launched 
into Outer Space, January 14th 1975 (33), apart from the two major space 
treaties. However, if the COPUOS is to remain a dynamic force in the 
formulation of international space law, rather than to decline to a mere 
monitoring agency in the somewhat appropriate words of F. Morgenstern, 
when discussing international legislation generally: - 
There would seem to be a need for a much wider aware- 
ness of the need of coherence in international legislation if 
the international law of the future is not to be cluttered, 
like space, with the imperfect technology of the twentieth 
century" (34). 
30. E. GALLOWAY, "Consensus Decisionmaking by the United Nations 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space", 7 Journal of 
Space Law 1979, p. 11. 
31.151 U. S. T. 7570; T. I. A. S. 6599. 
32.24 U. S. T. 2389; T. I. A. S. 7762. 
33.28 U. S. T. 695; T. I. A. S. 8480. 
34. F. MORGENSTERN, "International Legislation at the Crossroads", 
British Yearbook of International Law (1978), p. 117. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
SOVEREIGNTY IN SPACE 
On October 4th 1957 the world's first man-made satellite was launched 
into space by the U. S. S. R., the second following a month later. These 
events opened a new age in transport and to the international lawyer a 
cornucopia of unanswered questions as to the legal status of space. John 
Cobb Cooper in his article "Flight - Space and Satellites" (1) considered 
that the three most immediate questions were, firstly, what is the legal 
status of those areas of flight-space used in the launching and eventual 
passage of the satellite; secondly, what is the legal status of the satellite 
itself; and thirdly, what international questions of the future control of 
such flights and flight-space must be answered? In fact a fourth persis- 
tent and more fundamental question emerged very quickly, that is, to 
what extent does national sovereignty extend into the atmosphere? 
International Law could provide no answer to the problem of where 
airspace ended and outer space began, though two principles emerged after 
the first launch, namely, that space was not subject to national approp- 
riation, and secondly, that outer space was free for exploration and use. 
Quite clearly these two principles were incompatible with the legal regime 
governing airspace and thus an artificial boundary would have to be fixed 
between the two regimes. Certain jurists of the day, particularly those in 
the West, were opposed to this and advocated an 'open skies' policy, 
1.7 International and Comparative Law Quart2E! )ý, (1958), p. 82. 
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"We therefore conclude that state sovereignty reaches quite 
as high as the state's interest could reach, the possibility of 
which ends at the uttermost limit of the atmosphere ... In 
principle the airspace belongs to the sovereign state territory, 
so the state has full sovereignty to an unlimited height, 
which sovereignty can only be abolished or restricted by 
treaty. " (6) 
The period of 1909-1919 was a time for states to establish air sovereignty 
over their territory, though certain states, more particularly the U. S. A., 
persisted in adopting the freedom of the skies policy. At the Inter- 
national Conference on the Regulation of Air Navigation, called for by the 
French, a treaty regulating the use of airspace very nearly gained recog- 
nition but this was not to be, and it was not until 1919 that international 
rules were developed (7). This was not to say that there was a complete 
lack of regulation and control since many states acted quickly and force- 
fully by adopting unilateral controls, either by legislation or decree, though 
in 1913 an agreement was reached between France and Germany which 
severely restricted flights between the two countries. Such unilateral 
decrees were enforced particularly vigorously by neutral states against 
belligerent aircraft during the 1914-1918 war (8). 
In 1919 during the Versailles Peace Conference the U. S. A. again called for 
a freedom of the skies policy but this was rejected with the adoption of 
the Paris Convention 1919, in which Article I stated that "every Power 
has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its terri- 
tory. " The U. S. A. however did not completely accept the convention, in 
that it criticised the adoption of such a principle and at the 1929 Inter- 
national Air Conference it continued to attempt to re-introduce the 
concept of freedom of the skies, this time with the backing of Britain, 
6. LYCKLAMA NIJEHOLT, Air Sovereignty, the Hague, (1910), p. 46. 
7. J. C. COOPER, "The International Air Navigation Conference, Paris 
1910", 19 Journal of Air Law and Commerce, (1952), pp. 127-143. 
8. J. C. COOPER, "State Sovereignty in Space: Developments 1910 to 
1914". Beitrdge Zurn Internationalem Luftrecht, F; stschrift fUr Alex 
Meyer Dusseldorf, (1954), p. 41. 
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Sweden and Holland, without success. It eventually abandoned the idea 
when severe competition thrust America into a protectionist role, though 
at the Chicago Convention 1944 the U. S. delegate explained that the U. S. 
believed that there should be a general system of rights for aircraft to 
travel. This policy was not adopted, and the principle remains, that 
"every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace 
above its territory. " (9) 
After the Second World War when rocket flight became a reality (cul- 
minating eventually in Sputnik 1) it was soon apparent that some limitation 
of sovereignty of airspace was required, and the question began to be 
asked, "what is airspace? ". John Cobb Cooper attempted to define 
airspace by talking in terms of "flight" and "flight-space". "Flight", he 
maintained, included "any movement through space of man-powered or 
man-controlled devices or instrumentalities (to be known as 'flight-instru- 
mentalities') such as balloons, dirigibles, airplanes, rockets, guided missiles 
or space-ships". ' He went on to define "flight-space" as "so much of 
universal space above and beyond the-surface of the earth as is now used 
or may hereafter be used as the area in which flight takes place" (10). 
Professor Cooper in attempting to avoid the term "airspace" appeared to 
give too broad a definition when he included spaceships in his explanation 
of "flight", since if this is read with "flight-space" it would tend to 
suggest that a right of sovereignty would exist in space itself - something 
which is certainly denied today. In fact Professor Cooper appears to have 
recognised this mistake since later he stated: - 
I am convinced that the term airspace, as used in the Paris 
Convention in 1919, was there meant to include only those 
parts of the atmosphere above the surface of the earth where 
gaseous air is sufficiently dense to support balloons and air- 
planes, the only types of aircraft then in existence. " (11) 
9. Chicago Convention 1944 Article 1 (CMD 8742). 
10. J. C. COOPER, "Air Law -A Field for Intern6tional Thinking, 
4 TransQort and Communication Review, (1951), pp. 1-7. 
11. J=. COOPER, "Flight Space and Satellites", International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly,. (1958), pp. 84 & 85. 
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Cooper believed that since the Chicago Convention 1944 contained no 
definition of airspace it followed the Paris Convention from which it was 
derived, and thus it dealt only with that part of the atmosphere that 
could support balloons and airplanes. He concluded from this that there 
was nothing to preclude a state from extending its sovereignty by inter- 
national agreement. Such a conclusion may be reached on the basis that 
whilst the act of delimitation itself is of necessity a unilateral municipal 
act, its validity with regard to other states is dependant on international 
law as contained in custom or treaty (12). So far no agreement has been 
concluded, and in the absence of any customary international rule there 
appears to be no basis for such an argument. Cooper was not the only 
writer who attempted to delimit space by reference to its nature. Dr. 
Bin Cheng also tried to distinguish between "airspace" and "outer space", 
as he termed the different parts, again without success since his definition 
that "airspace is space where air is normally to be found" was too vague 
to be of any value (13) since traces of air may be found hundreds if not 
thousands of miles from the earth. These attempts to determine airspace 
by virtue of its nature have been rejected out of hand by Goedhuis (14) 
since he believed that in its absolute sense it was unacceptable to restrict 
the rights of states to that degree. On the other hand it is quite absurd 
to allow sovereignty to be extended ad infiniturn, since this would create 
an unintelligible result because of the rotating and revolving nature of the 
earth. 
Intermingled with the problem of delimitation is also the problem of the 
legal status of space and at the beginning of the 1960's legal opinion 
began to come to the conclusion that the legal status of space would be 
12. Anglo Norwegian Fisheries Case; I. C. J. Reports, (1951). 
13. B. CHENG, "International Law and High Altitude Flight; Balloons, 
Rockets, and Man-made Satellites", 
-International- 
and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, (1957), pp. 487-505. 
14. D. GOEDHUIS, "The Changing Legal Regime of Air and Outer 
Space", International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1978), p. 582. 
- 20 - 
found not in its nature; instead the idea developed that if sovereign rights 
over space were prohibited then this would be more benefit to the world 
community (15) since it would allow for the free exploration and develop- 
ment of space. Certainly there is a degree of truth in this comment, 
though it could also be said that a state possesses rights of sovereignty 
not just because one has effective control, but also because of the right 
of sovereignty over the land below it. An analogy in favour of this 
argument can be seen in relation to the international law governing the 
continental shelf as contained in the Geneva Convention on the Continen- 
tal Shelf 1958. This convention grew out of unilateral declarations by a 
number of maritime states laying claim to exclusive jurisdiction or control 
over the resources of the continental shelf. The United States claim was 
officially stated as being: - 
11... almost as large as the area embraced in the Louisiana 
Purchase, which was 827,000 square miles, and almost twice 
as large as the original 13 colonies, which was 400,000 square 
miles. Along the Alaska coastline the shelf extends several 
hundred miles under the Bering Sea. On the eastern coast of 
the United States the width of the shelf varies 20 miles to 
250 miles, and along the Pacific coast it is from 1 to 50 
miles wide. " (16) 
Clearly, while such a claim bears little relationship to that of the claims 
of exclusive control over the territorial sea and while the United States 
originally only claimed rights of jurisdiction and control over the natural 
resources of the subsoil and seabed, the actual waters remaining being 
regarded as high seas, later claims by other states involved claims as to 
sovereignty and ownership over not only the subsoil and seabed but also 
over the seas themselves (17). 
Thus in the Grisbadarna Case the Permanent Court of Arbitration held 
15. GOEDHUIS, Ibid. at p. 582. 
16. Annual Report of the United States Secretary of the Interior 1945. 
17. D. W. GREIG, International Law, Butterworths, (1979), p. 159. 
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that when certain land was ceded to Sweden the radius of maritime 
territory constituting an inseparable appurtenance of this land territory 
must have automatically formed part of this cession. " (18) 
Similarly, in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, Judge McNair stated: - 
"International law does not say to a state: 'You are entitled 
to claim territorial waters if you want them'. No maritime 
state can refuse them. International low imposes upon a 
maritime state certain obligations and confers upon it certain 
rights arising out of sovereignty which it exercises over its 
maritime territory. " (19) 
Nowadays Article 11 of the Convention provides that the coastal state 
exercise "sovereign rights", though these are really in the nature of 
proprietary control since the Convention does contain certain reservations; 
thus, the rights of the coastal state "do not affect the legal status of the 
superadjacent waters as high seas, or that of the airspace above those 
waters". While states cannot possibly exercise effective control over such 
areas, nevertheless, they are classed as sovereign territory merely because 
"the shelf was a natural prolongation or continuation of the land domain 
and therefore appurtenant to territory over which the coastal state already 
had dominion" (20). Clearly once sovereignty over land is established, e. g. 
by a continuous exercise of effective control and authority (21), then 
sovereignty over the airspace, as well as the territorial sea is auto- 
matically established by virtue of Article I of the Geneval Convention on 
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone which states: - 
"The sovereignty of a state extends, beyond its land territory 
and its internal waters, to a belt of sea adjacent to its 
coast, described as the territorial sec. " 
It would appear therefore that a state does not possess sovereignty over 
the air or territorial sea merely because it has effective control over them 
18. Norway v Sweden; Hague Court Reports, (1909), p. 121. 
19. I. C. J. Reports, (1951), p. 116. 
20. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, I. C. J. Reports (1969), pp. 30- 
31. 
21. Island of Palmas Arbitration, 22 American Journal of International 
Law, (1928), pp. 875-876. 
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but because they are attached to sovereignty over territory. Quite clearly 
if this were not the case the smaller less powerful states could not 
possess any sovereign rights in the air, or on the sea, at all (22). The 
corollary to this view is that the more powerful states could extend their 
degree of control over the high seas and into airspace where they do not 
necessarily have sovereign rights (23). Additionally military and strategic 
considerations mean that airspace and the high seas could be regulated 
outside the area of sovereignty, thus the U. S. A. restricts the use of 
aircraft 1,000 miles out to sea, and during the nuclear tests at Bikini 
asserted temporary control over 400,000 square miles of ocean surrounding 
the attoll (24). An attempt to impose a non-sovereignty rule over space 
because that is for the benefit of the world community would, in the light 
of the above, hit the difficulty that nations could possess sovereignty as 
of right and are merely unable to control that right. The theory also 
transgresses that old problem of the freedom of the skies -a concept 
that one of the more powerful nations, the U. S. S. R., will not accept. 
There is a further analogy that can be drawn from the other peculiar 
entity in international low - Antarctica, where with the adoption of the 
Antarctica Treaty 1959, all claims to sovereignty were held in abeyance. 
The result of this has been to increase co-operation between nations in an 
environment so harsh that co-operation is a matter of life and death. 
Certainly this system works well in Antarctica but u nlike space it poses 
no immediate military threat (25). Although the Outer Space Treaty 
attempted to provide a similar solution to space this has not been suc- 
cessful, primarily because of strategic considerations. 
22. J. C. COOPER, "High Altitude Flight and National Sovereignty", 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, (1951), p. 417. 
23. L. J. BOUCHEZ, "The Concept of Effectiveness as Applied to Territ- 
orial Sovereignty Over Sea Areas, Airspace and Outer Space", 
Netherlands International Law Review, (1962), pp. 151-82. 
24. BOUCHEZ, Ibid. pp. 171-4. Also "National SovJeignty of Outer 
Space", 74 Harvard Law Review, (1961), p. 1162. 
25. J. HANESSAN, "Antarctica: Current National Interests & Legal 
Realities", American Society of International Law, (1958), p. 148. 
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The fundamental difficulty seems to be the elimination of any possible 
claims to sovereignty whilst providing some other basis on which action 
can be taken on the premise of sovereignty. This new basis must allow 
for the protection of the interests of defence and security, since while 
many states recognise international interests in space and its exploration 
they will not forfeit their security measures for those principles. It was 
to achieve this aim of eliminating the sovereignty problem and yet 
providing some rights in space that the Russian writer Galina ennunciated 
the "national security" criterion (26). This was also ennunciated in 
another article published in the Soviet Yearbook of International Law by 
Kovalev and Cheprov as follows: - 
in our opinion, the states, in deciding ... the limit of their sovereign rights, will base themselves on the need to 
guarantee their security ... should a state find it necessary in the interests of security to extend its sovereignty beyond the 
limits of the airspace or the atmosphere it would be autho- 
rised in doing so. " (27) 
Quite clearly this would be tantamount to an unacceptable extension of 
national sovereignty, though in fact the writers deny this and state that to 
allow a state to extend its defensive area ad infiniturn would be contrary 
not only to the spirit of the freedom of the use of space, but would also 
be a disregard of basic astronomical factors regarding the rotational and 
revolving nature of the Earth and the surrounding universe. Certainly the 
view of Kovalev and Cheprov has in the past been upheld by other 
Russians, primarily Osnitskaya (28) and Zadorozhnyi (29). This theory was 
soon largely discounted in favour of the need for a treaty which not only 
26. A. (GALINA) OSNITSKAYA, "On the Question of Interplanetary 
Law", Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Provo, (1958), pp. 52-58. 
27. N. KOVALEV and I. I. CHEPROV, "Artificial Satellites and Inter- 
national Law", Soviet Yearbook of International Law, (1958), pp. 147- 
148. 
28. A. (GALINA) OSNITSKAYA, "International Law Problems of the 
Conquest of Space", Soviet Yearbook of International Law, (1959), 
pp. 65-71. 
29. G. P. ZADOROZHNYI, "The Artificial Satellite & International Law", 
Sovietskaya Rossiya, October 17th, 1957, pp. 1-2. 
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prohibited the establishment of sovereignty in space, but also protected 
the defensive needs of states by prohibiting certain activities (30). This 
treaty has been forthcoming to some extent in the form of the Outer 
Space Treaty of 1967, yet still the question of sovereignty remains to be 
solved since, even though Article I states that outer space shall be free 
for the exploration and use of all states (31), it gives no definition of 
outer space. It is clear then that where only a few states possess the 
ability to make use of space an oligopolistic situation could arise unless a 
definite delimitation of airspace and outer space is provided for. Thus on 
January 11th 1977 at the World Administrative Radio Conference for the 
Planning of the Broadcasting Satellite Service held in Geneva, the Colum- 
bian delegate stated: - 
"There is no definition of outer space that is valid and 
satisfactory for the international community such as might be 
cited to support the argument that the geostationary orbit 
(32) is included in outer space. Therefore it is imperative to 
arrive at a legal definition of outer space, since to apply the 
1967 treaty without one would merely ratify the presence of 
the states that are already using the geostationary orbit ... (33). 
Certainly there are many reasons why the international community has not 
provided or agreed on the criterion for the delimitati on of outer space, 
though the Legal S ub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space has now been given the task of solving the problem. This 
task has received new urgency with the growth of importance of the 
30. G. ZHUKOV "Conquest of Outer Space and Some Problems of 
International Relations", International Affairs, (1959), pp. 88-96. 
31. Article I Outer Space Treaty 1967 3. U. S. T. 2410, T. I. A. S. No. 6347. 
32. "Geostationary orbit" is the term given to a satellite which orbits 
the Earth at a height of 35,800 kilometres above the equator. At 
this height the satellite orbits the Earth once every 24 hours and is 
thus synchronised with the rotation of the planet below, appearing 
to 'hang' above it. This corridor can only hold a limited number of 
satellites (estimates vary from 180 to 1800) and is thus regarded as 
a limited resource which smaller third world countries lying 
below fear may become monopolised by the powerful 'space states'. 
COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION PROSPECTUS 
(1964), pp. 9-10. 
33. International Telecommunication Union Broadcasting Satellite Con- 
ference, Geneva 1977, Document No. 81. 
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geostationary orbit. Many proposals have been suggested in order to 
provide a solution but all have failed. These proposals have been divided 
in their approach - the vast majority attempting to provide a spatial 
solution, the others a functional approach. The different theories which 
have been advocated show up the strenuous efforts that have been made 
to delimit space, especially since those states lying beneath the line of 
geostationary orbit, even though not possessing space travel capability, are 
laying claim to this limited resource. 
THE SPATIAL THEORIES ON THE DELIMITATION OF SPACE 
Lubos Perek, Head of the Outer Space Affairs Division of the United 
Nations Secretariat, in his article entitled "Scientific Criteria for the 
Delimitation of Outer Space" (34), stated that outer space is a "three 
dimensional continuum" which could be "bounded by (a) one, (b) two, or (c) 
more than two simply connected surfaces". He maintained that in (a) the 
limiting surface would be a boundary close to the earth which would 
divide airspace from outer space. The second case (b) would not only 
have a "near" boundary but also a for limit. He gives no terms for this 
outer boundary, nor is it defined, but it could perhaps be explained by the 
International Telecommunication Union Radio Regulations which also uses 
such a far limit called "deep space", and which is defined as distances 
from the earth equal to or at a greater distance than the distance 
between the earth and the moon (35). The third category he main- 
tained would be used if it was necessary to delimit a specific body in 
space, e. g. to provide a contiguous zone for the moon, thus separating the 
moon from its surrounding space. 
34.7 Journal of Space Law, (1977), p. 113. 
Talt 35. A istrative Reguations (Radio Regulations),. annexed to the 
International Telecommunication Convention 1973. 
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In discussing the spatial theories on the delimitation of space the most 
relevant part of Perek's zones is (a) though in relation to geostationary 
orbit, which in recent years has tended to complicate the question of 
sovereignty, case (b) has also become an important issue in discussions in 
the Legal Sub-Committee of the United Nations Committee on the Peace- 
ful Uses of Outer Space. 
The spatial theories put forward as being possible solutions to the delimi- 
tation may be grouped into three broad areas - limits based on gravity, 
limits based on atmospheric properties, and limits based on the lowest 
perigees of orbiting satellites. 
A. LIMITS ON SPACE BASED ON GRAVITY 
1. The Gravitation Theory 
In 1753 Kroell in "Elements Createurs d'un Astronornique" (36) and later 
Rinck (37) proposed that the outer limit of sovereignty in space should be 
linked with the outer limit of the earth's gravitational field. Rinck put 
this distance at approximately one and a half million kilometres, even 
though at the time he discussed this theory there was no possible way in 
which this could be measured with any accuracy, indeed there was no, 
method even by which a satellite could be pinpointed, thus making a 
nonsense of his further statement that a state was not bound to accept 
the passage of a satellite through its area of sovereignty. Rinck's theory 
has been also discounted on the ground that the Moon itself would have 
penetrated his suggested sovereign area, thus precluding any attempt to 
inhabit the Moon. 
36. Revue G&n6rale de I'Air, (1953), pp. 222-233. 
37. "Recht im Weltraum", Zeitschrift fUr Luftrecht und Weltraum- 
rechtsfragen, (1960), pp. 191-208, as cited in Space Law by Gyula 
Gal, -Sijthof f -Leyden, (1969), p. 71. 
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Kroell's theory, which is more widely recognised, was based on the idea 
that sovereignty should extend to the point where the earth's gravitational 
field is balanced by the gravitational field of another celestial body. 
Professor Cooper was one of the first to initially accept this theory, 
basing his boundary on the point where a missile leaves the gravitational 
field of the sun - an altitude of some 160,000 kilometres (38). 
The theories of both Kroell and Rinck are generally rejected out of hand 
today for several reasons. Firstly, the distances referred to are so large 
that it renders any accurate pinpointing of the extent of sovereignty 
impossible because again of the rotating nature of the earth below. 
Secondly, the theories suppose that gravity exists in a uniform spherical 
shape corresponding to the curved surface of the earth. This is not so. 
Gravity is not uniform, and indeed fluctuates in relation to solar flare 
activity. Finally, the gravitational influences of various celestial bodies on 
the gravity of the earth would produce highly complex changes in the 
extent and direction of that gravity, and anyway, it would appear that the 
earth's gravity coupled with the sun's could extend many millions of 
kilometres into space (39). The theory as propounded by Professor Cooper, 
in that the boundary lies where a satellite leaves the gravitational pull of 
the earth, has also been rejected since such a boundary would vary with 
the velocity of the rocket (40). 
2. The Karman Primary Jurisdiction Line 
This theory has mainly gained its recognition because of the work of A. 
G. Haley, who adapted it from the basic technical idea of Theodor Von 
Karman. Haley maintained that the upper limit of air sovereignty would 
not be found by looking at the geophysical or aero-dynamic properties of 
38. J. C. COOPER, "High Altitude Flight and National Sovereignty" 
International & Comparative Law QuarterIX, (1951), pp. 411-416. 
39.0. SCHACHTER, "Who Owns the Universe? ", 
-Space 
Law, (1759), 
P. 16. 
40. SCHACHTER, Ibid. 
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the earth in isolation. To find the true boundary line one had to 
11... consider that the conditions for accomplishing aerial 
flight, that is to circle at constant altitude, are: weight 
equals aerodynamic lift plus centrifugal force. The aero- 
dynamic lift decreases with altitude because of the decreasing 
density of the air and in order to maintain continued flight 
beyond zero air lift, centrifugal force must take over ... It 
will be noted that in the corridor of continuous flight when an 
object reaches 275,000 feet and is travelling at 25,000 feet 
per second the Kepler force takes over and aerodynamic lift 
is gone. This is a critical jurisdictional boundary. " (41) 
Although Haley's theory appears to be an improvement on the aerodynamic 
theory (see below) it has not been adopted as providing an unequivocal 
line, indeed, there are misgivings as to its consistency since the velocity 
figures given -by Haley took into account the materials of the day and 
their inability to withstand frictional heat caused by travelling in excess of 
25,000 feet per second, and thus with the development of improved cooling 
methods and heat resisting materials velocities could be. pushed well beyond 
the 30,000 feet per second mark, where the frictional heat could exceed 
2,000'F, with a corresponding shift in the jurisdictional boundary line. 
Even if one could suppose that the technical criteria remains the same 
there could well be a movement of the line due to the differing charac- 
teristics of the object to be launched, thus necessitating a new calculation 
every time an object with a differing configuration is launched (42). ' 
Haley's theory also possesses a further flaw as was shown in his conflict 
with P. W. Quigg, who in his paper "Open Sky and Open Space" (43), stated 
that the Karman line could not provide a dividing point between an air 
breathing and rocket powered aircraft, as alleged by Haley, since certain 
hybrid types of aircraft such as the X15 (the forerunner of the U2 and 
latterley the 'Blackbird', an advanced reconnaissance aircraft) make use of 
41. A. G. HALEY, "Space Age Presents Immediate Legal Problems", First 
Colloquiurn on the Law of Outer Space, (1958), pp. 4 & 5. 
42. F. N. KOVALEV and I. I. CHEPROV, "On the Road Towards a Cosmic 
Law" Moscow, (1962), p. 42. 
43. P. W. QUIGG, "Open Sky and Open Space", Foreign Affairs, (1958), 
p. 95-106. 
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the lifting power of the air in the initial stages of flight but then continue 
to rise with the use of rockets to the height of the perigree of satellites 
i. e. approximately 320,000 feet. Haley however rejected that there was 
any conflict at all since he maintained that just because such craft had 
controls that could help them make use of air they could not be regarded 
as aircraft because of the way they relied on rockets for lift, an argument 
that does little to enhance his theory and which is generally regarded as 
being unacceptable. 
B. LIMITS BASED ON ATMOSPHERIC PROPERTIES 
The different theories which attempt to provide an adequate demarcation 
point for the division between airspace and outer space are really splinters 
from a much larger theory, known amongst its protagonists as the "airspace 
theory". The theory maintains that the distinction between airspace and 
outer space is the atmosphere itself. It is maintained that such a theory 
is justified because it can rely on international customary air law as 
recognised in international treaties and national laws for a meaning. 
Whether or not this is the case is a matter for speculation and discussion 
but certainly such writers as Bin Cheng and Eugene Pepin seem to support 
the basic concept of the theory (44). Further it is possible to rely on the 
Permanent Court of International Justice decision in the Legal Status of 
Eastern Greenland Case 1933 (45) to provide a solution. It was stated in 
this case that "the natural meaning of the term 'Greenland' was its 
geographical meaning". This decision has been extended and applied in the 
44. B. CHENG, "The Right to Fly", Grotius Society, (1956) p. 100 and 
Recent Developments in Air Low", Current Legal Problems, (1956), 
p. 210; E. PEPIN, Symposium, as cited by N. M. MATTE, -Aerospace Law, Sweet and Maxwell, (1969), p. 22. 
45.3 World Court Reports (1938), p. 171; P. C. I. J. Rep., Series A/B, 
No. 53, (1933). 
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Chicago Convention (the principle is also embodied in the Paris Convention) 
and thus when the treaty talks of airspace it is taken to mean that 
national sovereignty extends to the limit of airspace in its geographical 
meaning. It is upon this lost term that there is a divergence of opinion as 
to its meaning thus creating the differing sub-theories. 
1. The Atmosphere Theory 
This theory on the demarcation of space is largely derived from Article I 
of the Paris Convention which spoke in its French version of 'espace 
atmospherique", meaning that airspace is the same as the entire atmos- 
phere and therefore implying that space begins at the outer limit of 
terrestial atmosphere. It would seem then that the Paris Convention had 
unwittingly provided a definition of the limit of airspace and outer space. 
However this is not the case for two reasons; firstly, the term "espace 
atmospherique" was not translated into the English as "atmospheric space" 
but as "air space", thus giving an entirely different interpretation of the 
original term. This interpretation/translation error was further compounded 
in the Chicago Convention when the term "air space" was not re-translated 
to "espace atmospherique" but to "espace aerien" (46); secondly, the 
determination of the demarcation line according to the extent of the 
atmosphere does not provide as exact a definition as may be supposed 
since it would depend on what part of the atmosphere one uses. Thus the 
troposphere extends from sea level to approximately 10 kilometres, the 
stratosphere from 10 kilometres to approximately 375 kilometres, and 
finally, the exosphere from 375 kilometres to approximately 20,000 or more 
(47). With the distance involved in the latter two layers of the atmos- 
phere it is clear that such an extension of national sovereignty is unac- 
ceptable, although certain authors such as A. Meyer and V. Mandl consider 
46. CHENG, (1956), p. 213. 
47. G. GAL.. "Airspace and Outer Space", Symposium (1961), P. 1148. 
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that such an application of the theory has some credence, thus: 
"The acceptance by international law of sovereignty only 
included the zone of air, the atmosphere. There was no 
reason or intention to give the states rights going further 
upwards than that. Where airspace ends, there the territorial 
sovereignty - recognised by the states by way of treaties and 
constant practice - also ends. " (48) 
Similarly: - 
the concept of airspace cannot mean anything else but the 
space filled with air layers, without any further limitation. 
The idea that the term airspace should be limited to the area 
where air is so dense that it enables the airplanes, i. e. 
instruments relying on the properties of air, to remain aloft, 
seems unfounded: the space filled with thin air is also part of 
the airspace. " (49) 
These two views are not isolated by any means and D. Goedhuis, Bin 
Cheng, and E. Pepin have also stated that the theory could exist in an 
extreme form, justifying such views by the Eastern Greenland Case which, 
as we have already seen, appears to provide them with the authority to 
apply a geographical 'natural' meaning to the term 'airspace'. Thus Bin 
Cheng states: - 
"Airspace is the entire space where air is to be found under 
any form. This is identical with the atmosphere in its 
broadest meaning, including all its layers, irrespective of 
whether it is sufficiently dense to carry aircraft. " (50) 
Apart from the somewhat extreme notion of the extent of national sov- 
ereignty that this theory carries it also has intrinsic difficulties. If it is 
decided that national soveriegnty extends to the limit of the earth's 
atmosphere, it must be decided just where that point lies and in order to 
do that one must presumably rely on a geophysicist to calculate the 
48. V. MANDL, Das Weltraurnrecht, Mannheim & Leipzig, (1935), p. 31 as 
cited by GAL, (1969), ý_-14- 
U 49. A. MEYER, Die Staatshoheit im Luftraurn und die Entwicklungen im 
Weltraum", Zeitschrift fUr Luftrecht und Weltraurnrechts-fragen, 
(1965), p. 27 (as cited by G. Got, lbid). 
50. B. CHENG, "Recent Developments in Air Low", Current Legal 
Problems, (1956), pp. 210-213. GOEDHUIS, (1978), p. 582, though note 
that ; Wh-ilst he considered such a limit feasible given technological 
developments he thought such a limit probably absurd in its appli- 
cation and unduly restricted the rights of states. See above at 
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distance. Unfortunately the geophysicists themselves cannot agree on the 
extent of the exosphere, some putting it as low as 600 kilometres and 
others as high as 60,000 kilometres; indeed modern opinion is that particles 
of the atmosphere could extend to as far as 70,000 or even 100,000 
kilometres. Perhaps it would be easier to appreciate the difficulties 
involved if it is considered that at 100 kilometres above the surfaceof the 
earth the air is one-millionth the density of that at sea level (51). The 
difficulties do not stop there since it has been shown that the levels of 
the various layers may be subject to variation; thus the troposphere can 
increase or decrease according to the weather, and in fact there are 
geographical differences - extending from sea level to 10 kilometres above 
the poles but extending to 17 kilometres above the equator. Similar 
variations also occur within the ionosphere during periods of solar flare. It 
is therefore somewhat unrealistic to attempt to provide a 'natural' solution 
to define the extent of the atmosphere as is suggested by the Eastern 
Greenland Case, since not even natural science can provide an answer. 
Apart from the scientific criticisms there are also legal mis-givings over 
this theory since it can be said that the very conventions that gave rise to 
this theory (i. e. the Paris and Chicago Conventions) could also be used to 
disclaim it. The reasoning behind this is that neither convention actually 
defined the term 'airspace', and also the drafters never conceived that man 
would penetrate the upper reaches of the atmosphere. Thus to take 
Article 1 of the Paris Convention 1919 as defining the limit of outer space 
must be regarded as not only fallacious but also erroneous. 
The atmosphere theory then cannot in its present form be considered as a 
means of delimiting the extent of national sovereignty in space since it 
quite clearly possesses too many intrinsic contradictions to be realistic. 
51. E. NAGY, The Future of Space Flight, Budappst (1962), pp. 44- 
48. 
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This does not mean however that it should be completely discounted and 
some writers, such as C. W. Jenks suggest that the troposphere and 
stratosphere should be treated as airspace and everything else as outer 
space (52). Similarly, the Russian writer V. I. Lisovsky states: - 
"The sovereignty of a state extends to the stratosphere (that 
is the stratum of air from 11 to 75 kilometres from sea 
level) over its territory because at the present level of 
technique of aviation not only peaceful flights may be per- 
formed in the stratosphere, but also military operations. 
Consequently, the state must have the right to regulate the 
traffic of foreign aircraft also in this stratum of air". (53) 
The all important rider to this statement of Lisovsky's is contained in the 
words, "... at the present level of technique of aviation presumably 
today then he would be in favour of extending national sovereignty into the 
exosphere since this area has now become the level at which military 
activities take place. 
2. The Aerodynamic Theory 
As already mentioned the higher one goes the less dense the air becomes, 
density being measured by the number of molecules of air present in a 
given volume. Every molecule of air adds to the lift produced by the wing 
(or aerofoil) of an aircraft, which is achieved by the flow of air over the 
aerofoil surfaces. The upper half of the aerofoil is curved and is called 
the "camber", and the bottom half is generally flat; the whole cross- 
section thus resembling a half tear in shape. As the aerofoil travels 
through the air, the air is cut in half, one half passing over the camber 
the other passing underneath, both meeting again at the trailing edge of 
the aerofoil. Clearly because the curved upper side of the aerofoil is 
longer than the underside a parcel of air moving over it must move faster 
in order to reach the parcel of air that moved in the most direct way 
under the aerofoil. Bernoilli's theory of physics states that the faster a 
53. V. I. LISOVSKY, Mezhdunarodnoye Pravo, Moscow, (1961), p. 196. 
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fluid (or air) travels, the lower will be the pressure surrounding it, thus the 
air moving over the comber has a lower pressure than that under the 
aerofoil. Since air tends to move from high to low pressure, the high 
pressure under the aerofoil attempts to move towards the low pressure 
area above the camber. Thus, because the air cannot move through the 
aerofoil it tends to push it up, creating lift. The more molecules of air 
passing the aerofoil the more lift that is generated. The result of this is 
that as the altitude is increased the degree of lift decreases until ulti- 
mately the air is too thin to support the aircraft (54). 0. Schacter, in 
referring to this principle of flight, thought that it could be used to 
provide a definition of airspace - that is airspace ends where the air is too 
thin to provide flight (55). The supporters of this aerodynamic theory 
point out that the Chicago Convention talks of aircraft as being "all 
machines which can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of 
the air", and then attempt to use the converse of this to the effect that 
anything which flies without the support of the atmosphere, e. g. rockets, 
must be above the territorial sovereignty of the country over which they 
f ly: - 
"The outer space begins where ceases the possibility to fly, 
for the propelled and jet planes derive support in the atmos- 
phere from the reaction of the air. " (56 ) 
Other writers reject this idea pointing out that just because the Paris and 
Chicago Conventions give a definition of aircraft that does not necessarily 
give a definition of airspace and outer space. They state that both 
conventions had nothing whatsoever to do with the legal status of space, 
54. JOSEPH W. BENKERT, Introduction to Aerodynamic Science, 
Prentice-Hall, (1971), p. 7. - 
55.0. SCHACTER, "Legal Aspects of Space Travel", Journal of the 
British Interplanetary Society, (1952), p. 14. 
56. TAI--. -DWIRNOFF, "The Real Possibilities and the Main Principles of a 
Future International Convention on Outer Space", Second Colloquiu 
on the Law of Outer Space (1959), p. 324. 
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and thus any attempt to derive such a conclusion is therefore erroneous 
(57). Additionally, it would seem that if such a boundary were to be 
adopted then it would be set at a height of only some 30 kilometres - 
far too low for practical purposes, since as aircraft develop they will 
attempt to gain as much height as possible in order to reduce drag, so 
saving on fuel costs and increasing the speed of aircraft. Thus the future 
commercial aircraft may fly at speeds of 6000 milometres per hour at 
heights of 100 kilometres, thus putting them in space itself and above the 
sovereign jurisdiction of underlying states; a situation that is unlikely to be 
tolerated from a security and traffic control standpoint. 
C. THE DELIMITATION OF SPACE BASED ON THE LOWEST POSSIBLE 
PERIGEES OF SATELLITES 
It is probable that J. C. Cooper was the first to suggest this method of 
delimiting outer space from airspace, proposing that the boundary should be 
set at a height of 160 kilometres (58). R. Jostrow thought that outer 
space must be defined as the region traversed by vehicles which have been 
placed in orbit round the earth, or which have escaped the gravitational 
attraction of the earth (59). V. Kopal thought that the lowest perigee of 
satellites may be lower than 160 kilometres (60), and in later years he was 
proved to be correct since Skynet 2-A is listed in the Table of Earth 
Satellites as having a perigee of 96 kilometres - though this seems excep- 
tional and could be inaccurate (61). Nevertheless, perigees of 105 kilo- 
metres seem to be quite possible, and it would appear that if this method 
was used a boundary of between 90 and 100 kilometres would be the 
correct delimiting line since a working party of the Committee on Space 
57. E. KOROVIN, "International Status of Cosmic Space", International 
Affairs, (1959), p. 54. 
58. MATTE, (1? 69), p. 31. 
59. R. JASTROW, "Definition of Air Space", First Colloquium on the Low 
of Outer Space, (1958), p. 82. 
60. V. KOPAL, Tenth Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, (1967), 
p. 275 as cited in L. PEREK, "Scientific Criteria for the Delimitation 
of Outer Space", 5 Journal of Space Law, (1977), p. 121. 
61. Table of Earth Satellites 1? 74-1975. 
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Research found that satellites of the "usual" construction cannot survive 
for any appreciable length of time at 90 kilometres or lower (62). This 
criteria for delimiting space is clearly not new since another writer C. G. 
Fenwick in 1958 maintained that satellites did not violate international low 
provided they stay in orbit and retained their altitude (63). Although 90 
kilometres seems to be the limit that a satellite can descend to without 
re-entering the atmosphere and burning up, studies by the Committee on 
Space Research (COSPAR) suggest that a satellite could descend to as low 
as 79' kilometres. COSPAR's data was gained by photographing the re- 
entry of meteorites which usually travel at higher velocities and enter at 
steeper angles than ordinary satellites, and thus burn up within a few 
seconds of re-entry. COSPAR photographed two meteors, the first being 
20 tons in weight which began to glow at 98 kilometres, and the second 
being 500 kilograms began to glow at 86 kilometres. COSPAR calculated 
that if a meteor travelled at the normal re-entry speed of artificial 
satellites, i. e. 10 kilometres per second, then they would only begin to glow 
at 70 milometres. This does not mean however than an artificial satellite 
could survive an orbit at this height since there are high temperatures 
experienced even before an object begins to glow, and which would do 
irreparable damage to a satellite not designed to withstand the stresses of 
re-entry. 
It would appear that a delimitation of outer space based on the lowest 
perigee of satellites offers the best opportunity out of all the spatial or 
geophysical methods of delimiting space, since it has the advantage of 
relying on physical concepts that are inevitable. Unfortunately, even 
though scientists know that orbital decay occurs in the area between 90 
and 100 kilometres, this point of inevitability is not specific enough for 
62. U. N. Doc A/AC 1051164 (1976). 
63. C. G. FENWICK., "How High is the Sky? " Arrierican Journal of 
International Law, (1958), p. 98. 
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some international lawyers, whilst others maintain that this theory is 
already accepted as part of customary international law (64). Clearly 
agreement will have to be reached as to the limit of the lowest possible 
orbit and then delimit airspace and outer space by laying down a sub- 
orbital boundary. This criterion is clearly supported by the International 
Astronautical Federation which in 1960 come to an informal understanding 
that any craft exceeding 100 kilometres is to be classified as a spacecraft 
(65). 
It is the dissatisf action with these theories that has led to a questioning of 
the ability of science to provide a reliable criterion on which to base an 
international agreement on the delimitation of space. According to N. M. 
Matte (66) factors such as Einstein's theory of relativity and spherical 
trigonometry are so complex that any accurate calculations is well nigh 
impossible. Matte states that: - 
"Astronomy has succeeded in establishing spatial distances by 
taking as guidelines various celestial bodies and their move- 
ment, but the calculation is not done in the same way as on 
an even surface ... The notions of time and distance are not 
the same as on earth. Furthermore, science itself has not 
settled these concepts of mathematics and spatial geography. " 
(67) 
Other writers dispute the arguments of Matte and point out that spherical 
geography is used daily in maritime and air navigation, and that its 
calculations are certain and unequivocal, and that Einstein's theory of 
relativity has no influence on the measurement of the vertical height of 
sovereignty (68). 
Perek.. in his detailed examination on the boundary question in 1976 (69) 
64. P. M. SONTAG, "Der Weltraum in der Raumordnung das V61kerrechts", 
1966 in Gal, (1966), p. 86. 
65. International Astronautical Federation Congress, October 1960. 
66. MATTE, (1969), p. 51. 
67. Ibid at p. 49. 
68. L. PEREK, "Scientific Criteria for the Delimitation of Outer Space", 
Journal of Seace Low, (1977), pp. 111-123. 
69. L. P-EREK, "Remarks on Scientific Criteria for the Delimitation of 
Outer Space", Proceedings of the 19th Colloquiurn on the Inter- 
national Low ot Outer Spa-c-e-, TT9-77), p. 18-5. Also lbid at p. 111. 
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concluded that a definition based on the lowest perigees of earth satellites 
had the soundest scientific basis in that it was based on physical concepts 
that were invariable. Further he thought that such a limit would meet 
"all the requirements for a practical and meaningful delimitation of outer 
space" (70). 
Further in 1978 G6rbiel supported the spatial approach on the ground that 
it was not possible to make a precise and satisfactory distinction between 
the use of the airspace and the use of outer space (71). Similarly 
Goedhuis has also concluded that "the problem of demarcation can only be 
solved on a conventional basis taking i nto account some scientific criteria" 
(72). 
Nevertheless Matte and others (73) have rejected the scientific theories of 
the delimitation of space in favour of what has become known as the 
functional theory of outer space/airspace delimitation; that is a boundary 
fixed not by physical criteria but by the type of use to which it is put. 
THE FUNCTIONAL THEORY OF SPACE LAW 
As its name suggests the functional theory provides different ruleý occor- 
ding to the functions of the flying instrumentality. This theory is nct new 
by any means and M. Lemoine was one of the first to advance this 
approach in 1947 when he stated that air law is: 
70. Ibid at p. 192. 
71. A. GORBIEL, "Remarques sur la Definition de I'Espace Extra- 
Atmospherique", Proceedings of the 211st Colloquium on the Inter- 
national Law of Outer Space, (1979), p. 89. 
72. D. GOEDHUIS, "Some Observations on the Problem of the Definition 
and for Delimitation of Outer Space", 2 Annals of Air and Spac 
Law, (1977), p. 308. 
73. M. S. McDOUGAL AND L. LIPSON, "Perspective for a Lcw of Outer 
Space", American Journal of International Law, (1958), pp. 407- 
431; J. MUCK], "Security oT-Nations and Cosmic Space", SymFosium 
(1961), pF. 1164-1203. 
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the field of low which determines and studies the legal 
norms that regulate the traffic and use of aircraft, as well as 
the relations which they bring about. " (74) 
Wilfred Jenks in "International Law and Activities in Space" (75) maintained 
that the United, Nations should exercise jurisdiction over space and asserted 
that space activities should not be subject to national sovereignty. Jenks' 
approach is however fraught with the same dangers as the spatial theories 
since there appears to be no boundary between air and space activities, 
i. e. at what point does one become the other? The idea that the United 
Nations should exercise jurisdiction over space is certainly a good one 
though it is unlikely to gain much force in the near future, since it would 
require the overturning of that basic principle of international law as 
contained in the Corfu Channel (Merits) Case, in which the International 
Court of Justice stated that, "respect for territorial sovereignty is an 
essential foundation of international relations" (76). It is however encour- 
aging for supporters of the functionalist approach that the principle does 
have an exception in cases of proved 'force majeure' (77). 
R. Quadri in 1959 produced another interpretation of the functionalist 
theory whereby he grouped air and space into an inseperable mass and 
stated that the theory restricts the activities of the underlying states 
rather than the activities of satellites over flying their territory (78). 
Professor C. Chaumont, also in 1959, presented an argument in favour of 
the functionalist theory, whereby he rejected out of hand any limitation 
based on scientific criteria, arguing that they do not satisfy practical 
needs. He stated, correctly in the view of N. Matte, that it. is for easier 
74. M. LEMOINE, Trait6 de Droit A6rien, Paris, (1947), p. 3. 
75. C. W. JENKS, "International Low and Activities in Space", Inter- 
national and Comparative Law Quarterly, (1956), pp. 99-114. 
76. International Court ot Justice (1949), p. 35. 
77. JENKS, (1965), p. 232. 
78. R. QUADRI, "Droit International Cosmique". Recueil Des Cours de 
(T_9U9_T_ L'Acadernie De Droit International a La Haye, 5. 
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for states to reach agreement as to the activities of states than to fix an 
artificial boundary (79). This would appear to be supported by Professor 
Peter Sand, who mentioned that the functionalist theory is also acceptable 
by the Soviet Union for security reasons (80). 
Out of the various theories advanced on functionalism the most realistic 
would seem to be that proposed by the Russians, as described by Peter 
Sand. This viewpoint would appear to state that national security must 
underlie any agreements entered into for the regulation of space. Before 
the space age as regards aircraft it was clear that they had to appear 
before they could constitute a danger to security. Nowadays, however, 
with the enormous speeds of some ballistic missiles, it is clear that 
retaliatory defensive action must take place well before it approaches the 
sovereign territory of the target state. This Russian outlook seems 
consistent with. the existing practices of states as regards conventional 
aircraft and ships. 
With regard to conventional aircraft it has already been seen that they are 
governed by the Paris and Chicago Conventions which provide that a 
commercial airline's right to operate in the airspace of a foreign state 
depends on a treaty granting such operating rights to the airline's flag, 
state. However neither of these treaties contain regulations which deal 
with the case of the civil aircraft that strays into foreign airspace, though 
Article 25 of the Chicago Convention applies to such aircraft in distress. 
The problem here can be divided into two: firstly, when the unauthorised 
flight takes the aircraft into the territory of a state that is a party to the 
convention, and, secondly, when the unauthorised flight takes the aircraft 
into the territory of a state not a party to the convention. In the first 
79. C. CHAUMONT, Prob16mes de Drolt International de L'Espace 
Extra-Atmosph6ri ue, from lectures given at the Institut des HEtutes 
EtuJ-es Internationn e, Paris 1959, p. 10; (Cited in Matte, (1969), 
p. 67). 
80. P. SAND, "Die Entwicklung der Luftfahrtrechts in der Sowjetunion" 
Ost Europa Recht, (1964), p. 176. 
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case the general practice was considered by the International Court of 
Justice in the Aerial Incident case (81) as being the duty of the state to 
indicate to the aircraft that it is performing an unauthorised act, and, 
without putting it in danger, should direct that it either bring the intrusion 
to an end or require it to land and submit itself for examination. In the 
second case however, it would seem that there is nothing to prevent the 
territorial state from doing as it wishes, though on purely humanitarian 
grounds there should be no distinction between the case of the territorial 
state a party to the convention and one which is not. 
The Aerial Incident Case (82) is a classic example of the tragedies that 
can occur because of the operation of the second situation above. In the 
case an Israeli airliner flying from London strayed from the flight path 
allocated to it between Greece and Yugoslavia, and entered Bulgarian 
airspace. Bulgaria, acting within its rights, sent military interceptor 
fighters to investigate the intrusion but which attacked and destroyed the 
airliner. Bulgaria, whilst admitting that they had acted too forcefully, 
denied responsibility for the incident which they alleged had arisen out of 
an illegal violation of their airspace. In the submissions of Israel, the 
United States, and the United Kingdom, who represented the individuals 
killed in the incident, to the International Court of Justice, it was alleged 
that the remedy for the violation of airspace by a civilian airliner could 
never be to shoot it down. In this case the International Court of Justice 
referred to the Corfu Channel Case where it had arrived at its conclusions 
upon "elementary considerations of humanity even more exacting in peace 
than in war" (83). In that case the court also referred to the Mexico- 
U. S. Claims Commission case of Garcia v U. S. (84), where it was said that 
81. Aerial Incident of 27th July 1955 (Israel v Bulgaria); I. C. J. Pleadings 
(1959), p. 5. 
82. Ibid. 
83. Ibid. 
84. GARCIA v U. S., 4 United Nations Reports of International Arbitral 
Awards (1928), p. 119. 
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an unauthorised incursion into the U. S. territory could not be met with 
force "unless the importance of preventing or repressing the delinquency by 
firing is in reasonable proportion to the danger arising from it to the lives 
of the culprits and other persons in their neighbourhood". 
The decision of the court in Aerial Incident case in any event proved 
unforthcoming since Bulgaria had not provided a declaration accepting the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the court under Article 36(5) of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice, and therefore this court was not com- 
petent to hear the claim. It is nevertheless possible to draw certain 
conclusions from the case since it would seem that the previous cases 
quoted indicated that there is no rule of international low that would 
sanction the immediate destruction of a civilian airliner that has made an 
unauthorised entry into the airspace of a foreign state (85). The practice 
should be it would seem either for the territorial state to request the 
aircraft to land for inspection or for it to be escorted away from its 
airspace. 
The position of military aircraft is clear in international law even though 
neither the Paris Convention 1919 nor the Chicago Convention 1944, or any 
other treaty for that matter, governs this situation. The rule seems to be 
that the use of force against an aircraft engaging in operations over or 
against a territorial state is legitimate, just as it is against a military 
aircraft which strays into foreign territory while it is engaged in operations 
near the border of that state. The legitimacy of such action has been 
seen a number of times, the most famous being the U2 Incident of 1960 
(86), when there was no question of the U. S. Government alleging that 
Russia was in breach of international law by shooting down a plane engaged 
85. D. W. GRIEG, International Law, Butterworths, (1970), p. 285. 
86. Discussed in "Legal Aspe-c-t-s o-f the U2 Incident", by Quincy Wright. 
American Journal of International Law, (1960), p. 8A. 
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in espionage activities. Quite clearly this incursion was a deliberate act, 
but what of the unarmed military aircraft which inadvertently strays into 
foreign airspace? An incident taking in this question arose in 1952 when 
an unarmed Swedish military aircraft was shot down over an area of the 
Baltic Sea alleged by Russia to be part of its airspace (87). Russia alleged 
that it had the right to insist that the aircraft land for investigation, and 
if it fails to do so it may be attacked. The Swedish view was that the 
territorial state has the right to "warn off" but not to demand that they 
land, thus following the British and American view, though one which is 
unlikely to be a rule of international law. Military aircraft are clearly 
apart from civilian aircraft and the rule seems to be that any request to 
land is merely a concession to humanity rather than to any binding inter- 
national obligation. 
It would seem that the above attitudes towards civil and military aircraft 
may easily lend itself to providing a functional solution to the problems of 
sovereignty in space though it would be unrealistic to assume that it could 
be adopted as a fait accomplis. One of the first problems that would be 
met in adapting the airspace rules is, how does one decide whether a 
satellite has a civilian function or a military function? Since the Outer 
Space Treaty 1967 prohibits the placing of nuclear weapons or other 
weapons of mass destruction in orbit on the Moon or other celestial bodies 
(88), it must be assumed that a state would not attempt to place such a 
satellite in space. Nevertheless it would be extremely difficult to differ- 
entiate between the status of, for instance, a survey satellite, which could 
be engaged on. bona fide scientific research, from a spy satellite, particu- 
larly if such a satellite is powered by solar panels rather than nuclear 
f uel. Any satellite carrying the amount of fuel required for an atomic 
87. Inter alia in the American Journal of International Low, (1953), p. 559. 
88. Outer Space Treaty 1967 Article IV. 
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weapon, with today's sophisticated telemetry systems would be instantly 
recognised as such and the launching state could expect initially a warning 
as being in breach of international low and then retaliatory action being 
taken, either against the satellite itself or in the threatened state taking 
reciprocal measures. Clearly the major powers do possess 'spy' satellites 
but no attempt has yet been made to attack these (though the capability 
is being developed) and in the absence of an agreed limit on the extent of 
national -sovereignty one can only assume the major powers have come to 
an implied reciprocal agreement not to interfere with one another's 
surveillence facilities in that it is lawful to engage in remote sensing from 
the sovereignty-free area of outer space. It would seem however that this 
implied agreement is likely to be formalised since on April 10th 1978 Mr. 
Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State for the United States, stated that nego- 
tiations were taking place with the U. S. S. R. for a limitation on the use of 
so-called 'killer' satellites (89). 
A second problem with the adaptation of the rules relating to territorial 
airspace to outer space, is that the only real argument against military 
action being taken against a civilian airliner which strays into the airspace 
of a state not party to the Chicago Convention is that of humanitarian 
reasons. However, since the vast majority of satellites are unmanned, this 
reason for not taking action against a functional infraction of airspace is 
untenable. In the case of manned spacecraft it would seem that the 
humanitarian argument might carry some weight. In the Aerial Incident 
case the applicant states referred to an international obligation of states 
to assist aircraft in distress, even though the aircraft in question was not 
in distress. This obligation is more formal with regard to outer space 
since the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astro- 
nauts and the Return of Objects Launched in Outer Space imposes such 
89. Cyrus Vance at the American Society of Newspaper Editors April 
10th 1978. See also C. Q. CHRISTOL, "The Modern International Law 
of Outer Space', Pergamon Press, (1982)-, -p. 732. 
- 45 - 
obligations on the parties contracting to the agreement (90). 
A third problem occurs with the adaptation of the functional character of 
airspace to the outer space environment, and that is "At what point can 
action be taken against a military satellite? ' In airspace any military 
aircraft that strays into the territorial airspace of a foreign power whether 
armed or unarmed can expect at best to be either guided away or forced 
to land for inspection, and at worst to be shot down. The territorial 
airspace of a country will extend over its national boundaries and its 
territorial sea (91), while conversely the airspace above the High Seas is 
not subject to the sovereignty of any state (92). Thus, as already seen 
while the U. S. A. did not contend that the destruction of the U2 was 
contrary to international law, since it was over the territorial airspace of 
the U. S. S. R., it did allege such a breach when one of its RB-47 recon- 
naisance aircraft was brought down when flying over the high seas (93). 
While it is useful to use the law relating to international rights in airspace 
as a model on which to base sovereignty limitations in space, it must be 
said at this point that the extent of territorial airspace is not a settled 
matter in relation to the extent of those rights contained therein. The 
reason for this uncertainty is the diverse claims as to the extent of 
sovereign rights over the territorial sea. The traditional three mile limit 
has been superseded by the expansion of a territorial sea of up to 200 
90. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts 
and the Return of Objects Launched in Outer Space 1968.19 U. S. T. 
7570; T. I. A. S. 6599. 
91. B. CHENG, The Low of International Air Transport, London-New 
York, (1962), p. 3. Also the Anglo--Porwegian Fisheries Case, I. C. J. 
(1951) and Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Con- 
tiguous Zone 1958 Article I; U. K. T. S. 3, (1965); Command 2511; 516 
U. N. T. S. 205. 
92. Ibid Article II. 
73. O. J. LISSITZYN, "Some Legal Implications of the U2 and RB- 
47 Incidents", American Journal of International Law, (1962), p. 135. 
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miles in some cases (94). In 1974 at the United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea, virtually all the states present agreed to the estab- 
lishment of a 12 mile territorial sea, which is now contained in Article 3 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (95). 
In addition to the areas of territorial sovereignty over the territorial sea 
(and thus territorial airspace) many states have in addition made claims to 
an "exclusive economic zone", which does not encompass territorial sov- 
ereignty but lays claim to sovereignty over certain resources such as 
marine life and minerals. Article 57 of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea 1982 imposed a 200 mile limit for this purpose (96). 
In addition to these contiguous zones both the United States and Canada 
have established air defence identification zones (i. e. ADIZ and CADIZ 
respectively) extending several hundred miles into the Pacific and Atlantic 
oceans., within which aircraft approaching Canada and the United States 
must identify themselves (97). It is the adaptation of this area of the law 
relating to airspace that would render itself more easily to outer space in 
that states would not possess any sovereign rights as such but would be 
able to take pre-emptive action against military satellites entering such 
zones. Such a zone could extend for several hundred or possibly several 
thousand miles since the speed of missiles makes them a far larger risk 
than aircraft. The adoption of contiguous or air defence zones in space 
would allow for a truly functionalist method of controlling outer space, 
since such zones would not restrict the use of space by civilian satellites. 
Air defence zones are however not without their critics and some writers 
94. E. D. BROWN, "Maritime Zones: A Survey of Claims", 3 New Direc- 
tions in the Law of the Sea, (1973), p. 157. 
95. U. N. DOC. A/CONF. 627T2-2, October 7th 1982. 
96. Ibid. 
97. W. BISHOP, International Law, (1962), p. 533. 
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have alleged that the establishment of such zones is contrary to inter- 
national law as being an unwarranted and unilateral extension of territorial 
sovereignty (98). Other writers have viewed their introduction as legal by 
reason of the right of self defence as is inherent in the maritime doctrine 
of the contiguous zone (99). It has been suggested that such zones should 
not be considered as extensions of territorial sovereignty and that aircraft 
are as free to fly through such zones as they are through the airspace 
above the high seas (100). Such air defence zones as adopted by the 
U. S. A. and Canada are only air IDENTIFICATION zones and their establish- 
ment does not automatically mean that a pre-emptive attack would be 
launched immediately against an intruding aircraft since that may be 
contrary to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, in that while it 
allows for an inherent right of self defence this right may only be used 
where an armed attack has actually occurred. It is however difficult to 
assess when an attack has commenced and clearly it would be unreasonable 
and unrealistic to expect a state to have to wait until the first missile 
actually strikes before it could react. Once a missile has been launched it 
may be said that an attack has commenced and the appropriate action may 
then be taken. It would seem that the international community has come 
to accept an international customary right of anticipatory self defence 
since: - 
"Unless a rule of international law is based upon the practice 
of states or is sufficiently general to fit in with both that 
practice and the reasonable demands of states likely to be 
98. E. CUADRA, "Air Defence Identification Zones: Creeping Jurisdiction 
in the Airspace", Virginia Journal of International Law, (1? 78), p. 485. 
99. J. C. COOPER, "Contiguous Zones in Aerospace - Prevention and 
Protective Jurisdiction", 7 JAG Journal, (U. S. Government Printing 
Office), (1965), pp. 15-21. Also BIN ZMENG, "The Right to Fly", 
Grotius Society, (1956), p. 121. 
100. C. SHA CROSS and K. M. BEAUMONT, Air Law, Butterworths, 
(1977), p. 182. Also J. A. MARTIAL, "State Contr-oT of the Airspace 
Over the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone", Canadian Bar 
Review, (1952), p. 243. 
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faced with the need to act, it is probable that it will not be 
observed, and in the international community, rules based 
solely upon the legal niceties of treaty construction without 
adequate recognition by states are unlikely to meet whose 
demands. " (101) 
However such an approach is probably unnecessary where an armed attack 
actually takes place since Article 51 clearly maintains a right of self- 
defence. In the case of a situation where no armed attack has actually 
commenced, then Article 33 of the U. N. Charter requires states to Settle 
their disputes by peaceful means. Nevertheless where such attempts prove 
fruitless states retain their "inherent right of self defence" and may take 
action even if no armed attack takes place (102). 
With regard to missiles such a right of anticipatory self defence is essen- 
tial because of their relatively high velocities when compared to aircraft. 
The establishment of an air identification zone is thus a fairly simple 
method of maintaining national security without the need for the kind of 
pre-emptive action seen in the Aerial Incident case. 
Applying such a system into outer space would result in the establishment 
of a zone in which all satellite traffic would be required to identify 
themselves to the sovereign state over which they are passing, and failure 
to do so would possibly result in pre-emptive action being taken against 
that craft. There are other problems associated with these zones and 
their adaptation to space; firstly, a zone is still required and thus the 
same problems of delineating space; secondly, if a craft fails to identify 
itself there may be a problem over what action can be taken since only 
now are the major powers beginning to develop 'killer' satellites - thus the 
final, ultimate weapon against unathorised incursions is not available as of 
101. GRIEG, (1970), p. 680. 
102. Ibid. at p. 681. 
- 49 - 
yet; thirdly, the circumstances which arise may only warrant the escorting 
of a satellite out of the zone and there is no evidence that such a capa- 
bility exists, or is being developed; fourthly, since the majority - of -. -satel- 
lites stay i)n the same orbit for many months, if not years, it seems 
unrealistic to expect them to have to identify themselves every time they 
orbit; fifthly, what information would be required to be given? If a 
satellite was merely to identify who the launching state was that would 
seem incongruous with the functional theory, where it is the use the 
satellite is to be put to which is of fundamental importance. Further, 
given that the function of the satellite is declared, there is no method of 
assessing whether that be a military or civilian function, particularly in the 
case of earth resource satellites. Sixthly, the General Assembly in 1961 
called upon: - 
"States launching objects into orbit or beyond to furnish 
information promptly to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space, through the Secretary-General, for the 
registration of launchings. " (103). 
Whilst states have complied with this appeal the resolution' does not define 
the information that is required to be given. Thus the U. S. S. R. gives the 
serial number and the name of the device., the purpose of launching, the 
date of launching, and the angles of inclination to the equator, perigee and 
apogee. The U. S. A., on the other hand, does not indicate the purpose of 
launching but classifies the satellite by placing it under one of four 
headings, i. e. development of space flight and techniques, space research 
and exploration, practical application of space based technology, and non- 
functional objects. Predictably neither the U. S. A. nor the U. S. S. R. give 
information on military devices having secret missions, and thus the 
application of such a registration system with an air defence zone would 
be pointless unless states are more candid about the functions of their 
satellites. The fact that registration is now mandatory. by virtue of the 
103. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI), "Inter- 
national Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space", 1961. 
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Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space 1974 
appears to have made little impact on the attitudes of launching states 
(104). 
It would seem that a proposal for a space defence identification zone will 
not at present provide a workable solution to the question of the delimit- 
ation of territorial sovereignty in space, mainly because that it would still 
involve the establishment of a definite line, as with the spatial theories of 
delimitation with all their problems. However the functional theory would 
tend to reconcile the basic right of states to have access to the atmos- 
phere and space with their right to security and self-defence. If the state 
overflown has good reason to suppose that the craft will cause damage or 
is to be used for aggressive purposes, it has the right to defend itself in a 
manner proportionate to the danger. Similarly if a state launches a 
satellite which is likely to cause damage or is to be used in a hostile 
manner it must expect action to be taken against it, and should be pre- 
pared to provide compensation for any damage caused. It should also be 
borne in mind that if a craft is manned then there is a very strong rule in 
international space law that the reciprocating state should pay due atten- 
tion to the safety of that crew. N. Matte believes that the concept of, 
functionalism should be extended to encompass the aerospace as well, 
though he does give a concession of national sovereignty to states so that 
they may control aeronautical navigation over their territory (105). Matte 
also stresses that national sovereignty in this context is purely functional 
and is limited to aeronautical navigation only, thus there would be no need 
to establish barriers in air and space. In other words Matte is advocating 
an 'open skies' policy, as advanced by the U. S. A. at both the Paris and 
Chicago Conventions, limiting it only to the extent of aeronautical navi- 
gation and acts of belligerency. However admirable such a proposal is 
104. Article 11, para. 2. 
105. MATTE, (1969), pp. 72 & 73. 
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territorial sovereignty is here to stay and it is inconceivable that such a 
proposal would be adopted since this would require fundamental change in 
political, economic and legal reasoning. 
Many of the options available for the delimitation of outer space have 
been discussed in the United Nations Secretariat background paper produced 
in 1970 entitled "The Question of Delimitation and/or the Delimitation of 
Outer Space" (106), to which there was an addendum dated January 21st, 
1977 (107). Broadly speaking, and according to Bin Cheng (108) there were 
basically three groupings amongst states involved in the discussion - the 
spatialists, the functionalists and the "wait-and-seers" (which included 
"don't knows"). However over the years support for the functionalist 
approach amongst states haý waned, most being won over to the spatial or 
wait and see camps. Typical of this is Belgium who in 1976 advocated a 
spatial approach whilst formally it had adopted a functionalist Stance (109). 
The reason for this switch of attitude might be seen in the attitude of 
Gal, who whilst supporting the functionalist approach, considered that the 
spatialist approach offered better prospects for agreement (110). The 
Soviet Union however has maintained a spatialist approach advocating a 
boundary of 100 kilometres in its working paper of 1979 (111). The 
Western states, particularly the United States, the United Kingdom and the 
Federal Republic of Germany, have tended to lean towards the "wait and 
see" camp since, as the United States. has stated, most countries are unable 
to monitor any boundary that might be set up, secondly, the relevant 
scientific, legal and political factors have not been adequately examined, 
and thirdly, any boundary that is imposed could inhibit future efforts on 
106. U. N. DOC. A/AC. 105/2/7, (1970). 
107. U. N. DOC. A/AC. 105/C. 2/2/7, (1977). 
108. B. CHENG, "The Legal Status of Outer Space", Journal of Space 
Law, (1983), pp. 93-94. 
109. U. N. DOC. A/AC. 105/C. 1/L. 76,23rd March 1976. 
110. G. GAL, "The Question of Delimitation After Twenty Years", Pro- 
ceedings of the XXII Colloquium on the Low of Outer Space (1T80)_, 
p. 125. 
111. U. N. DOC. A/AC. 105/C. 2/L121 (Reissued version of March 28,1979). 
- 52 - 
the exploration and use of outer space (112). 
Each of the alternative approaches to the delimitation of airspace and 
outer space has presented its own special problems. The spatial approach 
has been hampered by disagreements between its own proponents as to a 
preferred spatially measured height and has been criticised by its opponents 
in that they do not consider that adequate scientific and technological data 
has been supplied respecting the lowest safe perigee of earth satellites. 
The functional approach for its part is open to the problem of the need to 
categorise air activities and space activities and the subsequent difficulties 
involved with defining hybrid space missions. 
Ultimately the proposals of the U. S. S. R. may carry the day since its 
language was simple and comprehensible and addressed itself to the goals 
of the 1967 Treaty in that it facilitates the free and equal exploration, 
use, and exploitation of, and equal access to outer space (113). Further it 
tends to favour the growing feeling that the spatial solution to the ques- 
tion of delimitation has now become part of customary international law in 
that the space powers now appear to accept that all orbits of artificial 
earth satellites are considered to lie in outer space and that national 
airspace does not exceed the lowest perigee height of any satellite (114). 
Cheng suggests (115) that while such a line is apparently a rule of general 
international law the fact that the space powers have refused to define 
such a line is indicative of a desire to leave their options open in order to 
raise or lower this line as their national interests determine at some future 
date. He goes on to suggest that in fact the positions of the U. S. S. R. and 
112. U. N. DOC. A/AC. 105/C. 2/SR 316,4th April 1979. 
113. C. Q. CHRISTOL, "The Modern International Law of Outer Space', 
Pergamon Press, (1782), p. 525. 
114. B. CHENG, "Outer Space: The International Legal Framework", 10 
Thesaurus Acroasium, (1979), pp. 66-72. 
115. B. CHENG, (1983), pp. 95-96. 
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the U. S. A. are identical in that their aims are to enhance their own 
positions - the U. S. A. by their "wait and see" policy, the U. S. S. R. by not 
only establishing a line on 100 kilometres above sea level but also by 
proposing a right of space objects to pass through the territorial airspace 
of underlying states in order to enter outer space or to return to earth 
(116). 
The functionalist approach is really a great deal more extreme in that they 
are saying that if a space flight is lawful then the craft is free to pene- 
trate the airspace of an underlying state and therefore as far as legal 
space activities are concerned sovereign airspace has been abolished. With 
regard to military reconnaissance satellites whilst these are legal once 
stationed in outer space they do not represent a legal activity when 
passing through the sovereign airspace of another state and it is really at 
this point that this approach departs from the spatial approach since 
functionalists would not allow these craft to pass through the airspace of 
an underlying state. 
It is suggested therefore that while an agreement on delimitation is 
desirable because of the problems relating to the geostationary orbit it is 
unlikely to be forthcoming because of the interests of the space-powers, 
who clearly feel it is to their advantage to maintain the status quo. 
TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY IN RELATION TO THE GEOSTATIONARY 
ORBIT 
As already described (117) geostationary orbit is the term that is given to 
a satellite which orbits the earth at a height of approximately 35,800 
kilometres above the equator, turning about the polar axis once every 24 
hours, it is thus synchronised with the rotation of the earth appearing to 
116. Ibid. 
117. Supra Note 32. 
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'hang' above a given underlying point. The area of geostationary orbit has 
been described by Gehrig as a "three dimensional corridor" within which 
satellites move at different heights, inclinations, and speeds in relation to 
the equatorial plane (118). The corridor does have physical limitations of 
size but it is highly unlikely that this will cause any problems in the 
foreseeable future. The real problem with satellites in geostationary orbit 
is electromagnetic interference from other satellites since the distances 
between satellites will vary with the tolerations of each satellite to such 
interference. It is this, and other factors, such as the size of satellites 
and stability of orbit, that led a United Nations study of the problem to 
state: - 
"It is impossible to state how many satellites can be accom- 
modated in the geostationary orbit. It is, however, possible to 
find out if a specific satellite system, with all the parameters 
defined would interfere with other systems or not. " (119) 
It has been estimated that between 1980 and 1991 274 such satellites will 
be launched (120), however, the eventual number cannot be realistically 
assessed. As more and more states lay claim to the use of geostationary 
orbit so the problem of overcrowding will become acute, and it has already 
been described as a "limited natural resource" (121). It is because it is a 
finite resource that controversy has erupted as to who has the right to use 
this resource and to what extent can its use be controlled? Clearly the 
answer to these questions must involve the problem of sovereignty rights in 
space, and the various theories as to how such rights can be delineated. 
118. J. J. GEHRIG, "Geo-stationary Orbit - Technology and Law", Pro- 
ceedings of the XIX Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, (1T7_7)_, 
p. 268. 
119. U. N. General Assembly Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space; "Physical Nature and Technical Activities of the Geo-Station- 
cry Orbit", Study prepared by the Secretariat, U. N. Document A/AC. 
105/203, (1977). 
120. GEHRIG, (1977), p. 270. 
121. International Telecommunication Convention, October 25th 1973. 
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1. The Geostationary Orbit and the Delimitation of Territorial. 
Sovereignty in Space 
The problem of the geostationary orbit and the question of sovereignty in 
space may be divided into two. Firstly, the establishment of sovereignty 
into areas traditionally thought of as outer space by extending the limits 
of airspace. Secondly, the establishment of "pockets" of sovereign terri- 
tory in outer space by the exercise of possessory rights established by the 
stationing of a satellite in a particular position. 
Having examined the various theories, and the difficulties inherent in 
them, it would seem that any solution to the problem of delimitation is 
inconclusive. Nevertheless, many years of experiment and discussion could 
be said to have created a rule of customary international law in that 
satellites move in outer space (122). There now appears to be a consen- 
sus that outer space begins just under the lowest orbit that a satellite can 
maintain (i. e. between 100 and 110 kilometres) (123). Since satellites 
move on a geostationary orbit at an altitude of approximately 35,800 
kilometres they are undoubtedly moving in outer space and therefore 
beyond the sovereign areas of the underlying states. It follows that if 
this geostationary orbit is in outer space then the Outer Space Treaty 
1967 must come into operation, and this states that: - 
"Outer space ... shall be free for exploration and use by all 
states ... on the basis of equality, and in accordance with international law. " (124) 
The treaty also states that: - 
"Outer space ... is not subject to national appropriation by 
claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation. " (125) 
122. M. S. McDOUGAL, "The Emerging Customary Law of Space", 
58 N. W. U. L. Review, (1964). S. H. LAY and H. J. TAUBENFIELD, 
The Law Relating to the Activities of Man in Space University of 
Chicago Press, (1978). 
123. GEODHUIS, (1978), p. 591. Note, however, supra at p. 35 et seq the 
earlier arguments regarding the lowest perigees of satellites. 
124. Outer Space Treaty 1967 Article 1, para. 2. 
125. Outer Space Treaty 1967 Article 11. 
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Recently, however, the application of the above two articles of the Outer 
Space Treaty has been challenged by the equatorial states underlying the 
corridor of geostationary orbit, claiming rights of sovereignty over parts of 
the geostationary corridor. This challenge was formalised in November 
1976 when eight equatorial states (126) met in Bogota to decide on a 
unified agreement on the status of the geostationary orbit. The con- 
ference concluded in December 1976 with a statement which has subse- 
quently become known as the Bogota Declaration. The declaration, which 
discusses both the arguments for and against the position of the equatorial 
states in relation to the geostationary orbit, asserts that the orbit is a 
natural resource constituting an integral part of the equatorial countries, 
which therefore have complete and exclusive rights (127). The declaration 
went on to state that any state placing a satellite on a geostationary 
orbit above an equatorial state had first to get "express authorisation on 
the part of the state concerned" (128); that the equatorial states would 
not condone the use of the geostationary orbit by existing satellites, and 
that such existing satellites would not confer any rights to place other 
satellites in that position (129). The declaration did however make two 
exceptions to the claim: firstly, the equatorial states did not object to the 
free transit of satellites approved and authorised by the International 
Telecommunication Convention (130); and, secondly, that segments of the 
orbit corresponding to the high seas beyond national jurisdiction would be 
the "province of all mankind" (131), as contained in the Outer Space 
Treaty and the Draft Treaty Relating to the Mcon (132). 
126. Brazil, Columbia, Congo, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda, and 
Zaire. 
127. Bogota Declaration Section 1. 
128. Bogota Declaration Section 3(d). 
129. Bogota Declaration Section 3(e). 
130. Bogota Declaration Section 3(c). 
131. Bogota Declaration Section 3(b). 
132. Article I and Article X res pectively. 
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The above assertions in the Bogota Declaration were based on several 
arguments. Firstly, it was alleged that the geostationary orbit was a 
physical fact arising from the nature of the earth because it depends 
exclusively on the phenomena of gravity caused by the earth. Geodhuis 
maintains that this argument is fallacious in that the geostationary orbit is 
exactly the same as any other orbit, except that the satellite is synchro- 
nised to a particular location on the earth. He maintains that the unsyn- 
chronised orbit also relies on the properties of the earth as a whole, and 
therefore it is impossible to argue that the geostationary orbit is not in 
outer space (133). 
The second argument used in justifying the declaration was the allegation 
that, according to the International Telecommunication Union (134), 
geostationary orbit is a limited natural resource and therefore should be 
subject to the sovereign control of the equatorial states. Such an argu- 
ment, at least according to Geodhuis (135), cannot be justified at all since 
the issue at stake is whether the orbit does or does not lie in outer 
space, where there exists a fundamental freedom of exploration and use 
(136). 
The third argument was that the present rules of international law were 
drawn up by industrialised states for their own benefit, and that developing 
countries were not given the opportunity to detect and assess contradic- 
tions in those rules because they lacked adequate scientific aid. Again 
Goedhuis rejects the argument by maintaining that the principles of 
f reedorn and non-appropriation in space was universally accepted as rules 
133. GOEDHUIS, (1978), p. 588. He refers to a statement by the U. S. 
delegate at the meeting of the U. N. Legal Sub-Committee on Outer 
Space on April 6th 1977 - U. N. Doc. A/AC 105/C2/SR281, (1977). 134. International Telecommunication Convention, October 25th, 1973. 
135. GOEDHUIS, (1978), p. 589. 
136. Outer Space Treaty 1967 Article I para. 2. 
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of international law by virtue of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty. He 
also correctly commented that these rules have never been challenged 
until the Bogota Declaration. 
The three arguments above were also supplemented by others in order to 
justify the declaration, thus, they argued that since there is no definition 
of. outer space there can be no objection to the geostationary orbit being 
excluded from outer space. Additionally, the equatorial states alleged that 
since the Outer Space Treaty has no provisions regarding the geostationary 
orbit it cannot be regarded as being legal authority for the regulation of 
the geostationary orbit - it is not the "final answer" (137). 
In 1977 and 1978 at a meeting of the U. N. Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space, the Columbian delegate Mr. Aguilera made certain 
additional comments on the arguments raised in the Bogota Declaration. 
Firstly, he stated that the continued uncertainty of a definition for outer 
space is illustrated by the different criteria suggested in order to solve 
the problem (138). Following on from this point Mr. Aguilera maintained 
that, since there is no definition of outer space, principles of domestic law 
will apply and thus allow for the establishment of such sovereign rights as 
are in keeping with public international law (139). He also maintained, 
that countries who had not ratified the Outer Space Treaty were not 
bound by it, and that geostationary orbit was a unique and natural res- 
ource because it was the only position where solar energy platforms would 
be capable of operating from (140). 
The attempt by equatorial states to establish sovereign rights over the 
geostationary orbit has been overwhelmingly rejected and condemned by 
the other members of the U. N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
137. Supra Section 4. 
138. U. N. Doc. A/AC 105/C2/7/ADD 1, (1978). 
139. U. N. Doc. A/AC 105/C2/SR296, (1978). 
140. Ibid. 
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Space (141). The United States delegate maintained that there was no 
legal or scientific basis for a claim of national sovereignty over the 
geostationary orbit, and that such a claim could not serve the best 
interests of mankind since the exploration and exploitation . of space would 
be inhibited (142). 
Other members of the committee produced arguments against the claims 
of the equatorial states, most notably Belgium who maintained that any 
comments by the International Telecommunication Union on the geostation- 
ary being a limited resource was without legal foundation since Article 33 
of the International Telecommunication Convention only describes the 
geostationary orbit from a scientific standpoint (143). It was also pointed 
out that the only legal provision in the International Telecommunication 
Convention maintains that any orbital allocation does not confer permanent 
priority or possession (144). Belgium also maintained that in order to 
validly claim sovereign rights it must be based on effective occupation 
(145), that geostationary orbit was an intellectual concept based not on its 
physical relation to the earth but arising out of the mathematical and 
scientific mind (146), and that any claim that it was a natural resource 
subject to sovereign acquisition was manifestly absurd (147). The United 
Kingdom commented that the use of geostationary orbit is subject to the 
Outer Space Treaty (148), whilst Italy stated that no state had ever before 
protested against space activities that were being carried out for the 
benefit of mankind (149). 
141. Inter alia: Australia, Belgium, Czechoslavakia, France, German 
Democratic Republic, Iran, Italy, Mexico, U. K., U. S. A., U. S. S. R. 
142. U. N. Press Release OS 852, (April 5th 1978). 
143. U. N. Doc. A/AC 105/C2/SR298, (1978), p. 5. 
144. lbid on p. 6. 
145. U. N. Doc. A/AC 105/C2/SR298, (1978), p. 5. 
146. U. N. Press Release OS 224, (April 5th 1978). 
147. U. N. Doc. A/AC 105/C2/SR298, (1978), p. 6. 
148. U. N. Press Release OS 852, (April 5th 1978). 
149. U. N. Press Release OS 852, (April 5th 1978). 
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Referring to the Bogota Declaration and the claim of national sovereignty 
over the geostationary orbit by the equatorial states, it can be seen that 
one of the arguments was that since these states had not ratified the 
Outer Space Treaty they were not bound by it. However, it was stated by 
the dissenting members of the Committee of the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space that it had become part of international law, in that space was not 
subject to national appropriation and that the exploration and exploitation 
of space was free for all (150). Until the declaration in 1976 no state had 
ever questioned the 'basic freedom' criteria contained in the Outer Space 
Treaty. Prior to this treaty in 1963 there had been a unanimous accep- 
tance by the Eighteenth General Assembly of the United Nations of the 
Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space (151). The acceptance of this dec- 
laration was given in such a manner that it would appear to have the 
force of a legally binding instrument, such were the nature of the state- 
ments from nearly all the members of the United Nations. Manfred 
Lachs, who at the time was President of the International Court of Justice 
remarked of the resolution: - 
"Thus, by expressing their will to be bound by the provisions 
of the document in question, they consented to so to be 
bound, and there is no reason why they should not be held to 
it. For their intention seems to have been clear, the question 
of form therefore ceases to be of the essence. " (152) 
If the conclusions of Lachs are correct it would appear that Resolution 
1962 (XVIII) will have the binding force of international law. This resolu- 
tion states that "the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried on 
for the benefit ... of all mankind" 
(153), and follows "outer space and 
celestial bodies are free for exploration and use (154) ... and are not 
150. Supra Note 136. 
151. G. A. Resolution 1962 (XVIII), (1963). 
152. MANFRED LACHS, The Law of Outer Space (19724, p. 138. 
- - - 153. Supra Note 151, Sec tio n T 
154. Supra Note 151, Section 2. 
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subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use 
or occupation, or by any other means" (155). It would seem that the 
claims of the equatorial states in contravention of this resolution are 
contrary to international law. This conclusion may be reinforced by the 
fact that even though the term "outer space" has not yet been defined, no 
state has ever protested about the passage of the several thousands of 
satellites that have orbited the earth. Additionally, D. Goedhuis in 1 966 
conducted an investigation into the attitudes of bodies concerned with the 
development of space law, i. e. inter alia the Institut Du Droit International, 
the International Law Association, and the David Davies Memorial Instit ute, 
and all the bodies concerned in the investigation considered that the 
principles of freedom and non appropriation of outer space were part of 
international law (156). Similarly at the 21st Colloquiurn on the Law of 
Outer Space of the International Institute of Space Low of the Internat- 
ional Aeronautical Federation in 1978 not one commentator supported the 
claim of the equatorial states, and all considered that the Bogota Dec- 
laration to be a violation of customary law (157) in that the doctrine of 
opinio juris et necessitatis provides that customary international law is 
constituted by recurrent practice or abstention which gives rise to an 
expectation that in future situations that practice or abstention will be 
repeated. However S. 38(1)b of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice refers to "general practice accepted as law" and therefore for 
customary international law to be established there must be a degree of 
155. Supra Note 151, Section 3. 
156. D. GOEDHUIS, "Reflections on the Evolution of Space Law", The 
Netherlands International Law Review (1966), p. 112. 
157. R. ARZINGER, "The Freedom of Outer Space and the Geostationary 
Orbit", p. 12. Others expressing such views were: - Edward R. FINCH, "Outer Space Global Independence and the Geostationary Orbit", p. 17; 
JONATHAN F. GALLOWAY, "The Current Status of the Controversy 
Over the Geostationary Orbit", p. 22; P. HAANAPPEL, "Article 11 of 
the Toshio Kosuge, "National Appropriation of Geostationary Satel- 
lite Orbit", p. 31; KRYSTYNA WIEWIOROWSKA, "Legal and Political 
Problems of the Geostationary Orbit", p. 34. All contained in the 
Proceedings of the 21st Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 1978. 
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obligation rather than mere usage. Indeed the Permanent Court in The 
Lotus stated that to establish customary international law there must be a 
conscious obligation rather than mere long practice (158). Further both in 
The Lotus and in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (159) it was stated 
that a high standard of proof was required of the concept of opinio juris. 
Nevertheless the amount of emphasis given to opinio juris in establishing 
customary international law varies according to the circumstances (160) and 
it is possible for customary international law to be established without the 
need of proving the psychological element of opinio juris, though this may 
be regarded as a minority view. 
The fact that the parties to the Bogota Declaration do not accept the 
'basic freedom' criteria of the Outer Space Treaty or Resolution 1962 
would probably not however prevent a rule of customary international low 
from being established. The reason for this is that since the Declaration 
of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, "on which the Outer Space Treaty was based, was 
passed unanimously this must represent the law as generally ACCEPTED by 
the member states of the United Nations and must therefore form the 
basis of opinio juris (161). Thus the Canadian delegate stated: 
"The Legal Principles contained in it reflected international 
law as it was currently accepted by Member States. " (162) 
Further evidence of this attitude may be seen in an earlier statement 
referring to Resolution 1721 (163), which was also passed unanimously, 
stating: 
158. P. C. I. J. Reports (1927), Ser. A No. 10, p. 28. 
159. I. C. J. Reports (1969), p. 43. 
160. D. W. GREIG, International Law, Butterworths, (1970), p. 16 & 17; 
P. GUGGENHEIM, "Les Deux El6ments de la Couturne en Droit 
International", 1 Etudes en L'Honneur de G. Scelle, (1950), p. 275, as 
cited in B. CHENG, "United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: 
"Instant" International Customary Law? " 5 Indian Journal of Inter- 
national Law, (1965), p. 23-48. 
161. CHENG, I p. 38. 
162. U. V. Doc. A/C 1/SR 1346, December 5th 1963, p. 189. 
163. U. N. Doc. A/AC 105/C2/SR 20, April 22nd, 1963. 
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"A General Assembly resolution would be the most appropriate 
instrument for a declaration of general principles. Some 
delegations had argued that only an international agreement 
signed by governments would be legally binding. International 
agreements were not, however the only sources of law. As 
stated in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice, decisions of international tribunals and the growth 
of customary low as evidenced by State practice should also 
be taken into consideration. When a General Assembly 
resolution proclaimed principles of international law as reso- 
lution 1721 (XVI) had done - and was adopted unanimously, it 
represented the law as generally accepted in the international 
community. " (164) 
Since neither Resolutions 1721 and 1962 impose legally binding obligations 
on the parties it is clear that the only way in which the parties to them 
may be bound is by customary international law. While the psychological 
evidence of custom can be shown by reference to the unanimous resol- 
utions above there is apparently no material or usage element. In the 
opinion of Bin Cheng the usage element is only of evidential necessity and 
where the usage is usually extensive there is no real need for this; in fact 
he maintains there is no need for any evidence of usage at all provided 
the opinio juris of the States concerned can be shown, though it may be 
difficult to talk in terms of custom in these circumstances (165). Further 
Cheng maintains that whilst opinio juris is usually established over a long 
period of time there is no reason why in fact it cannot be established over 
a very short period of time, such as in a unanimous General Assembly 
resolution which would operate to "positivize" their opinio juris; States 
being bound not by reason of the resolution but from their acceptance of 
the principles contained in the resolution (166). 
Summing up it would seem that the principle of freedom and use of outer 
space as contained in Articles I and II of the Outer Space Treaty includes 
the area of geostationary orbit, which is thus in outer space and therefore 
164. U. N. Doc. A/AC 105/C2/SR 20, April 22nd, 1963. 
165. CHENG, (1965), p. 37. 
166. lbid at p. 38. 
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cannot be subject to a claim of national sovereignty. Thus the recom- 
mendation of the panel of the Sub-Committee on Space Science and 
Applications of the House Committee on Science and Technology stated 
that - 
11... action should be initiated and vigorously pursued to 
establish an international codicil to the 1967 Outer Space 
Treaty which specifically forbids any individual nations claim- 
ing sovereignty over the geostationary orbit. " (167) 
should be rejected as being unnecessary since the legal status of the 
geostationary orbit has already been established by the Outer Space 
Treaty. The panel also recommended (168) that alternatives to the geo- 
stationary orbit should be found by technological advancement which would 
seem, at least to S. Neil Hosenball (169), to be a far better solution. 
2. The Establishment of Territorial Sovereignty Within the Geostationary 
Orbit 
The importance of satellites in geostationary orbit cannot be underlined 
enough since modern telecommunications depend on satellites being in line 
of sight so that there is no break in the communications system, which 
would occur if the satellite travelled faster or slower than the earth's 
rotation. Further not all such satellites are used for telecommunications 
purposes since many are now used for military surveillence, weather 
forecasting and navigational purposes. It is further anticipated that by the 
end of the century space solar power stations will be developed to trans- 
mit energy to earth (170). 
167. Sub-Committee on Space Science and Application of the Committee 
on Science and Technology: U. S. House Report on International Space 
Activities, November 1978. 
168. Ibid at p. 38. 
169. S. NEIL HOSENBALL, "The United Nations Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Past Accomplishments and Future 
Challenges", 7 Journal of Space Low, (1979), p. 113. 
170. "An Orbiting Solar Power Station", 49 Sky and Telescope,. (1975), 
p. 226. 
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One of the main problems associated with geostationary orbit is that it is 
limited in its area. It is because of the fact that it is limited in its area 
that there is some speculation as to the number of satellites the corridor 
will hold. The estimated number of satellites varies between 180 and 
1800, since some authors consider that a one degree segment could hold 
five satellites without colliding (171), whilst others consider that the 
technological limit is one satellite per two degree segment (172). Even 
this latter figure is very much guesswork since the criteria restricting the 
number is not availability of space but the actual radio frequencies used by 
the satellites in geostationary orbit. This is because any overlap of 
frequencies will cause interference, particularly if the radio frequencies of 
each satellite are very close together. This restricting criteria should not 
only be judged from the point of view of the close proximity of satellites 
to each other but also to the area of intended reception on earth. Thus a 
satellite broadcasting to a very wide geographical area is more likely to 
suffer from interference than one broadcasting to a very small area (173). 
Severe problems may also occur if space solar stations become a reality 
since one proposal is for a satellite to cover an area of 17.4 square miles 
(174). 
In order to create some sort of order in the allocation of radio frequencies 
the International Telecommunication Union, which has been a part of the 
United Nations since 1947, has played an important role. Normally the 
I. T. U. allocates frequency bonds for certain uses and then different states 
assign frequencies to their radio stations, which in turn are registered with 
the International Frequency Registration Board of the I. T. U. on a "first 
171. W. R. HINCHMAN, "Issue in Spectrum Resource Management", 
Twentieth Century Fund Task Force, The Future of Satellite Com- 
munication, (1970), p. 52. 
172. J. BUSAK, "Geostationary Satellites and the Law", 39 I. T. U. Tele- 
communication Journal, (1972), p. 487. 
173. S. E. SCRUPSKI "User-s Starting to Hop Aboard U. S. Communications 
Satellites", 47 Electronics, (1947), pp. 98-100. 
174. Supra Note 176.7 
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come, first served" basis (175). Nevertheless breaches of the frequency 
allocations are common, and though this is sometimes due to atmospheric 
conditions, it is also due to deliberate action which the I. T. U. is unable to 
prevent because of its lack of effective sanctions. 
Further compounding the difficulties of radio frequency allocation is the 
fact that there is no overall system of allocating geostationary orbital 
positions, though these are nearly always registered with the United 
Nations under the relevent convention (176). The method by which a state 
establishes a satellite in geostationary orbit is again on a purely "first 
come, first served" basis since this is a "firmly embedded concomitant of 
the principle of freedom of exploration and use of outer space" (177), and 
may be clearly seen in state practice. With a need for an estimated 230 
new geosynchronous satellites between 1975 and 1990 (178) there is an 
obvious need for some sort of regulatory system of the geostationary orbit. 
Thi'S---is particularly acute because the figure does not take into account 
areas taken up by 'dead' satellites. These satellites occur not necessarily 
because they cease transmitting but also because satellites in geostationary 
orbit constantly have to have their positions corrected in order to take 
into account movements in the earth's axial tilt and other variations 
caused by the gravitational effects of the moon and the sun. Once the 
fuel on board the satellite runs out there is no way of correcting its 
position and the satellite consequently drifts out of position. Normally 
drifting satellites eventually take up a position at either 90 degrees west 
longitude above the Galapagos Islands or at 80 degrees east longitude above 
175. S. HOUSTON LAY and HOWARD J. TAUBENFIELD, The Law 
Relating to Activities of Man in Space, University of Chicago Press, 
(1970), p. 114. 
176. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 
1975; 28 U. S. T. 695; T. I. A. S. 8480. 
177. G. GOROVE, "The Geostationary Orbit: Issues of Law and Policy", 
American Journal of Interna tional Law, (1970), p. 455. 
178. , W. VON KRIES, "Legal Status of the Geosynchronous Orbit", Pro- 
ceedings of the Eighteenth Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, 
(1975), p. 30. See also the estimates of GEHRIG, ( 1977), p. 270. 
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the equator, south of Sri Lanka (179). These conglomerations of derelict 
satellites clearly take up valuable space until they eventually drift back 
into the earth's atmosphere and burn up. Furthermore they may from time 
to time produce hazardous situations and thus the recent trend has been to 
remove such satellites from the geosynchronous corridor with their last 
reserves of fuel (180) so that they again burn up in the atmosphere. It is 
anticipated that satellites not removed in this way could eventually be 
remo, zFd by the space shuttle (181). 
Undoubtedly the "first come, first served" basis of allocating radio fre- 
quencies and acquiring geostationary positions must benefit the more 
technologically advanced nations rather than the developing ones. These 
States fear that once they are in the position to launch geostationary 
satellites, the geostationary corridor could be saturated with satellites from 
advanced States, thus precluding the use of their satellites. Nevertheless 
the practice of unilateral acquisition of orbital positions and frequencies, 
which was endorsed by the I. T. U. at the Extraordinary Administrative Radio 
Conference in 1963 (182), is still in operation despite various attempts to 
make alterations to this system, indeed in the Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space in 1979, the Brazilian delegate stated: - 
the geostationary orbit is being occupied at present at a 
rate and in a form that basically benefits those countries 
which have a monopoly on space technology. This is the 
principle of "first come, first served", which cannot be 
179. E. N. VALTERS, "Perspectives in the Emerging Law of Satellite 
Uommunications", Stanford Journal of International Studies, (1970), 
p. 53,71. 
180. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Physical Nature 
and Technical Attributes of the Geostationary Orbit, Study Prepared 
by the Secretariat 3, U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/203, (1977). 
181. K. G. GIBBONS, "Orbital Saturation: The Necessity for International 
Regulations of Geosynchronous Orbits", California Western Inter-_ 
national Law Journal, (1979), p. 146. 
182. Final-Acts of the Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference to 
Allocate Frequency Bands for Space Radiocommunication Purposes, 
November 8th 1963,15 U. S. T. 887, T. I. A. S. 5603. - 
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accepted by those countries that do not have the conditions 
of technological progress that enable other countries to 
develop their space applications at an increasing pace. Thus 
the use of the geostationary orbit is not a purely technical 
problem. There must be negotiations to establish an inter- 
national legal system that would serve the interests of all 
countries in the international community. " (183) 
One of the first attempts to give the underdeveloped countries protected 
rights to radio frequency allocations in space and geostationary orbital 
positions occurred in 1971 during the World Administrative Radio Con- 
ference for Space Communications in which a resolution was passed, which 
stated that all countries had equal rights in the allocation of radio fre- 
quencies and in geostationary satellite positions for the use of those 
frequencies (184). However in the light of this resolution it must be borne 
in mind that a further resolution made it specifically clear that the 
registration of space radio frequencies does not provide any individual state 
with a permanent prior claim over that frequency, and any other state 
need not regard such registration as a barrier to a state using that fre- 
quency. Additionally there is no part of any resolution which speaks in 
terms of the I. T. U... the International Frequency Registration Board (I. F. R. B. ) 
or any other organisation having the power to introduce an allocation 
scheme. The conference therefore left the position more or less in the 
status quo except for one or two minor changes. 
The concern of several states as to the need for the allocation of geo- 
stationary orbital positions was raised two years later at the International 
Telecommunication Convention, when Israel made a specific proposal to 
this effect. However this proposal failed to attract support and a revision 
of Article 10 was accepted instead. This reads as follows: - 
183. Mr. DAYNELL de LIMA, the Brazilian delegate, in the Committee 
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space held on 25th June 1979, U. N. 
DOC. A/AC 105/P. V. 199 (1979), p. 29. 
184. Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio Conference for Space 
Telecommunications Resolution No. SPA2-1, (Geneva'1971). 
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"International Frequency Registration Board. 
The International Frequency Registration Board shall 
consist of five independent members, elected by the 
Plenipotentiary Conference. The members shall be 
elected from the candidates sponsored by countries, 
Members of the Union, in such a way as to ensure 
equitable distribution amongst the regions of the 
World. Each Member of the Union may propose only. 
one candidate who shall be a national of its country. 
(2) The Members of the International Frequency Registra- 
tion Board shall serve, not as representing their 
respective countries, or of a region, but as custodians 
of an international public trust. 
(3) The essential duties of the International Frequency 
Registration Board shall be: - 
to effect an orderly recording of f requency 
assignments made by the different countries so as 
to establish., in accordance with the procedure 
provided for in the Radio Regulations and in 
accordance with any decision which may be taken 
by competent conferences of the Union, the date, 
purpose and technical characteristics of each of 
the assignments, with a view to ensuring formal 
international recognition thereof; 
(aa) to effect, in the same conditions and for 
the some purpose, an orderly recording of 
the positions assigned by countries to 
geostationary satellites; 
(b) to furnish advice to Members with a view to the 
operation of the maximum practicable number of 
radio channels in those portions of the spectrum 
where harmful interference may occur, and with 
a view to the equitable, effective and economical 
use of the geostationary orbit; 
(c) to perform any additional duties, concerned with 
the assignment and utilisation of frequencies and 
with the utilisation of the geostationary orbit, in 
accordance with the procedures provided for in 
the Radio Regulations, and as prescribed by the 
Administrative Council with the consent of a 
majority of the Members of the Union, in prepa- 
ration for or in pursuance of the decisions of 
such a conference; 
(d) to maintain such essential records as may be 
related to the performance of its duties. " (185) 
It would appear that the Israeli proposal to give the I. T. U. power to 
allocate "position slots on the geostationary orbit" (186) was rejected 
185. International Telecommunication Convention 197ý, Article 10, as 
adopted in Torremolinos by the International Telecommunication 
Union Plenipotentiary Conference. 
186. C. E. RANKIN, "Utilisation of the Geostationary Orbit -A Need for Orbital Allocation? ", Columbia Journal of Transnational Low, (1974), 
P. 102, Note 25. 
- 70 - 
because it was outside the competence of the Conference and the I. T. U. 
itself in that it was a political act which would result in a major shift of 
policy within the I. T. U. The effect of such a shift may be summed up by 
C. E. Rankin in the following terms: - 
"If the proposal had been accepted, it would have meant the 
eventual granting of power to some international body and a 
reciprocal loss of power now held by the individual member 
nations. Any surrender of sovereign rights requires a p'Olit- 
ical decision at the highest government level; and the dele- 
gates at the Torremolinos conference were neither prepared 
to discuss such a decision nor equipped with the authority to 
make it. " (187) 
In spite of the lack of progress made in the allocation of geostationary 
orbital "slots" (188), in February 1977 a system of allocation for direct 
broadcast satellites was adopted at the World Administrative Radio Con- 
ference for the Planning of the Broadcasting Satellite Service. This system 
went into effect amongst the accepting parties in January 1979 and 
designated frequency assignments in the radio bands and the geostationary 
orbital positions (189). 
The above system was put forward by the states of Western Europe and 
received the support of the Soviet Union, China and Japan, however the 
United States, Brazil and Canada did not accept this system (190) and thus 
it only applies to Region 1 which consists of Africa, Europe, the Soviet 
Union and Mongolia, and Region 3, consisting of Asia and the Pacific (191). 
The main reason for it not applying to Region 2 (which consists of the 
Americas) is that an evolutionary approach was favoured in this region on 
187. Ibid at p. 189. 
188. A geo-stationary "orbital slot" is defined by C. E. Rankin "as a 
particular segment of space into which a satellite may be placed 
without causing interference to other satellite systems". lbid at 
p. 102. 
189. Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio Conference for the 
Planning of the Broadcasting Satellite Service, RES. NO. SAT-7, 
(Geneva 1977). 
190. K. JOHNSEN, U. S. to Oppose Broadcast Satellite Plan", 106 Aviation 
Weekly and Space Technology, (January 10th 1977)' 
191. I. T. U. Press Release, I. T. U. 77-6-36, (November 1976). 
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the insistence of the U. S. A., Canada and Brazil (192). The evolutionary 
approach provides that orbital slots are only allocated when a requesting 
state is about to put a satellite into orbit, though this is a simplistic 
definition since the approach also provides that the principles of equality 
of countries, equitable rights of access and equal rights for services be 
recognised (193). This method was favoured by those states because they 
argued that an advanced allocation plan takes away orbital slots which 
could be used by other geostationary satellites. This is particularly- rele- 
vant if solar power from satellites ever became feasible since very large 
areas of the geostationary orbit would be required. Thus if any particular 
area had been previously allocated serious restrictions would be placed on 
space development (194). In other words a geostationary slot may be 
allocated to an undeveloped country, which would not have the technology 
to make use of that slot, thereby inhibiting its use. According to the 
United States it would make more sense to allocate areas of the geo- 
stationary orbit as and when a state requires a geostationary position. 
Since this evolutionary approach is subject to equitable rights of access it 
would appear that satellites in geostationary orbit should have the capa- 
bility of being manoeuvred in order to accommodate further satellites that 
are likely to be needed in that area (195). 
The United States, Canada and Brazil were not the only states to reject 
the allocation system since the equatorial countries also adopted the same 
approach. The reasons behind this rejection may be seen in the Bogota 
Declaration of 1976, as discussed above (196). However the claims of the 
192. S. GOROVE, "The Geostationary Orbit: Issues of Low and Policy", 73 
The American Journal of International Low, (1979), p. 458. K. GIBBONS 
"Orbital Saturation: The Necessity for International Regulation of 
Geostationary Orbits", 9 California Western International Law Journal 
(1979), p. 154. 
193. LONBERG, "The Broadcasting Satellite Conference", 44 I. T. U. 
Telecommunication Journal, (1977), p. 488. 
194. GIBBON, (1979), p. T55-3. 
195. JOHNSEN, (1977), p. 85. 
196. I. T. U. Broadcasting Satellite Conference, DOC. No. 81-E, Annex 4 
(January 17th 1977). Also Journal of Space Low, (1978), p. 193. 
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equatorial states in this Declaration were overwhelmingly rejected before 
the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in 
1978 (197) and were further rejected by the Final Acts of the World 
Administrative Radio Conference, in which the United States (198), amongst 
others, stated that the decision of the conference to assign geostationary 
orbital slots was fully within the International Telecommunications Conven- 
tion (199). 
With regard to the allocation plan adopted by the I. T. U. at the 1977 World 
Administrative Radio Conference, several problems present themselves as a 
result of this approach. The first is the fact that the allocation of orbital 
slots might inhibit and hamper the development of space technology by 
withdrawing the availability of slots, as already discussed in relation to the 
United States criticism of the allocation plan. The second problem is to a 
certain degree related to the first in that if states are restricted to 
certain areas of geostationary orbits, then in order to make the fullest use 
of that area, technological prohibitions will be placed on the functioning of 
satellites. This in itself is a serious disadvantage but the overall effect 
could also be to make satellites so expensive as to be uneconomic, thus 
making any system of allocation completely meaningless (200). 
The third problem is not one which is unknown to this whole discussion of 
the common heritage of mankind, common province of mankind and the 
appropriation of territory in outer space and on the moon, in that which 
body should be given responsibility for allocating geostationary orbital slots? 
In the Moon Treaty there is provision for an international regime to govern 
activities on the moon, however no such provision is made for the alloca- 
tion of areas of geostationary orbit in the Outer Space Treaty, though it 
would seem that the I. T. U. has been given the competence to deal with 
197. See earlier arguments. 
198. Supra Note 1-89, Final Protocol No. 74. 
199. Supra Note 185. 
200. United States Department of State, Office of Telecommunications, 
Position Paper on the Allocation of Orbit Positions and Specific 
Radio Frequency Channels, World Administrative Radio Conference, 
June 1971. 
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this issue by virtue of the 1977 Conference. This role that the I. T. U. 
would seem to have acquired would appear to be logical in that it would 
be extremely difficult for a body assigned the task of co-ordinating the 
efficient and economic use of the radio spectrum to do this competently 
without having some say in the positioning of satellites since the two are 
undoubtedly inseperable (201). It is perhaps this fact that eliminates both 
INTELSAT and the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space from taking on this role as suggested by some writers (202). 
INTELSAT is particularly inappropriate since the Soviet Bloc countries are 
not members and therefore any geostationary planning could simply be 
ignored by those nations (203). 
The fourth problem, and the most relevant to this discussion, is that if a 
system of allocation is provided for the use of the geostationary orbit, then 
there must be an overturning of the non-appropriation principle contained in 
Article 11 of the Outer Space Treaty. Further any system of allocation 
must by definition be contrary to Article I of the Outer Space Treaty in 
that "the exploration and use of outer space ... shall be carried out for the 
benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of 
economic or scientific development and shall be the province of all man7 
kind", and more particularly, "outer space (etc. ) ... shall be free for 
exploration and use by all states without discrimination of any kind, on a 
basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall 
be free access to all areas of celestial bodies". If however no allocation 
system is used then the fact that satellites in geostationary orbit occupy a 
particular area of space on a continuous basis (subject to its orbital life), 
201. S. K. SARKAR, "Geostationary Orbital Positions for Space Stations", 
Proceedings of the 20th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 
(1978), p. 450. 
202. Suggesting INTELSAT as the regulator: A. CHAYES and L. CHAZEN 
"Policy Problems in Direct Broadcasting from Satellites", Stanford 
Journal of Internatiohal Studies, (1970), p. 4. Suggesting 
U. N. C. O. P. U. O. S. GIBBONS-, TF979), pp. 154 & 155. 
203. GIBBONS, (1979), pp. 143 & 154. 
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say for thirty years, then that might constitute an appropriation of that 
area of space in that there is an exercise of indefinite control and the 
excluding of others. 
In examining the allocation system and the 'laissez-faire' system of using 
the geostationary orbit and comparing them with Articles I and 11 of the 
Outer Space Treaty, there would appear to be 'circular' inconsistencies in 
that both systems could be inconsistent with the non-appropriation rule in 
Article 11, which in itself is inconsistent with Article I since the non- 
appropriation rule must of itself impose restrictions on the use of space by 
states, which is contrary to paragraph 2 of Article I in that "outer space 
... shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimin- 
ation". This latter point was discussed by the French delegation at the 
United Nations Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites in 1969 in 
which it was stated: 
11... the rule of non-appropriation ... in itself implies a limitation on the complete freedom of States in space. In 
fact the very use of geostationary satellites can be regarded 
as an "appropriation" of the equatorial orbit, which is a 
privileged portion of space. In return for de facto occupation, 
the State responsible for the satellite should agree to submit 
to certain rules. The same applies to the use of a frequency 
for broadcasting, especially since the optimum spectrum of 
frequencies for present requirements is already in very heavy 
use. " (204) 
The U. S. A. immediately countered this argument by stating that provided 
space was used in a peaceful and legitimate manner, then the use of the 
geostationary orbit could not amount to appropriation. According to 
Rankin the U. S. A. is really distinguishing between the word 'use' and the 
phrase 'appropriation by means of use' as found in Article 11 the effect of 
which, it is alleged, is that the use of the geostationary orbit for legit- 
imate activities is allowed because there is no intent to appopriate (205). 
204. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/62 (1969) at p. 3 & 4, as ý: ited by RANKIN, 
(1974), p. 100. 
205. RANKIN, (1974), p. 100 
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Whilst undoubted difficulties exist with the attempts at rationalising the 
geostationary orbit with the non-appropriation rule in Article 11 some light 
might be found by taking the view that the role of the I. T. U. in adopting 
an allocation system is not contrary to Article 11 in that such a system 
does not create "national appropriation by claim of sovereignty". While 
this may seen to be inconsistent with Article I in that the I. T. U. may 
place restrictions on how that allocation is used (vis 6 vis radio fre- 
quencies), it would be illogical to interpret that as stating that the free- 
doms and benefits conferred by Article I are prohibited by Article Il (206). 
As stated already one criticism of the allocation system is that it might 
deprive the world community of a geostationary slot simply because the 
state to which it is allocated has no plans to exploit that slot at that 
particular moment in time. However from the earliest beginnings of man's 
exploitation of space the principle of "first come, first served" applied. 
This principle was succinctly put by the Argentine representative to the 
U. N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in the following 
manner: 
... though everybody has a right to place a space object in 
orbit, the second in line is to respect the route chosen by 
the first. " (207) 
In such a situation where a state has exercised its right of freedom to use 
space by establishing a satellite in a geostationary slot already allocated to 
another state which has failed to make use of that area, it would seem 
inconceivable on the above information that the first state will move out 
of that position merely on the whim of the second state to decide to use 
that slot. Such an attitude would be reinforced on the basis that the first 
state is unlikely to waste very large sums of money on a satellite only to 
206. GIBBONS, (1979), p. 151. 
207. A. A. COCCA, "Towards an Adequate Legal Regulation of the 
Geostationary Orbit", Proceedings of the 20th tolloquium on the 
Low of Outer Space, (1-27-8), p. IV4. 
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be ordered to remove it from its designated orbit, particularly since in 
practice this would be tantamount to the destruction of the satellite 
because of the limited degree to which most satellites in geostationary 
orbit may be manoevred. It must be said therefore that a state putting a 
satellite into another's geostationary slot must be exercising de facto 
control over that area while the satellite is in situ, and is thus technically 
in breach of Article 11 of the Outer Space Treaty, in the some way as any 
other satellite. This is particularly true when one considers there are no 
sanctions that can be taken against a state taking control of another's 
geostationary slot. Nevertheless it should be stated here that while states 
are not legally bound to the resolutions of the I. T. U. they do generally 
abide by them. It is also suggested that the wide consensus on the 
resolutions of the I. T. U. and the regulations contained in the I. T. C. and 
Radio Regulations' instruments imply that there is no legal right to use a 
geostationary position permanently (208), however that in no way detracts 
from the reasoning that a state exercises de facto appropriation of that 
area of space while it has a satellite located there. 
CONCLUSION 
The problem of where national sovereignty over airspace ends and outer 
space begins has been discussed now for more than twenty years without 
its issues being reconciled, even though five treaties dealing with outer 
space have come into being in that time. Indeed the Outer Space Treaty 
1967 would seem to have exacerbated the problem because it is so radic- 
ally different from the Chicago Convention which, by Article 1, "recognises 
that every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace 
above its territory". It would appear however that the perennial problem 
208. S. GOROVE, "The Geostationary Orbit: Issues of- Law and Policy", 
American Journal of International Law, (1979), pp. 458 & 459. 
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of the definition and delimitation of outer space may well soon disappear 
from the agenda since at the 1979 session of the United Nations Com- 
mittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space the U. S. S. R. introduced draft 
provisions for a U. N. General Assembly resolution on the sovereignty 
problem and the status of the geostationary orbit. In this working paper 
(209) the U. S. S. R. proposed: 1) that the region above 100/110 kilometres 
from sea level will be deemed to be outer space in that this is the lowest 
height at which satellites can survive; 2) that space objects of states 
have the right to fly over the territory of other states at lower altitudes 
for the object for the purpose of placing the object in orbit and to effect 
re-entry of the object to the earth's atmosphere; and 3) that the area of 
geostationary orbit is deemed to be in outer space and as such is governed 
by the Outer Space Treaty 1967 - it is thus not subject to claim of 
national sovereignty. 
The U. S. A. has indicated its agreement with the U. S. S. R. on the issue of 
geostationary orbit, though it does not consider a definition of the demar- 
cation line between airspace and outer space to be necessary since it 
maintains that no problem would be solved by the adoption of such a 
definition (210). It has also been stated by the Committee on Space, 
Research of the International Council of Scientific Unions that in the past 
estimates of the lowest altitude at which satellites can survive have been 
too high, thus arguing against the establishment of such an arbitrary 
boundary (211). It is perhaps as a consequence of these two attitudes that 
there has been no commencement on the drafting of any treaty documents 
based on the working paper of the U. S. S. R. 
While the U. S. S. R. 's working paper was undoubtedly a reaction to the 
Bogota Declaration it went further to include a solution to any problem 
209. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/L112, (1979). 
210. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/240, (1979). p. 9. 
211. U. N. DOC. A/AC 1051164, (1976). 
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caused by the inauguration of the space shuttle by the U. S. A., and while 
the problems associated with the geostationary has not prompted inter- 
national action there are possibilities that this new development will. The 
space shuttle has been designed to ascend into outer space like a conven- 
tional spacecraft and to descend in a manner similar to an ordinary 
aircraf t. The problem which has grown out of this development has been 
succinctly put by S. Gorove as follows: - 
"Reduced to its bare essentials, the question is whether the 
shuttle is an aircraft, a spacecraft or both ... If the shuttle is an aircraft while in airspace it will be subject to the rules 
of air law, domestic and international i. e. the CHICAGO 
CONVENTION WILL APPLY. If the shuttle is a spacecraft 
not only in outer space but also during its descent through 
airspace to earth, then the rules of the space low, domestic 
and international would apply to it, i. e. the OUTER SPACE 
TREATY WILL APPLY". (212) 
Thus the problem even though quite different from that of the geosta- 
tionary orbit raises the same questions as to national sovereignty and the 
delimitation of airspace and outer space. As already stated, none of the 
five existing space treaties (213) define the terms 'airspace' and 'outer 
space', but neither do they define the term 'space object', though it has 
been proposed by one author that a space object is any craft designed and 
intended for use in outer space (214). If this definition were applied 
clearly the space shuttle would be considered as a space vehicle and the 
four earlier international treaties would apply to it. If this was the case a 
further question would be raised as to whether international space law 
would take precedence over the Paris and Chicago Conventions. it is 
suggested that the space agreements being later in time would take such 
precedence, at least to states that are parties to both the air and space 
212. S. GOROVE, "Legal Aspects of the Space Shuttle", International 
Lawyer, (1979), p. 154. 
213. Outer Space Treaty 1967; Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, 
the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into 
Outer Space 1968; Convention on the Registration of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space 1975; Convention on International 
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects 1972; Moon Treaty 
1979. 
214. S. GOROVE, Space Low - Its Challenge and Prospects, Sijtoff- 
Leyden, (1? 77), pp. 105-6. 
- 79 - 
agreements, and thus would not be in breach of the sovereign airspace of 
any state it might pass through, either in ascending into orbit or in re- 
entering to the atmosphere. 
The adoption of the U. S. S. R. 's proposal that space objects of states have 
the right to fly over the territory of other states at a lower altitude than 
that of their proposed 100/110 kilometre boundary, in order to place an 
object in space and to effect re-entry, would undoubtedly provide the best 
solution to the problem, though one that is unlikely to be adopted for two 
reasons. Firstly, the proposal has pre-empted the need for such an excep- 
tion to the two previous international air law conventions in that there is 
no requirement for such a facility, since both major space nations are able 
to use either their own territory or the high seas to effect orbit and re- 
entry. Secondly, the U. S. S. R. proposal is likely to be viewed by other 
states as an erosion of their sovereign airspace and is unlikely to be 
countenanced not only from this point of view, but also from the fact that 
such a right of passage could affect their national security. On the other 
hand, it has been argued that national security would not be threatened by 
the adoption of such a proposal since if the spacecraft was a space 
shuttle, with the manoeuverability of an aircraft, it would still be possible 
to regulate its height and direction so as to fully protect the security of 
the underlying state (215). It is also argued that if it was decided to 
establish an outer space boundary that this would do nothing to protect a 
state's security (216). Both arguments could be said to be incorrect since, 
the first fails to recognise the possibility of such a craft carrying weapons 
of mass destruction aimed at the underlying state, and although such 
weapons are prohibited from being placed in orbit by virtue of Article IV 
of the Outer Space Treaty 190, there is nothing to prevent a state using 
outer space to deliver such weapons. The first argument may also be 
215. S. B. ROSENFIELD, "Where Air Space Ends and Outer Space Begins", 
7 Journal of Space Low, (1979), p. 146. 
216. lbfiýr_ 
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criticised in that it attributes a potential of manoeuverability to the space 
shuttle that has not been developed, and is unlikely to be developed for 
many years, as well as the fact that at present all spacecraft (including 
the shuttle) are carried into orbit by conventional means. The second 
argument may be said to be incorrect in that it attempts to justify the 
application of the U. S. S. R. proposal by adopting a negative stance on a 
state's right to sovereignty over its airspace -a principle that is firmly 
accepted as positive international law. The main concern of a state is to 
protect itself against surveillence or attack, and since surveillence can be 
carried out far more easily in space than from an aircraft at a lower 
altitude, the question must be asked - what altitude is required to protect 
a state? Merely deciding on an arbitrary limit on airspace is unlikely to 
increase the security of a state because of the accuracy of satellite 
surveillence techniques. Nevertheless, a state is entitled to feel secure on 
both its horizontal and vertical boundaries., and while a definition of where 
sovereignty ends is unlikely to increase such security, it does provide a 
state with an air defence identification zone within which pre-emptive 
action could be taken against unidentified vehicles (217). Several states, 
particularly the U. S. A. would prefer the existing functional approach rather 
than the provision of a definitive line as proposed by the U. S. S. R. and 
clearly as regards the problems that have occurred so far the functional 
approach has provided a solution, though this is primarily because such an 
approach is contained in the existing international space law agreements, 
other than the Outer Space Treaty which ignores the question altogether, 
except insofar as it regulates activities rather than areas. Thus, in the 
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the 
Return of Objects Launched Into Space 1968 part of the purpose of this 
agreement is to render assistance to astronauts in cases of distress or 
217. Supra Notes 97 & 98. 
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emergency (218) without reference to where the incident occurred. The 
Convention will apply therefore if the distress occurs on the territory of a 
contracting party, on the high seas, or in any other place not under the 
jurisdiction of any state (219) providing the incident involves an astronaut 
or an object launched into space. A similar approach is found in the 
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects 
1972 where a launching state is liable for any damage caused whether that 
be on the surface of the earth, to an aircraft in flight, or in outer space 
(220). Thus it is of no importance where the damage occurred if a 
spacecraft is involved, just that it occurred. In both these cases no 
definition of outer space is required for the solution to be found since they 
are purely functional in their operation. 
Though the functional approach can provide solutions to certain problems it 
would be shortsighted to dispense with the need for a definitive line, since 
if the space shuttle became available to smaller, less scientifically advan- 
ced states some degree of limitation would be required simply to avoid the 
possibility of a vehicle using the same course as some other craft. 
Certainly if a line is to be drawn it must be based either on some scien- 
tific criteria on which states can agree, or be designed as a solution to a 
specific problem. No prediction can be made as to when these circum- 
stances may arise though it is plain that they do not exist at the present 
moment in time. Even if they did it is probable that the states concerned 
would not be able to agree on substantially the same policies, but prefer 
to rely on the vague and ambiguous formulae laid down by the Outer Space 
Treaty 1967. 
With regard to the problem of the establishment of sovereign rights within 
the geostationary orbit it would seem that the system of allocation would 
tend to overturn the non-appropriation principle set out in Article 11 of the 
218. Article 11. 
219. Article I. 
220. Article 11 and 111. 
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Outer Space Treaty. Further it may be said that if a state were to 
occupy a position within the geostationary orbit for an extensive period of 
time on a continuous basis then an implication of sovereign rights may be 
raised, though in the face of Article 11 such a view would be erroneous. 
Alternatively it would probably prove logical to suggest that whilst such 
rights are not established, a state would enjoy enhanced possessoxy rights. 
The 1980 Report of the Legal Sub-Committee still reflected the fact the 
members of COPUOS still had divergent views relating to both the issues 
of delimitation and the geostationary orbit. On the matter of the former 
there was still disagreement as to whether the spatial or functional 
approach should be adopted, though even amongst those advocating the 
spatial approach there was widespread disagreement (221). With regard to 
the latter the equatorial states re-asserted their claim that they exercised 
sovereign rights over those segments of the orbital position superjacent to 
their territories. These claims were of course rejected by the space- 
resource states, though some of these states did acknowledge that devel- 
oping countries should have equitable access to the orbital position and 
that their needs might be determined through the I. T. U. The representa- 
tives of the developing countries favoured the creation of an equitable 
regime whose function would be to ensure that the orbital position be 
employed for the benefit of all countries but with special reference to the 
needs of the developing states (222). Their claim that the "first come, 
first served" basis of allocating geostationary orbital slots was depriving 
them of future resources was, not surprisingly, opposed by the advanced 
states whocla-kned that any detailed allotment of orbital slots would simply 
result in a freeze of technological advance. 
221. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/271, April 10th 1980. 
222. C. Q. CHRISTOL, (1982), p. 494. 
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In 1981 the Legal Sub-Committee considered widely the pros and cons of 
using a formal agreement on the boundary between airspace and outer 
space (223), however it was clear that the members of COPUOS were not 
in a consensus position on the subject of delimitation. Further the widely 
divergent views relating to the geostationary orbit also put this issue in 
the same position, as a result no set of proposals was forthcoming. 
Perhaps the most ominous aspect to this area of international space law 
was that attitudes were beginning to harden, particularly in relation to the 
geostationary orbit, and such a situation is fatal to a system based on 
consensus. 
Clearly there are direct links between the issues of the geostationary 
orbit and the question of the delimitation of space. However the claims 
of the equatorial states have come after several years of space explor- 
ation by the space-resource states who have now come to rely on the 
international legal regime built up over those years - the right to assured 
freedom of access to space coupled with the free and equal use of the 
space resource, as given in Article 1, Il and III of the 1967 Treaty. The 
result of these claims was to put the spotlight on the delimitation problem 
which had, until 1976, been pushed to the backwaters of international 
space low, when it emerged as a rule of customary international law in 
that the boundary between airspace and outspace was at least as low as 
100-110 kilometres. 
No agreement would appear to be forthcoming that will contradict this 
rule and therefore above this level one has to rely on the outer space 
Treaty to find the law, and since the treaty specifically preserves the free 
and equal exploration, use and exploitation of space together with free 
223. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/288, April 20th 1981, p. 10. 
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access, it seems clear that the geostationary orbit falls within the pro- 
visions of the treaty. However in the absence of provisions prohibiting 
the acquisition of preferential rights in space there is no reason why a 
rule of customary international law cannot in due course arise giving such 
a right even though they would tend to be inconsistent with the freedom 
of use provisions of the 1967 Treaty. 
- 85 - 
CHAPTER TWO 
STATE PRACTICE AND THE MOON TREATY 
WITH REFERENCE TO THE OUTER SPACE TREATY 1967 
From the very beginnings of space flight it seemed to be accepted that 
space was subject to the principle of res communis omnium, as opposed to 
res nullius, and could not be appropriated on a basis of sovereignty. 
Strictly speaking because space is infinite and incapable of measurement it 
should be regarded as communis omnium though not necessarily res (1). 
This approach would however seem to be somewhat trivial since even in 
Roman law intangible 'things' were included in its property system as res 
incorpolares (2). The main distinction between res communes and res 
nullius would appear to be that the latter indicates that the area in 
question is not subject to state sovereignty and is thus capable of occu- 
pation, whilst in the former the area cannot be occupied in a manner 
which can establish sovereign rights, and is thus described by some writers 
as res extra commercium in order to underline the principle (3). Though 
the term res communes has never been conclusively def ined in inter- 
national law (4), in the view of Gyula Gal it would seem that in the 
context of space law it means that all states may carry on space activi- 
ties on the basis of sovereign equality (5). 
1. BIN CHENG, "The Extra-Terrestial Application of International 
Low", 18 Current Legal Problems, (1965), p. 143. 
2. INST. 11 2,2 as contained in G. GAL Space Law, Sijthoff Leyden, 
(1? 6? ), p. 124. 
3. BIN CHENG, "International Low and High Altitude Flights, Balloons, 
Rockets and Man-made Satellites", International and Comparative 
Law QuarterIX, (1? 59), p. 4? 4. 
4.97T. - LAY and J. J. TAUBENFIELD, The Law Relating to the Activi- 
ties of Man in Space, University of Chicago Press, (1970), p. 53. 
5. GAL, (1? 6? ), p. 123. 
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The theoretical acceptance of the principle of res communis in space is 
derived from the analysis of two other legal regimes - the High Seas 
which has had the greatest influence in providing space with the principle 
of res communis, though the High Seas regime itself has not always 
accepted the principle. Between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries 
the accepted legal principle on the High Seas was one of mare clausurn or 
"closed seas", though this declined after Grotius publicised his objections 
to Portuguese monopoly of navigation and commerce in the East Indies 
(6). The main objections by Grotius were that firstly, the ocean cannot 
be the property of a state since it cannot be effectively taken into 
possession by occupation, and secondly, Grotius maintained that things 
which are inexhaustible and capable of being used by anybody cannot be 
appropriated by-someone else to the exclusion of all others (7). 
An attempt to define the principle of freedom of the seas was made in 
Article Il of the Convention of the High Seas, signed at Geneva in 1958, 
which states: - 
"The High Seas being open to all nations, no state may 
validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. 
Freedom of the High Seas is. exercised under the conditions 
laid down by these articles and by the other rules of inter- 
national law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and 
non coastal states: - 
1. Freedom of navigation, 
2. Freedom of f ishing, 
3. Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, 
4. Freedom to fly over the high seas, 
These freedoms, and others which are recognised by the 
general principles of international law, shall be exercised by 
all states with reasonable regard to the interests of other 
States in their exercise of the freedom of the High Seas. " 
The above freedoms, particularly the freedom to fish, have their original 
6.1. BROWNLIE, Principles of Public International Law, Clarendon 
Press, (1973), p. 233; from "De Jure Praedae" by GROTIUS. 
7. GROTIUS, "More Liberum", (1609). 
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authority in arbitral decisions (8) and customary rules of international law, 
but all are subject to the rights of states over the continental shelf and 
contiguous zones, as discussed in the United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea. It should however be stated that the freedom of the 
High Seas from assertions of sovereignty is not irrebuttable, since it is 
possible for a state's territorial sea to be extended and acquired by virtue 
of general acquiescence (9). 
Another feature of the rules relating to the high seas is that while certain 
freedoms are protected this does not mean that there otherwise exists a 
possibility of unregulated lawlessness, since there exist specific inter- 
national rules giving maritime states such rights as "hot pursuit" and the 
right to board ships engaged in piracy or slavery (10). 
Whereas the legal regime for the high seas gives it a status of res omnium 
communis, the legal regime for Antarctica gives it a theore tical status of 
res nullius, though it is in fact subject to a specific legal regime. The 
reasoning behind this difference lies in the fact that while certain states 
have laid claim to sovereignty on the basis of the sector principle (11), 
Article IV of the A-itarctica Treaty 1959 states: 
"No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty 
is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting 
or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or 
create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new 
claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present 
Treaty is in force. " (12) 
Thus states party to the Antarctica Treaty are not renouncing their claims 
to sovereignty, on the contrary they have merely reserved their rights and 
claims for a period of thirty years (13). There is therefore nothing to 
8. e. g. The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case I. C. J. Reports (1951), 
pp. 181-9; The Bering Sea Fisheries Arbitrations (1983) (Moore, 
"Digest", Para. 172) and (1902) (Moore, "Digest", Para. 173). 
9. Ibid. 
10. Convention on the High Seas 1958, Article 22. 
11. GRIEG, (1976), p. 174. 
12. Antarctica Treaty Article IV. Text Command 913, MISC. No. 21, 
(1959). For the U. K. See the Antarctica Treaty Act, 1967 ch. 65. 
13. Article XII. 
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prevent a state not party to the Treaty laying a claim of sovereignty to a 
part of Antarctica because of its res nullius status. Despite this a 
number of authors refer to the regime in Antarctica as being analogous to 
the regime in outer space (14). Whilst it is true that certain articles of 
the Outer Space Treaty have their counterparts in the Artarctic Treaty 
(15), the fact that claims as to sovereignty have only been suspended must 
cost doubts on such an approach. In this respect Gyula Gal has stated: - 
"As ... the renouncement of rights is but temporary, we are bound to reach the conclusion that an analogous application of 
the present status of the Antarctic, ... for outer space would be incorrect". (16) 
Those who support the view that the regime in Antarctica is analogous to 
outer space point to the preamble of the Antarctica Treaty which states: - 
it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall 
continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes 
... it 
as indicating a resemblance between the two regimes. However, if one 
compares thiswording with equivalent provisions in Article I of the Outer 
Space Treaty that "... outer space ... shall be the province of all mankind" 
and the provisions in Article XI of the Moon Treaty that "... the moon 
and other celestial bodies shall be the common heritage of mankind", it is 
clear that whilst the regime in Antarctica may conceivably amount to 
something more than res nullius, it cannot be said to constitute a regime 
of res omnium communis. 
If the assumption is made that space and celestial bodies constitute a 
regime of res communis, as described above, the fact that it has never 
been defined in international law must not be ignored. It is thus neces- 
sary to examine the extent of the "common heritage of mankind" provision, 
14.1. BROWNLIE, Principles of Public International Law, Clarendon 
Press, (1973), p. 261; C. W. JENKS 'S ace Low, (1? 65), p. 106; J. E. S. FAWCETT, International Law and the Uses of ý)uter Space, Man- 
chester University Press, (1968), p. 34; N. MATTE, Aerospace Law, 
Sweet & Maxwell, (1969), p. 289. 
15. i. e. Articles 1,11 and V. 
16. GAL, (1? 6? ), p. 121. 
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which purports to embody the principle of res communis, in that there can 
be no sovereign rights established in space. However the increasing use 
of the term "mankind" tends to indicate something more than such a 
prohibition: Thus Article I of the Outer Space Treaty 1967 states that: - 
"The exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon 
and other celestial bodies shall be carried out for the benefit 
and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their 
degree of economic or scientific development and shall be the 
province of all mankind. " (17) 
With regard to the M oon and other celestial bodies, Article XI Paragraph 
1 of the Agreement governing the Activities of States on the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies (18), reinforced the res communis nature of the 
Outer Space Treaty by stating that, 
"The Moon and its natural resources are the common heritage 
of mankind 
What may be said to be a further reinforcement of these provisions may 
also be found in Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, which specifically 
prohibits the appropriation of space, 
"Outer Space, including the moon and other celestial bodies is 
not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, 
by means of use or occupation or by any other means. " 
Similarly this article is also embodied in the Moon Treaty of 1979 (19). 
From the above it would seem that the principle of the common heritage 
of mankind as embodied in the Moon Treaty has established a further 
category of ter ritory in international law alongside national sovereignty, 
res nullius and res comm urAs (20). Since the Moon Treaty was the first 
document of a binding nature to contain this term it is necessary to 
17. G. A. RESOLUTION 2222 (XXI), Annex (6 I. L. M. 386 (1967) ); 3 
U. S. T. 2410; T. I. A. S. 6347. 
18. U. N. DOC. A/34/664; 18 I. L. M. 1434 (1979), G. A. RES. 34/68. 
19. Article XI Paragraph 2. 
20. BIN CHENG, "The Moon Treaty: Agreement Governing the Activities 
of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies within the Solar 
System other than the Earth, December 18th 1979, Current Legal 
Problems, (1980), p. 213. 
- 90 - 
analyse it in order to discover the extent of its application, both to states 
and private entities. 
Whilst the Moon Treaty was the first to embody the concept of the 
"common heritage of mankind" it was in fact proposed as long ago as 
August 17th 1967, when Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta asked the 21st 
Session of the United Nations General Assembly to include on its agenda 
for the 22nd Session an item proposing a discussion and treaty reserving 
the sea bed, ocean floor and underlying seas beyond the then limits of 
national jurisdiction for exclusively peaceful purposes. Accompanying the 
proposal was a memorandum explaining that the sea bed and ocean floor 
should be for the "common heritage of mankind" (21). In December 1970 
the General Assembly resolved that: - 
"The sea bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as 
the area), as well as the resources of the area, are the 
common heritage of mankind" (22). 
However such resolutions are not considered to be legally binding, and as 
a result the concept was adopted by the United Nations Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and embodied in the Moon Treaty before 
the orga nisational session of the United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea could translate the new concept into treaty law. 
There have been attempts to use the common heritage of mankind princ- 
iple in the Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 as analogous to that in 
the Moon Treaty though this is questionable, since according to C. Q. 
Christol (23), there has been an effort to keep separate the common 
heritage of mankind principle as applying to the deep sea bed separate 
21. U. N. DOC. A/6695, August 18th 1967. 
22. U. N. DOC. A/RES/2749 (XXV), (1970), 10 International Legal Mat- 
erials (1970), 220. 
23. C. Q. CKRISTOL, "The Common Heritage of Mankind Provision in the 
1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies", International Lawyer (1980), p. 475. 
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from that as applying to the Moon; in that the criteria contained in 
Article XI Paragraph 7 of the Moon Treaty, for the implementation of the 
common heritage of mankind principle, were designed specifically for 
application to the Moon and its natural resources. Further, Ambassador 
R. W. Petree of the United States before the Special Committee of the 
General Assembly on November 1st, 1979 maintained that the meaning of 
the common heritage of mankind principle was "without prejudice to its 
use and meaning in any other treaty" and that its meaning was "to be 
found within the Moon Treaty itself" (24). 
Nevertheless an examination of the Declaration of Principles Governing the 
Sea Bed and the Ocean Floor (25) may give some indications as to the 
extent of the term "common heritage of mankind" as a form of territorial 
status, since Principle 2 states: - 
"The area shall not be subject to appropriation by any means 
by states or persons, natural or juridical, and no State shall 
claim or exercise sovereign rights over any part thereof. " 
Further Principle 3 states: - 
"No State or person, natural or juridical, shall claim, exercise 
or acquire rights with respect to the area or its resources 
incompatible with the international regime to be established 
and the principles of this declaration. " 
Private companies or "non-governmental entities" are expressly permitted 
to take part in activities in space and on celestial bodies by virtue of the. 
Outer Space Treaty of 1967 (26), provided the relevant State party 
authorises and undertakes continuing supervision of that entity. It would 
seem that this supervision does not mean the continued presence of a 
governmental official, but that control would be in the nature of consul- 
tations, reports, inspections and investigations of reported failure to abide 
24. R. W. PETREE, U. N. DOC. A/SPC/34/SR 19, November 1st 1979. 
25. G. A. RESOLUTION 2749 (XXV) (1970). 
26. Article VI. 
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by regulatory directives, as may be embodied in statute (27). The involve- 
ment of non-governmental entities in space was extended to include the 
Moon and other celestial bodies by the Moon Treaty of 1979 (28). . 
How- 
ever this involvement has also created a problem since the growth of 
private enterprise must depend on the commercial exploitation either of 
space itself or of the moon or some other celestial body, and such 
exploitation would appear to contradict the common heritage of mankind 
principle. A further difficulty also arises with the attempts to justify 
private exploitation in that Article Il of the Outer Space Treaty and 
Paragraph 2 of the Article XI of the Moon Treaty expressly states that 
outer space including the moon and other celestial bodies is not subject to 
national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occu- 
pation or by any other means and therefore there would appear to be room 
for private appropriation. There would thus appear to be some inconsis- 
tency between private and public involvement in space. 
Whilst the exploitation of space on a commercial scale by non-govern- 
mental agencies with the supervision of their respective governments is 
clearly in order, this would not seem to be the case with the moon or 
other celestial bodies since Article XI states: - 
"Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon, nor any 
part thereof or natural resources in place, shall become 
property of any state, international, intergovernmental or 
non-governmental organisation, national organisation or non- 
governmental entity or of any natural person. The placement 
of personnel, space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations and 
installations on or below the surface of the moon, including 
structures connected with its surface or subsurface, shall not 
create a right of ownership over the subsurface of the moon 
or any areas thereof. The foregoing provisions are without 
prejudice to the international regime referred to in paragraph 
5 of this article. " (29) 
27. M. MENTOR, "Commercial Participation in Space Activities", 
Journal of Space Law, (1981), p. 56. 
28. Article XIV. 
29. Paragraph 3. 
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Paragraph 5 of Article XI then goes on to say: - 
"States Parties to this Agreement hereby undertake to estab- 
lish an international regime, including appropriate procedures, 
to govern the exploitation of the natural resources of the 
moon as such exploitation is about to become feasible 
(30) 
The effect of reading these two paragraphs in conjunction with each other 
may be to render the commercial exploitation of the moon, or other 
celestial bodies, extremely difficult post the stage of initial exploration 
until the establishment of the international regime. According to Para- 
graph 7 of Article XI the main purposes of the international regime is to 
ensure: - 
(a) The orderly and safe development of the natural 
resources of the moon; 
(b) The rational management of those resources; 
(c) The expansion of opportunities in the use of those 
resources; 
(d) An equitable sharing by all State Parties in the 
benefits derived from those resources, whereby the 
interests and needs of the developing countries, as 
well as the efforts of those countries which have 
contributed either directly or indirectly to the 
exploration of the moon, shall be given special 
consideration. " 
If this paragraph portrays the criteria for the application of the common 
heritage of mankind principle, as seems to be suggested (31), then it goe's 
a great deal further than anyone first imagined when comparing the 
principle with the concepts of res nullius and res communis. Certainly the 
principle is more restrictive than the "common province of all mankind" 
provision contained in the Outer Space Treaty (32), which the U. S. S. R. 
preferred to adopt since it meant that the moon and other celestial bodies 
would be "available for the undivided and common use of all states but 
not jointly owned by them". (33) 
30. Article XI Paragraph 5. 
31. CHRISTOL, (1980), p. 453. 
32. Article 1. 
33. U. S. S. R. Working Paper. U. N. DOC. A/AC/ 1051101 (1973). 
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In fact the U. S. S. R. only eventually acceded to the common heritage of 
mankind provision on the last day of the 1979 meeting of the Committee 
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. 
However whilst the common heritage of mankind provision is more restric- 
tive as towards rights on the moon, inextricably mixed into the rights 
given to exploit the moon and other celestial bodies is the requirement to 
establish the international regime to police the activities of states and 
individuals in their exploitation of the moon and other celestial bodies. So 
far however no such regime has been established and one wonders whether 
the drafters of the treaty envisaged the setting up of a new international 
organisation to monitor the factors contained in Article XI Paragraph 7, 
or alternatively the provision of a set of rules designed to ensure comp- 
liance with Paragraph 7. Each interpretation has its problems. In the 
first instance it is doubted whether the willpower is present to set up a 
new international organisation, quite apart from the difficulties involved in 
monitoring compliance with the treaty and funding in such an organisation. 
Secondly, it is unlikely, in the light of the protracted negotiations 
required to produce the Moon Treaty in the first place, that sufficient 
impetus is present to produce a complex set of rules giving effect to 
Paragraph 7. 
Article XI Paragraph 6 states: - 
"In order to facilitate the establishment of the international 
regime referred to in paragraph 5 of this article States 
Parties shall inform the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations as well as the public and the international scientific 
community, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of 
any natural resources they may discover on the moon. " 
From this there would appear to be an indication that the drafters 
intended that a body of rules be formulated to give effect to Paragraph 7 
through state practice, though it must be said that such an approach 
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would appear to be unworkable without some sort of institutional structure. 
This is particularly true as regards Paragraph 7 (d) which relates to the 
equitable sharing of benefits. It would seem that another treaty would be 
required to establish the international regime, otherwise Article XI Para- 
graph 5 would merely be in the nature of a pacturn de contrahendo, 
requiring states merely to attempt to negotiate with a view to establishing 
such a regime (34). 
The problem of such an agreement becoming reality was summed up by 
Neil Hosenball, Chairman of the U. S. Delegation to the 1979 Committee 
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space meeting as: - 
"There is nothing ... in the M oon Treaty that binds us to 
anything in any follow up conference, and the world, I think, 
may be a lot different when exploitation is proven feasible on 
a commercial scale, and that common heritage may mean 
something completely different then. " (35) 
The Moon Treaty does however make some provision for what is to happen 
in the interim period before the agreement is made since Article XI 
paragraph 8 states: - 
"All the activities with respect to the national resources 
of the moon shall be carried out in a manner compatible with 
the purposes specified in paragraph 7 
Nevertheless unless some further agreement is arrived at over the esta6- 
lishment of an international regime, the scope of the common heritage of 
mankind provision must be seriously weakened. 
As already indicated the U. S. S. R. has historically shown itself to be less 
than willing to adopt the common heritage principle and, indeed, in 1978 
it made the following statement: - 
34. B. CHENG, "General Principles of Law as Applied by International 
Courts and Tribunals", 1953, pp. 117-118, as cited in B. CHENG, "The 
Moon Treaty: Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies within the Solar System Other than 
the Earth, December 18th 1979"; 
-Current 
Legal Problems, (1980), 
p. 231. 
35. Given on July 3rd 1979 and quoted before the House Committee on 
Science and Technology, 96th Congress, 1st Session, (1979), p. 96, in 
the Hearing on International Space Activities. 
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"The complete unwillingness of some countries to abandon the 
introduction of the concept of common heritage into the new 
treaty threatened to make it impossible to conclude the 
treaty" (36). 
Prior to this statement there had been very fierce resistance to the 
common heritage principle seen in the writings of Dekanazov, who stated 
that the concept was: - 
untenable from the legal point of view. It uses civil Law 
categories in an arbitrary eclectic fashion without any regard 
for established legal realities and brings to mind undesirable 
associations (like the notion of res omnium communis which 
had been) transfered from the Roman private low into the 
field of international relations. " (37) 
The reason why the concept was "untenable from the legal point of view" 
to the U. S. S. R. was that it regarded the common heritage of mankind 
provision as embodying the concept of inheritance which belonged to civil 
law, and since the concept was not known in Soviet civil law it could not 
be embodied as part of public international law (38). 
It is not inconceivable therefore that the U. S. S. R. could accept the notion 
of the common heritage of mankind by acceding to the treaty, and yet 
reduce its effectiveness substantially by failing to agree on the introduc- 
tion of the international regime. The position may be summed up by Mr. 
Petree before theSpecial Political Committee as follows: - 
"Each of the participants in the conference on such a regime 
would of course, have to evaluate any treaty emerging from 
the conference in the light of their own national interests. 
For this country that would require a treaty which was 
balanced and reasonable and which met with the approval of 
the United States Senate. " (39) 
In the light of this it may be argued that if the exploration of the Moon, 
36. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/219, May 15th 1978, p. 35. 
37. R. V. DEKANAZOV, "Relationship Between the Status of Outer Space 
and the Statuses of Areas Withdrawn from State Sovereignty", 
Proceedings of the 16th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, 
(1974), p. 10. 
38. U. N. DOC. A/AC 1051M, ANNEX, April 11th 1977 p. 11. 
39. R. W. PETREE, U. N. DOC. A/SPC/34/SR19, Noýember 1st 1979, 
Para. 24, before theSpecial Political Committee of the U. N. General 
Assembly. 
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and the other principles contained in Article XI paragraph 7 are dependent 
on the establishment of the international regime, it might be interpreted 
that a moratorium exists on the exploitation of the moon and other 
celestial bodies until such a regime is established. 
The problem of whether the treaty contained a moratorium or not arose 
because of the United Nations Assembly resolution declaring a moratorium 
on the exploitation of the sea bed and ocean floor in 1969 (40) and it was 
thought that the Moon Treaty had the same effect. This was regarded 
seriously by the United States since as early as 1973 the Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space had been advised as to the United 
States position. Thus the United States working paper of that year 
stated: - 
"As is apparent from the text, this paper excludes the 
concept of a pre-regime moratorium. References to the 
words 'in place' in the first sentence of that paragraph (2) 
and to paragraph 7 of Article X (41) make this clear. More 
particularly, the words 'in place' in the first sentence of 
paragraph 2 are intended to indicate that the prohibition 
against assertion of property rights would not apply to natural 
resources once reduced to possession through exploitation 
either in the pre-regime period cr, subject to the rules and 
procedures that a regime would constitute, following the 
establishment of the regime. " (42) 
After the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space vote on the 
draft treaty, Neil Hosenball, the United States delegate, stated: - 
"The draft agreement ... as part of the compromises mcde by 
many delegations, places no moratoriurr. upon the exploitation 
of the natural resources on celestial bodies, pending the 
establishment of an international regime. This permits 
orderly attempts to establish that such exploitation is in fact 
feasible and practicable, by making possible experimental 
beginnings and, then, pilot operations, a process by which we 
believe we can learn if it will be practicable and feasible to 
exploit the mineral resources of such celestial bodies. " (43) 
40. U. N. DOC. A/RES/2574 D(XXIV), (1970), 9 International Legal Mat- 
erials, (1970), p. 422. 
41. Article X in the draft treaty became Article XI in the treaty itself. 
42. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/C2 (XI)/WORKING PAPER (1Z73). 
43. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/PV 203, July 3rd 1979, p. 22. 
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This view was supported by Petree in his statement before the United 
Nations General Assembly Special Political Committee when he said that: - 
"The draft Treaty placed no moratorium on the exploitation of 
the natural resources of celestial bodies by States or their 
nationals, but it did provide that any such exploitation must be 
carried out in accordance with Article XI paragraph 7, and 
Article VI Paragraph 2. " (44) 
Certainly Paragraph 6 of Article XI also tends to imply that at least 
preliminary exploitation may be carried out since it requires states to 
inform the Secretary General of the United Nations, as well as the public, 
of the feasibility of the exploitation of the moon or other celestial bodies 
so that the international regime can be established (45). 
Such views have been rejected by L. S. Ratiner who stated on September 
6th 1979 that: - 
it is my very strong view that the Moon Treaty in its 
present form imposes a de facto moratorium on private 
enterprise use of outer space in connection with the develop- 
ment of natural resources. " (46) 
It seems, according to Cheng, that the difference of opinion is caused by 
different interpretations of the term "exploitation" (47). He thought that 
Ratiner in analysing Article XI Paragraph 5, which provided for an inter- 
national regime to be established when "exploitation is about to become 
44. U. N. DOC. A/SPC/34/SR 19, November 1st 1979, Para. 25. Article VI 
Paragraph 2 states: - 
"In carrying out scientific investigations and in furtherance of 
the provisions of this Agreement, the states Parties shall have 
the right to collect on and remove from the Moon samples of 
its mineral and other substances. Such samples shall remain 
at the disposal of those States Parties which caused them to 
be collected and may be used by them for scientific purposes. 
States Parties shall have regard to the desirability of making a 
portion of such samples available to other interested States 
Parties and the international scientific community for scien- 
tific investigation. States Parties may in the course of 
scientific investigations also use mineral and other substances 
of the moon in quantities appropriate for the support of their 
missions. " 
45. Ibid at p. 119. 
46. Hearings before the Sub-Committee on Space- Science and the 
Application of the Committee on Science & Technology, U. S. House 
of Representatives, 96th Congress 1st Session, September 5th & 6th 
1979. 
47. CHENG, (1980), p. 230. 
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feasible", had come to the conclusion that "exploitation" meant the sys- 
tematic utilisation of the moon and other celestial bodies for commercial 
or other purposes. Certainly such an interpretation would be borne out by 
examining the Deep Sea Mining (Temporary Provisions) Act 1981, Section 
17 of the United Kingdom where "exploration in relation to the hard 
mineral resources of the deep sea bed, means the investigation of that 
part of the deep sea bed for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not 
the hard mineral resources of that part of the deep sea bed can be 
commercially exploited". On the other hand Hosenball seemed to indicate 
in his statement (48) that the term "exploitation" also included the prelimi- 
nary exploratory work and since such work is permitted by virtue of 
Article VI Paragraph 2 (49) provided it is carried out in accordance with 
the principles contained in Article XI Paragraph 7 and in Article VI 
Paragraph 2 itself (50), there can be no question of a moratorium existing. 
A further point which would appear to contradict the theory that a 
moratorium exists is that in 1974 a proposal was put forward by Egypt, 
Nigeria and India, that only "exploration for experimental purposes" should 
be permitted, but this was firmly rejected. (51) 
It would from the above arguments, appear that even if the U. S. S. R. 
attempted to prevent the full application of the common heritage principle 
by prevaricating over the setting up of the international regime, this would 
be to no avail since states parties may still exploit the moon and celestial 
bodies. Such exploitation must however take place in accordance with 
state practice, though it is difficult to imagine how the "rational manage- 
ment of those resources" provision under principle (b) will develop satisfac- 
torily by such a method when such co-operation is so difficult to achieve 
48. Supra Note 43. 
49. For text See Note 44 Supra. 
50. Article XI Para. 8, which states: - "All the activities with respect to 
the natural resources of the moon shall be carried out in a manner 
compatible with the purposes specified in Para. 7 of this Article. and 
the provisions of Article 6 Para. 2. " 
51. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/C2A-97 (1974). 
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in relation to the earth itself. 
A similar difficulty may also be found with regard to provision (d) under 
Paragraph 7 of the Article XI, which states that the benefits derived from 
the exploitation of space shall be 'equitably shared by all States Parties'. 
According to Carl Christol the common heritage of mankind principle has 
been influenced by considerations based on the moral concern that "man- 
kind has been based on the proposition that the rich and powerful possess a 
moral obligation to aid those less favourably endowed" (52). He also 
maintains that "realism must take into account the fact that scientific and 
technological competences are not equally shared amongst states" (53). On 
the subject of such realism it should be pointed out that such moral 
considerations requiring the equitable sharing of the proceeds of the 
exploitation of space only apply to " States Parties" to the treaty, and 
further, realism should also dictate and envelope the method by which the 
proceeds of exploitation are to be distributed. 
At present there is no accepted definition as to the practical meaning of 
the term "equitable sharing" though it seems likely that a restricted 
meaning of the term should be adopted because of obvious difficulty of 
calculating and distributing any benefits that have accrued to states., 
However the preamble to the United Nations Convention on the Low of the 
Sea gives some indication of the possible meaning of the term when it 
states: - 
"Recognising the desirability of establishing through this 
Convention, with due regard for the sovereignty of all States, 
a legal order for the seas and oceans which will facilitate 
international communication., and will promote the peaceful 
uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient 
utilisation of their resources, the conservation of their living 
resources, and the study, protection and preservation of the 
marine environment. Bearing in mind that the achievement of 
52. CHRISTOL, (1980), p. 453. 
53. Ibid. 
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these goals will contribute to the realisation of a just and 
equitable international economic order which takes into 
account the interests and needs of mankind as a whole and, in 
particular, the special interests and needs of developing 
countries, whether coastal or land-locked. " (54) 
Nevertheless, as far as outer space is concerned, it may well be simpler to 
interpret the term in an analogous manner to Article I of the Outer Space 
Treaty of 1767, which stated that "the exploration and use of outer space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies shall be carried out for the 
benefit and in the interests of all countries Such an approach would, 
it is suggested provide a more logical interpretation since Petree, referring 
to Article XI Paragraph 7 (d), stated: - 
"This language also reflects the international co-operation that 
exists today in the communications and other practical applic- 
ations of space: for example, Intelsat, Intersputnik, and 
Inmarsat, where those states who have expended large res- 
ources, either public or private, to develop space systems to 
exploit these applications have equitably shared the benefits 
with the international community" (55). 
In the long run it will be for the proposed international regime to decide 
how wide the term "equitable sharing" will come to mean, even though the 
provisions for the establishment of this are vague and inconclusive. 
While it must be acknowledged that the Agreement Governing the Activi- 
ties of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies is a tremendous 
achievement, it must be stated that its lack of definition has created 
substantial interpretative problems. In fact so serious has this criticism 
come to be regarded in the U. S. A. that there are now open calls for its 
rejection. According to Christol: - 
"This form of criticism comes from those who. when confron- 
ted by innovative terms such as mankind or the common 
heritage of mankind, seek to advance a definition of a concept 
54. United Nations Convention on the Low of the Sea Reproduced from 
U. N. DOC. A/CONF. 62/122 of October 7,1982. I. L. M. Vol. XXI No. 6, 
November 1982, p. 1271. 
55. R. W. PETREE, U. S. Department Report to the U. N. Security Council, 
in the United Nations General Assembly Special Political Committee 
on the Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space and the Moon Treaty (Press Release U. S. U. N. 107(79) (Novem- 
ber 1st 1979). 
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or of an idea. In this connection it should be kept in mind 
that while definitions may be suitable for a specific defect, 
having for example, tangible qualities, or for private relation- 
ships, as in a contract situation, the utility of endeavouring to 
define a principle may be questioned. It is generally accepted 
that principles do not lend themselves readily to definitional 
labels. The latter serve as arbitrary limitations on growth and 
destroy the usefulness of principles. " (56) 
Statements such as this, rejecting the need for the definition of principles, 
are not in the best interests of international law, since it is clear that 
where language differences may be present it is infinitely better for a 
consensus to be arrived at over a definition, rather than to let state 
practice provide the solution. 
Undoubtedly one of the most serious interpretative deficiencies with regard 
to the treaty concerns the role of private enterprise in the exploitation of 
the moon and celestial bodies. Indeed the treaty has caused so much 
concern from this aspect that a former chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, Senator Frank Church, and Senator Jacob Javits have 
requested that the United States oppose the opening for signature of the 
treaty in that it was contrary to . the 
free enterprise interests of the 
United States. Similarly Congressman John Breaux also considered that the 
treaty would deprive the U. S. A. of opportunities for space technology and 
resources, when he appeared before the House Sub-Committee on Space 
Science and Applications of the Committee on Science and Technology 
(57). 
This opposition to the treaty is founded upon the adoption of the phrase 
"common heritage of mankind" in Article XI Paragraph 1 which states that 
it refers to the whole treaty for its meaning. Thus Paragraph 1 makes 
particular reference to the international regime in Paragraph 5, whose aims 
and purposes are laid down in Paragraph 7, which contains the "equitable 
ý6. CHRISTOL, (1980), p. 479. 
57. S. B. ROSENFIELD, "The Moon Treaty: The Unifiýd States should not 
become a Party", 74 American Society of international Law Pro- 
ceedings (1980), p. 162. 
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sharing" provision as already stated. Further.. opponents of the treaty 
refer to Article XI Paragraph 3, which provides that "neither the surface 
nor the subsurface of the moon, nor any point thereof or natur al resources 
in place shall become the property of any state ... or of any natural 
person", as authority for the prevention of private enterprise activity on 
the moon. 
It would appear therefore that the opponents of the treaty are interpreting 
the common heritage of mankind provision as embodying the purposes laid 
in Paragraph 7, as suggested earlier in this chapter (58), and this involves 
the "equitable sharing" of benefits realised in the exploitation of the moon 
and other celestial bodies. However this term has come to be interpreted 
as a device to eliminate any profits earned by private enterprise by 
disseminating them on a world wide basis. Strictly speaking whilst the 
extent of the term is for the international regime to decide, since the 
Moon Treaty is really only an extension of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty it 
is anticipated that a similar approach would be adopted, i. e. "exploration 
... shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all coun- 
tries" (59) and without question this provision has allowed for the free use 
and access into the space environment, which is likely to be increased 
with the development of the space shuttle. At present while there has 
been little or no sharing of any financial benefits derived from man's 
exploration into space, there has been a sharing of technological advance- 
ments. It is unlikely that the Moon Treaty will overturn that position but 
merely attempt. to formalise the system by creating specific rights and 
duties. 
It is also imprecise to state that the Moon Treaty is anti-private enterprise 
for the treaty merely prohibits the acquisition of sovereign rights to areas 
58. Supra, p. 93. 
59. Outer Space Treaty 1967, Article I. 
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of the moon, since Article XI states: - 
'Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon, nor any 
part thereof or natural resources IN PLACE, shall become the 
property of any state (60) 
The term "in place" was included in this paragraph on the specific request 
of the United States. Thus the treaty allows for the exploitation of 
resources that have been removed from their original location and are thus 
reduced into the possession of the exploiting body (61). Clearly by allow- 
ing such activity the treaty conforms to the original 1967 treaty in that 
space activities should not be restricted, subject to any procedures that the 
international regime, once established, might inaugurate. In the meantime 
exploitation could proceed on the basis established by the treaty and 
subsequent state practice. 
It is perhaps on this latter point that criticism can be aimed at the Moon 
Treaty because, since it is by nature somewhat innovative, the inter- 
national regime should have been negotiated, agreed on and brought into 
existence at the same time as the treaty itself. This thesis is agreed on 
by both Alfred Neil Kramer and Stephen Gorove (62), who commented: - 
"I ... believe that in order to alleviate some of its fears, it 
might in retrospect have been better to have negotiated all 
of the provisions of the international regime now rather than 
later, or none at all. Industry fears would probably be 
allayed if it knew precisely what was meant by the term 
"equitable sharing in the benefits", and what the power and 
authority of the international regime would be. " 
It might be said to this suggestion that the negotiations establishing the 
regime would have further delayed the adoption of the treaty, and while 
this may be true it is unlikely to have had a great effect because the 
treaty is largely speculative anyway and pre-empts any possibility of lunar 
60. Paragraph 3. Emphasis has been added. 
61. U. S. Representative at the Legal Sub-Committee in 1973. C. Q. 
CHRISTOL, The Modern International Law of Outer Space Pergamon 
Press, (1982T, -p. 278. 
62. Comments by A. N. KRAMER and S. GOROVE in response to S. B. 
ROSENFIELD's paper, "The Moon Treaty: The United States Should 
Not Become a Party", American Society of International Law 
Proceedings, (April 1980), p. 171. 
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exploitation and exploration by many years. However if the Moon Treaty 
was intended to create a new category of territorial status then the body 
proposed to govern the actions of States in that territorial regime should 
have been created and brought into operation alongside the treaty itself. 
The reasons for this approach may be summed up by Bin Cheng who 
stated: - 
just as the conclusion of the moon treaty was a matter 
of political will, so will be its implementation. Whether the 
new concept of the heritage of mankind introduced by the 
treaty develops into a striking reality or degenerates into a 
myth will depend on whether in the years to come the States 
Parties display the necessary will to comply with not only the 
letter of the treaty, but also its spirit. " (63) 
The establishment of the regime could help to prevent the degeneration of 
the principles set out in the Moon Treaty by the ad hoc development of 
the Moon and other celestial bodies by state practice. Such an approach 
may be justified by an examination of the Outer Space Treaty which, 
while containing several laudable principles, has been suborned by the 
practice of States. This is not to say that states have consciously set out 
to break down the principles of the treaty, though certainly this has been 
the effect. Typical of this is the military use of space as discussed in 
the forthcoming chapter, and a similar trend can be seen with regard to 
national sovereignty in space. 
Article 11 of the Outer Space Treaty 1967 states that: - 
"Outer Space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, 
is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sov- 
ereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other 
means. " 
The principle contained in Article 11 that states should not be able to 
establish sovereign rights in space grew quickly after the launching of the 
first satellite. Its foundation was based on the belief that if the full 
63. BIN CHENG, "The Moon Treaty: Agreement Goverrýing the Activities 
of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies Within the Solar 
System Other than the Earth", December 18th, 1979, Current Legal 
Problems, (1980), p. 233. 
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potential of outer space was to be achieved, claims of national sovereignty 
would have to be prohibited. Also if the principle that space was to be 
the province of all mankind was to be the guiding light, any establishment 
of sovereign rights was clearly incompatible with that principle. 
However this prohibition must be regarded as illusory since if one considers 
that a space station may be in orbit for many years and the fact that 
satellites in geostationary orbit occupy the same position in space in 
relation to the earth, then some degree of dominion control must be 
established over that area of space to form what may be termed enhanced 
possessory rights. It might be suggested that the Outer Space Treaty 
itself recognises this fact since it specifically gives restricted rights of 
access to other States Parties' installations (64). In actual fact this 
provision makes no mention of access to vehicles and installations in space 
itself but only those on the moon and other celestial bodies. Thus it is 
conceivable that any installation in outer space could, on the strict interp- 
retation of the provision, be used to the exclusion of all other states. 
Whilst this may not seem particularly important at the present time, 
without doubt serious problems could result when very large space instal- 
lations with large crews or even colonies are developed. 
It has already been seen that Article II of the Outer Space Treaty only 
prohibits the national appropriation of outer space including the Moon and 
other celestial bodies, though this prohibition has been extended by Article 
XI Paragraph 3 of the Moon Treaty to prevent the acquisition of property 
rights by private enterprise and non-national organisations on the moon and 
other celestial bodies. Thus while non-nationals could in fact appropriate 
areas of outer space itself, the Moon Treaty has only broadened the scope 
of the Outer Space Treaty with regard to the moon, and only here to any 
areas or parts of the moon "in place". Nevertheless by establishing an 
64. Outer Space Treaty 1967, Article XII. 
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installation on the moon any non -government aI agency must exercise some 
degree of control over that area. Further any materials not "in place" 
would be subject to appropriation thus, for example, any materials extrac- 
ted and separated from the surface or subsurface by mining operations 
could be appropriated into the ownership of a non-governmental agency. 
However with regard to the appropriation of areas of outer space by 
individuals it should be borne in mind that in international low individuals 
and non-national entities have no locus standi before the international 
community and therfore could be said to have no legal basis for estab- 
lishing such claims. Normally speaking where an individual's rights have 
been violated by another state, a fiction is used whereby the claim of the 
injured individual or non-national entity becomes that of the State's (65). 
The effect of this could be therefore for states to acquire enhanced 
territorial rights over areas of space through the fiction of diplomatic 
protection. This approach could also be justified on the basis that "man- 
kind", as contained in Article 1, specifically includes private entities and 
thus recognises the significant contribution that can be made by non- 
governmental entities in outer space. 
This method of spatial appropriation by proxy can be seen by the role of 
Eurospace, for example, which, though made up of private industrial 
organisations, undoubtedly represents European national interests in certain 
aspects of space exploration and co-operation (66). While such observations 
indicate the substantial contribution that non-governmental entities play in 
establishing national interests in space, it would be erroneous to think in 
terms of these entities being subjects of international law, since states 
65. E. BORCHARD, "The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad", 
1915, as cited in I. H. P. H. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR and W. 
GORMLEY, "The Future Legal Status of Non-Governmental Entities 
in Outer Space: Private Individuals and Companies as Subjects and 
Beneficiaries of International Space Low", 5 Jour; ial of Space La 
(1977), p. 130. 
66. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & GORMLEY, lbid, p. 128. 
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nonetheless remain responsible for their activities. Thus Article VI of the 
Outer Space Treaty states: - 
"States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international respon- 
sibility for national activities in outer space, including the 
Moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are 
carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental 
entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried 
out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present 
Treaty. The activities of non-governmental entities in outer 
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall 
require authorisation and continuing supervision by the 
appropriate State Party to the Treaty. When activities are 
carried out in outer space, including the moon and other 
celestial bodies, by an international organisation, responsibility 
for compliance with this Treaty shall be borne both by the 
international organisation and by States Parties to the Treaty 
participating in such organisation. " 
Further treaties also lay down national reponsibility for non-governmental 
entities (67). 
It has been stated in the past that individuals and non-governmental 
agencies did not enjoy the status of full subjects in space because of their 
inability to acquire the facilities to develop space commercially (68) though 
it must now be conceded that such possibilities do now exist. This is 
because in the past it was thought that commercial companies would have 
to develop their own launching facilities at tremendous cost and, anyway, 
private enterprise could never develop the high technology required to 
enter space within the parameters of a commercial undertaking. This has 
now been proved to be false since several organisations, albeit for the 
most part government agencies, allow commercial enterprises to use their 
launching facilities in order to put their satellites into space. Certainly 
one of the main fLnctions of the space shuttle is to sell cargo space 
for private organisations wishing to put their own satellites into space. - 
Thus whilst private, non-governmental entities are still not considered 
67. Convention on International Liability for Damages Caused by Space 
Objects 1972 and the Convention on the Registration of Objects 
Launched in Outer Space, 1975. 
68. W. GORMLEY, "The Procedural Status of the Individual Before 
International and Supranatural Tribunals", 41 
-University 
of Detroit 
Low Journal, (1964), p. 405. 
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subjects in international low, their part in the development of space is 
becoming of major importance and sooner or later that significant contri- 
bution will have to be recognised, particularly if these enterprises will 
occupy areas of space. Nevertheless sovereign states continue to be the 
dominant subjects under the rules of international law, though if the 
U. S. S. R. 's interpretation of the "common province of mankind" provision in 
the Outer Space Treaty that celestial bodies (and presumably space itself) 
are "available for the undivided and common use of all states, but not 
jointly owned by them" (69), is universally accepted, then states would 
naturally, it is suggested, encourage private enterprise in space in order to 
widen their influence in space through individuals or commercial entities. 
Indeed the fact that the U. S. Congress, in order to induce private sector 
use of the space shuttle, has provided for third party liability insurance to 
protect the users from third party claims (70), and the fact that in the 1st 
Session of the 96th Congress in 1979 a bill was introduced to establish a 
Space Industrialisation Corporation, whose aim would be to provide govern- 
ment funds to promote and encourage private enterprise in space (71), 
could be regarded as evidence of the desire by the U. S. A. to establish 
rights in space through the possible establishment of enhanced territorial 
rights by private enterprise by way of control, as well as being simply 
good business. 
69. U. S. S. R. Working Paper, U. N. DOC. A/AC105/101 (1973). As stated 
above this statement would appear to have been made in connection 
with celestial bodies since for many years the U. S. S. R. would not 
accept the phrase "common heritage of mankind" in connection with 
the Moon Treaty. Since the phrase "common province of mankind" 
relates to the Outer Space Treaty, it is assumed that the U. S. S. R. 's 
interpretation would also apply to outer space as well as celestial 
bodies. 
70. Pub. L. 96-48 modified S. 308 of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Act 1958 was enacted on August 8th, 1979, and provided for 
insurance and indemnification under regulations to be laid down by 
the NASA Administrator; G. J. MOSSINGHOFF, "Managing Tort 
Liability Risks in the Era of the Space Shuttle", 7 Journal of Space 
Law, (1979), p. 120. 
71. H. R. 2337,96th Congress 1st Session 1979. See also L. D. FUQUA, 
"Space Industrialisation: Some Legal and Policy Considerations for 
Private Enterprise", 8 Journal of Space Law, (1980), p. 1-7. 
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A further difficulty which arises with the fact that Article 11 of the Outer 
Space Treaty appears to allow non-governmental agencies to appropriate or 
at least exercise dominion over areas of space (albeit subject to the 
control of their respective States) is that many enterprises carried out in 
space are joint ventures, involving both public and private bodies. If one 
accepts the restrictive interpretation of Article 11 which prevents national 
appropriation, but with certain reservations allows non-governmental appro- 
priation or possibly enhanced territorial rights, the question of mixed 
enterprises becomes a fundamental problem since national entities may 
attempt to play down their national role and portray the entity as being 
private in nature so that it could establish rights in space, which in the 
event of a dispute will be defended on the basis of state responsibility 
(72). Thus it would appear that national bodies or states could establish 
rights in space under the auspices of what purports to be an independant 
commercial body. 
CONCLUSION 
The Moon Treaty, like the other Treaties dealing with outer space that 
followed the Outer Space Treaty 1967, is to a large degree a more de- 
tailed examination of the principles laid down in that treaty. The main 
distinction between the two however is that during the somewhat protrac- 
ted negotiations establishing the Moon Treaty, a new category of territ- 
orial status emerged which enlarged the concept of the res communis and 
firmly rejected the concept of res nullius in the context of the moon and 
other celestial bodies. This new status - the common heritage of mankind 
- contained principles intended to produce a more equitable sharing of the 
benefits received from the exploration of the moon and celestial bodies 
than had beenachieved by the Outer Space Treaty itself. Further it 
72. MAVROMMATIS PALESTINE CONCESSIONS CASE, P. C. I. J. REP. 
SER. A, No. 2, (1924), p. 12. 
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contemplated the creation of an international regime to ensure that certain 
pre-determined objectives be obtained (73). 
It would appear that the Moon Treaty has done too much in attempting to 
produce a detailed legal regime for the moon together with a new type of 
territorial status. These two factors combined in a treaty, which is highly 
speculative anyway in that it will be many years before the moon could 
possibly come to be exploited on any type of scale, has inevitably led to 
problems of both a practical and theoretical nature. In particular the 
Moon Treaty has tended to ignore the practicalities of the exploration and 
exploitation of the moon since there must come a moment in time when 
some degree of appropriation is carried out. Such a situation must clearly 
occur when one state has established some sort of moon base since it is 
inconceivable that another state could successfully require the removal of 
that base in favour of its own simply because it requires that particular 
position on the moon. Additionally it is unlikely that a state would bear 
the huge development costs of building such a base not to require some 
other state seeking to use it from contributing to that cost. In such a 
situation there must by implication be some exercise of dominion over that 
base in that there is a granting of a licence to use that base. In this 
respect the principle of non-appropriation is very similar to the position of 
satellites in geostationary orbit in that once established they exercise 
enhanced territorial rights over that area of space until their removal. 
Such a view is also reinforced by reference to Article XII Paragraph 1 of 
the Moon Treaty, which states: - 
"States Parties shall retain jurisdiction and control over their 
personnel, vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations and instal- 
lations on the Moon. The ownership of space vehicles, 
equipment, facilities, stations and installations shall not be 
affected by their presence on the moon. " 
73. As contained in Article XI,, Paragraph 7. 
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Further evidence of the possible establishment of enhanced territorial 
rights may also be seen in Article XV in that whilst a state is entitled to 
have access to another's facilities it must give notice of such a visit. 
Thus: 
"Each State Party may assure itself that the activities of 
other States Parties in the exploration and use of the moon 
are compatible with the provisions of this Agreement. To 
this end all space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations and 
installations on the moon shall be open to other States 
Parties. Such States Parties shall give reasonable advance 
notice of a projected visit, in order that appropriate consul- 
tations may be held and that maximum precautions may be 
taken to assure safety and to avoid interference with normal 
operations in the facility to be visited ... ". 
On the problem of the non-appropriation principle, contained in the treaty, 
one must also take into account not only the exercise of enhanced terri- 
torial rights but also the appropriation of its natural resources. Certainly 
the right to exploit the natural resources of the moon and other celestial 
bodies is allowed by the treaty, since byArticle VI Paragraph 2 "... States 
Parties shall have the right to collect and remove from the moon samples 
of its minerals and other substances". Further Article XI Paragraph 3 
states that, "Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon, nor any 
part thereof or natural resources in place, shall become the property of 
any State As already stated (74), this allows states to exploit the 
mineral and natural resources of celestial bodies because once they have 
been removed from their original position they may then be reduced into 
the possession of that state. This situation must raise the question, that 
to what degree is the exploitation of the moon and other celestial bodies 
to be allowed since, again, there must come a point at which such exploi- 
tation becomes appropriation. E. Brooks raised this very point in 1969 in 
relation to Article Il of the Outer Space Treaty, when he stated: 
74. Supra at p. 104. 
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since the use of planetary resources is permitted but 
national appropriation is not, there is a point at which the 
use of a planetary resource becomes appropriation and is 
forbidden. " (75) 
According to C. Christol, Brook concludes that "appropriation occurs when 
there is a substantial use of a tangible resource and when this results in 
"a significant benefit to a single nation" (76). Undoubtedly therefore the 
Moon Treaty has failed to reconcile this problem, even though it purports 
to deal with the moon and other celestial bodies in detail. It is for this 
reason that it mi, ght well have been more prudent to exclude asteroids 
from the treaty since it is these which might hold the best potential for 
the exploitation of minerals, but the use of which may now be barred by 
the treaty as constituting an appropriation of a celestial body. Neverthe- 
less it is a problem which is unlikely to present itself for many years to 
come and may well be solved by the simple fact that the rising costs of 
space exploration and exploitation will almost certainly result in any 
commercial exploitation of the moon being organised on a multi-state 
basis. - 
A further method of solving the last problem, should it ever arise, is 
through the international legal regime proposed in Article XI. It has been 
said that the need to establish the international regime creates a mora- 
torium on the development of the natural resources of the moon, this is 
not the case, though it would appear to restrict full scale commercial 
exploitation. This is because Article XI requires the parties to the treaty 
to establish the regime once exploitation becomes feasible, and if no 
regime is forthcoming this could have the effect of preventing the further 
development of the moon or any other celestial body. If this is the case 
State Parties to the treaty could block the establishment of the inter- 
national regime in order to protect their own interests until they too are 
75. E. BROOKS, "Control and Use of Planetary Resources", Proceedings 
of the 11th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space (1? 69), p. 346. 
76. CRM-STOL, (1? 80), p. 447. 
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ready to exploit the moon and other celestial bodies on an equal footing. 
With regard to the establishment of the international regime it must be 
seriously questioned as to whether the political will exists to inaugurate 
such a body. Further, if such will does exist, judging by the extremely 
lengthy negotiations needed to produce the Moon Treaty itself (77) then 
one must be sceptical as to whether any exploitation on a commercial 
scale would ever get past the initial research state, which states are 
entitled to do before the establishment of the regime, as laid down in 
Article XV Paragraph 5. 
Doubts must also exist as to the effectiveness of such a regime, even if 
established, since the parameters of its operation must be decided by an 
international conference of those States Parties to the treaty itself, who 
will evaluate any discussions in accordance with their own national int- 
erests. Certainly this is the position as summed up by Mr. Petree before 
the Special Political Committee of the U. N. General Assembly (78). 
Further reservations must also be made as to the operation of the inter- 
national legal regime when it is borne in mind that the equivalent organi- 
sation in the Convention on the Law of the Sea, the International Seabed 
Authority, together with the treaty itself, has recently been rejected by 
America, Turkey, Venezuela and Israel whilst Britain, West Germany and 
Russia held such critical views that they abstained from the vote adopting 
the treaty in the United Nations General Assembly. Two reasons for the 
way America voted were, firstly, the treaty allowed for three-quarters of 
the signatories to impose amendments on the rest, and secondly, and as 
far as the outer space international regime, most importantly it excluded 
America from the International Seabed Authority, even though it was the 
77. The first proposal for an international agreement for the moon and 
other celestial bodies, which included the principle of the common 
heritage of mankind was put forward on July *3rd 1970, in U. N. 
DOC. A/AC105/C2/L71. The treaty was opened for signature on 
December 18th 1979. 
78. Supra Note 39. 
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foremost production country in the devlopment of the exploitation of deep 
seabed resources (79). Clearly if a similar attitude is adopted with regard 
to the international regime in the Moon Treaty by the other members of 
the United Nations then the future does not look good. Certainly any 
isolation of leading states in the exploration and exploitation of space from 
the international regime would only denude it of any influence it might 
have. 
The attitude of states as enunciated by Petree may also be seen in the 
approach that has been taken on the control of satellites in the geosta- 
tionary orbit, since while no special regime has been created to deal with 
the allocation of geostationary slots, this role would appear to have been 
accepted by the I. T. U. Thus several states have formally rejected the 
allocation system put forward at the World Administrative Radio Con- 
ference, preferring an evolutionary approach (80). Whilst others, though 
accepting the system, have not altogether restricted their activities to the 
areas allocated to them. The justification for this is that while the 
geostationary orbit is below saturation point there is no reason why 
unoccupied areas cannot be used. The implication here is that the ground 
rules laid down by an international regime may always be dismissed by 
states acting in their national interest, particularly when that international 
regime lacks any sanctions that might enforce compliance with its rules. 
It may thus be unrealistic to expect absolute compliance with any rules 
laid down by the international regime proposed in the Moon Treaty since 
state practice will adjust those rules in accordance with national interest, 
prticularly if amendments can be made by a proportion of the signatories 
as in the Convention on the Low of the Sea (81). 
79. D. SHEARS, "U. S. Rejects Sea Low Treaty", Daily Telegraph, July 
9th 1982, p. 32. See also Editorial Comment p. 18. 
80. i. e. the U. S. A., Canada, Brazil and the other equatorial states as 
signatories to the Bogota Declaration. 
81. U. N. G. A. RES. No. 37166; U. N. DOC. A/CONF. 62/122; I. L. M. VOL. 
XXI No. 6, (Nov. 1982), p. 1272. 
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That the Moon Treaty protects the rights of non-governmental enterprises 
cannot be doubted because of Article XIV, which has a corresponding 
provision in Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty. Nevertheless there are 
fears, particularly in the U. S. A., that whilst the Moon Treaty clearly made 
provision for the participation of the free enterprise systems in the 
exploitation of the moon and celestial bodies, the environment in which it 
is expected to participate is in fact hostile to private commercial inter- 
ests. Such fears are largely based on the com mon heritage of mankind 
principle of equitable sharing, as laid down in Article XI (82), in that 
private enterprise will not invest immense amounts of money in projects 
the proceeds of which will have to be shared amongst States Parties to 
the treaty, particularly when those states have not contributed to any of 
the development costs (83). Certainly the situation initially looks very 
pessimistic until it is considered that the extent to which the common 
heritage of mankind principles will be applied is for the legal regime, 
when negotiated and created, to decide. Additionally limitations are 
already imposed on the extent to which any benefits gained will be shared 
by the use of the word "equitable" rather than "equal". Up until the 
establishment of the legal regime it is anticipated that any sharing will be 
carried out in accordance with the present system under the Outer Space 
Treaty, where states have benefitted considerably from the technological 
"spin-offs" of space development. It is this area in the Convention on the 
Law of the Sea that contributed to the U. S. A. 's decision not to sign, since 
private enterprise would not only have to sell its technology to the 
international authority and train its personnel, but also have to contribute 
a share of their profits to that authority who in return would grant mining 
licences and impose production quotas. The profits received by the 
authority would be shared amongst the other signatories, even though they 
had contributed nothing to the effort needed to raise the mineral deposits 
82. Paragraph 7 (d). 
83. MENTER, (1981), p. 52. 
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from the seabed except to guarantee freedom of navigation to the other 
States Parties (84). Undoubtedly if such a situation were to be repeated 
within the international regime envisaged by the Moon Treaty private 
enterprise would be deterred from taking part in the exploration and 
exploitation of the Moon and other celestial bodies. 
As can be seen from the above discussions the whole structure of the 
Moon Treaty is extremely loose and has perhaps suffered from nine years 
of piecemeal construction. It is also regrettable that a new type of 
territorial status has to be introduced in*this manner, and indeed it is a 
serious omission to introduce such a new concept into a treaty without 
having it properly defined, except for the four elements which it is 
considered should be included in that definition (85). Since the common 
heritage of mankind principles are required to be implemented by an 
international regime which itself has yet to be established, it is suggested 
by Christol that the traditional principle of res communis will apply (86). 
This is certainly acceptable though it should be added that such principles 
of the Moon Treaty as are consistent with the Outer Space Treaty 1? 67 
should also apply bearing in mind that the latter provided a basis for it. 
It would seem that already the principles contained in the Moon Treaty, 
will be altered by subsequent state practice. This is particularly true of 
the United Sta tes where the House of Delegates of the American Bar 
Association has been advised by the Section of International Law to urge 
the Senate to adopt four re servations before ratifying the Moon Treaty 
(87). The first read: - 
84. Supra Note 61-. - 85. Article XI Paragraph 7. 
86. C. CHRISTOL, "The American Bar Association and the 1979 Moon 
Treaty. The Search for a Position", Journal of Space Law, (1981), 
p. 78. 
87. Section of International Law, Americal Bar Association.. Report to 
the House of Delegates 1980, p. 10, CHRISTOL, (1991), p. 79. 
- 1.18 - 
"it is the understanding of the United States that nothing in 
this Agreement in any way diminishes or alters the right of 
the United States to determine how it shares the benefits 
derived from the exploitation by or under the authority of 
the United States of natural resources of the Moon or other 
celestial bodies. " (88) 
This reservation was particularly consistent with the United States reser- 
vation attached to its ratification of the Outer Space Treaty (89), except 
insofar that this did not refer to natural resources. It was therefore a 
substantial updating and clarification of the U. S. position in the light of 
the potential exploitation of natural resources. 
The second reservation took into account the property rights of natural 
resources taken into possession and stated that such rights were "subject 
to the exclusive control of, and may be considered as the property, the 
State Party, or other entity responsible for their extraction, removal or 
utilisation" (90). This reservation was clearly intended to protect the 
interests of private enterprise from the subordination of their property 
rights in the exploitation of natural resources to those of States Parties to 
the treaty. Further this reservation is a reinforcement of the rights of 
States to reduce resources no longer "in place" into their ownership 
contrary to the original Soviet proposal against the establishment of such 
rights (91). 
The third reservation proposed referred directly to the common heritage 
of mankind principle as laid down in Article XI Paragraph 1 of the Treaty 
(92), and provided that the term related only to its context in the Moon 
Treaty itself. It was therefore not to be interpreted in the light of any 
other provision. This was a reference to the use of the term in Article 
136 of the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text) (93), 
88. Ibid at p. 2. CHRISTOL, (1981), p. 80. 
89. Treaty on Outer Space, Executive Report No. 8 to accompany Senate 
Ex. D 90th Congress lst Session 4,1967, as contained in Christol, 
(1981), p. 80. 
90. Supra Note '87 at p. 2. 
91. CHRISTOL, (1981), p. 80. 
92. Supra Note 87" at p. 2 and Ibid. 
93. U. N. DOC. A/CONF. 62/WP 10/REV 3, August 27th 1980. 
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and was a clear indication to the fact that any new type of territorial 
status inaugurated by the Moon Treaty should be confined to the areas 
covered by that treaty, so as not to inadvertently prejudice the United 
States position in the Law of the Sea negotiations. Not content with the 
above declaration the Section also laid down that the common heritage of 
mankind principle was subject to the principles laid down in Articles I and 
11 of the Outer Space Treaty. Further the Section wanted to make it 
abundantly apparent that the terms of the Moon Treaty allowed States 
Parties to the treaty to "... retain exclusive jurisdiction and control over 
their facilities, stations and installations on the Moon, and that other 
States Parties are obligated to avoid interference with normal operations 
of such facilities" (94). According to Christol this overkill approach by 
the Section was in response to concern that the Moon Treaty was preju- 
dicial to private enterprise when it was apparent that the treaty specifi- 
cally allowed for the involvement of such entities in the exploitation and 
development of the Moon and other celestial bodies (95). 
The fourth and final reservation of the section was concerned with the 
period up to the time of the establishment of the international regime, 
provided for in Article XI Paragraph 5 and the period after. Up until the 
establishment of the regime, the Section provided that a status of res 
communis would apply to the exploitation and development of the Moon 
and that, "No moratorium on such exploitation is intended or required by 
this Agreement" (96). However the Section did state quite specifically 
that the United States had to comply with the provisions laid down in 
Article XI Paragraph 7 during this period, at the some time adding a rider 
that the United States had the right to determine the standards of such 
compliance until it became a party to the international regime. This first 
94. Supra Note '87 at p. 2. CHRISTOL, (1981), p. 81. 
95. CHRISTOL, (1981), p. 81. 
96. Supra Note '87 at p. 2 and Ibid. 
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part of the fourth reservation must be considered a major departure from 
the provisions of the Moon Treaty and must lend a great deal of weight 
to the argument that State practice in certain areas of space law has 
evolved in such a way as to suborn the provisions of the guiding treaties. 
The principle reason for such a statement is that Article XI Paragraph I 
of the Moon Treaty states that "The Moon and its natural resources ARE 
the common heritage of mankind The text is thus phrased in the 
present tense and must therefore become a binding principle once the 
treaty comes into operation, albeit that part of its expression is subject to 
the procedures laid down by the establishment of the international regime 
(27). Nevertheless, it may well be argued that because the establishment 
of the international regime, as laid down in Paragraph 7, are not expres- 
sions of the term "common heritage of mankind" in its present context. 
However such an argument may be countered in that Paragraph 1 talks 
about the term finding its expression from the provisions of the Agree- 
ment and that because the guiding principles of the regime are expressly 
stated then these also are expressions of that term, notwithstanding that 
they provide the regime with its basic purposes. Having stated this 
position it may be seen that such confusion has its roots in the impatience 
of the Outer Space Committee of the United Nations General Assembly to 
have a Moon Treaty in a final form as soon as possible because of its own 
impatience with the protracted negotiations that had been taking place. 
Thus the Chairman of the Outer Space Committee in his opening speech 
at the 22nd Session of the Committee on June 18th, 1979 stated: 
"Indeed the end result of the work was not altogether 
encouraging, and we have to face this fact squarely ... Progress by the Sub-Committee on the outstanding issues will 
take place only as Member States display an active desire 
and, let me say, a stronger political will to achieve the 
necessary compromises ... In this connection, the time might 
even have come for us to reassess our respective positions in 
97. Moon Treaty Article XI Paragraph 1. 
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order to see whether we cannot really bridge this gap. And 
if, in all honesty, we find ourselves unable to do so, the time 
might also have come to devote our energies - at least for 
the time being - to other important areas of concern which deserve our attention. " (98) 
While accepting the Chairman's point concerning the political will of 
states, it is nevertheless unhelpful to the achievement of consistent rules 
of international law to attempt to introduce innovating concepts and 
principles without attempting to define their parameters. Such an erro- 
neous approach is further compounded when, having just had the political 
will of states questioned, those concepts and principles are left to some 
future regime to delineate more fully, the existence of which is itself 
open to the vagaries of that political will. It should also be noted in this 
context that the other forms of territorial status have emerged over many 
centuries and that to develop an impatience over lack of progress after a 
mere ten years of debate and discussion is not likely to promote the 
conditions tending towards good low, particularly when the exploitation and 
development of the moon and celestial bodies is not likely to arise for 
several decades at least. It is in this context more feasible to treat the 
rnoon and celestial bodies as being subject to a regime of res communis, 
even though this is apparently in conflict with the treaty in its present 
terminology. 
The second part of the fourth reservation concerned itself with the period 
of time relating to the negotiation of the proposed international regime, 
and is perhaps indicative of the possible lack of political will discussed 
above. The reservation stated that whilst the United States would engage 
in the negotiations in good faith, it would not agree to: - 
... any particular provisions which may be included in such a 
regime: nor does it constitute an obligation to become a 
Party to such a regime regardless of its contents. " (99) 
98. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/PV. 190, June 18th 1979, pp. 7-13. 
99. Supra Note '*. 87 at p. 2, CHRISTOL, (1981), p. 82. 
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Such an approach is unlikely to aid the development of a coherent legal 
system for the moon and celestial bodies, and it is likely to undermine 
treaty making processes generally since if several states took a similar 
approach the result could, in the words of Christol, produce "a splintering 
effect with the resultant loss of the general agreement evidenced in the 
terms of the agreement and its negotiating history" (100). 
From the stance taken by the Section of International Law, the Section of 
Natural Resources Low also added its criticisms of the common heritage 
of mankind principle contained in the Moon Treaty (101). This section had 
already come across the principle in the Draft Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (Informal Text) 1980 Article 136., and had considered it prejudicial 
to United States interests. The section therefore proffered three poten- 
tial risks in accepting the principle. Firstly, they suggested that accep- 
tance could harm United States interests in the Law of the Sea negotia- 
tions, and potentially in the eventual negotiations on the status of Antarc- 
tica when the present thirty year moratorium ended. Such a risk must be 
apparent since it is inconceivable that the principle could have one 
interpretation for the moon and celestial bodies and another for other 
regimes, though surprisingly the representatives of both sections eventually 
accepted that the principle should apply to the moon and celestial bodies, 
but should be divorced from the use of the principle in the Draft Conven- 
tion on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text). 
The second risk was that the acceptance of the principle in its present 
form would force the United States into 'surrendering explorative and 
exploitative autonomy to the international regime (102). Finally it was 
stated that it was possible that a "moratorium on exploration and exploi- 
tation of space resources is inherent in the Moon Treaty, pending estab- 
lishment of machinery to govern such activities under the control of the 
100. CHRISTOL, (1981), p. 82. 
101. Report of the Section of Natural Resources with Recommendation 
to the American Bar Association House of Delegates, (1980), as 
contained in CHRISTOL, Ibid. 
102. Ibid. 
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international regime" thereby damaging United States interests still further 
(103). 
In May 1? 81 the two sections, having reconciled any differences there may 
have been in their reports, produced a joint recommendation which took 
into account the statements issued by both sections (104). The principle 
recommendation to the House of Delegates was that it adopt a resolution 
for the signature and ratification of the Moon Treaty. Though on first 
appearances this might seem surprising in the light of the reservations put 
forward, on further reflection it can be seen that if the United States did 
not become a party to the agreement then it would forego its right to be 
a participant in the later negotiations on the international legal regime, 
which it might be able to influence in its favour. 
The American Bar Association report to the House of Delegates was 
framed in the form of six declarations, to which ratification of the treaty 
was to be subject. The declarations corresponded closely to the reconciled 
views of the two sections. However if the American Bar Association 
report (105) was accepted by the United States then the declarations 
contained therein would amount to interpretations of national policy, unlike 
reservations which would amount to interpretations as to the terms of the 
treaty (106). Such an approach should be rejected since in terms of 
producing a coherent system of international law the whole area would 
become an entangled mass because of individual states wishing to raise 
their own objections to different parts of a particular treaty. While there 
tends to be a modern trend to adopt this approach, it is nevertheless a 
weakening of the treaty making process which could encourage a deviation 
from the terms of a treaty by way of state practice. It is this and more 
103. Ibid. 
104. American Bar Association, Report to the House of Delegates (1981). 
105. Ibid. 
106. CHRISTOL, (1981), p. 88. 
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importantly the failure of the Moon Treaty to provide sufficient definition 
that would give rise to an undermineing of the treaty by means of state 
practice, as further disclosed by the attitudes found while discussing the 
geostationary orbit and its related issues. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN SPACE 
Since the launch of Sputnik 1 and the development of inter-continental 
ballistic missiles the military importance of outer space has increased 
dramatically over the years. Intercontinental ballistic missiles, however, 
constitute only a small part of the military involvement of states in 
space, and projects which are generally regarded as being for scientific or 
commercial purposes, such as meteorological, navigation and communi- 
cations satellites, furnish essential services for military operations (1). 
The distinction between the civilian and military uses of space is not easy 
to make, since both the U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R. space programmes rely 
heavily on the involvement of their respective armed forces in what are 
essentially civilian projects. Thus, for instance, both major space powers 
rely heavily on the armed forces for their astronauts. Similarly certain 
pieces of equipment have a dual military/civilian use (2). 
The Outer Space Treaty 1967 clearly lays down as its first and most 
fundamental object the principle that outer space, including the moon and 
celestial bodies, is the province of all mankind. Further Article I states 
that activities in outer space are to be carried on for the benefit and in 
the interests of all countries, whilst Article 11 provides that outer space is 
to be used "in the interest of maintaining international peace and security 
1. P. C. JESSUP and H. J. TAUBENFIELD, "Controls for Outer Space 
and the Antarctic Analogy', New York, (1959), pp. 222-25. 
2. -9;; T-ISSILES AND ROCKETS", January 20th, 1964; NASA PRESS 
RELEASE, (1964), pp. 64-234. 
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and promoting international co-operation (3). While space is being used 
for various military activities, which appear to be contrary to the prin- 
ciples laid down in Articles I and 11, Article IV states that only certain 
military activities are barred: - 
"States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit 
around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any 
other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such 
weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer 
space in any other manner. The moon and other celestial 
bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty 
exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of 
military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of 
any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoevres 
on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military 
personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful 
purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment 
or facility necessary for the peaceful exploration of the moon 
and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited. " (4) 
Article IV attempted to enlarge and re-inforce the principles put forward 
by the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which merely prohibited the 
testing of nuclear devices in outer space (5). While there appeared to be 
no difficulty within the Legal Sub-Committee of the United Nations 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in achieving this when 
the article was drawn up, in subsequent years it has been subject to close 
scrutiny which has produced conflicting interpretations of the provisions in 
Article IV. The possible result of these conflicting interpretations has' 
been, it is suggested, to detract from the principles of disarmament in 
space, as contained in the Outer Space Treaty. The analysis of these 
interpretations may be broken down into two basic areas; firstly, interpre- 
tations of the provisions relating to nuclear weapons and other types of 
weapons; and secondly, interpretations of the provisions dealing with the 
peaceful uses of the moon and other celestial bodies. 
3. TREATY ON PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF 
STATES IN THE EXPLORATION & USE OF OUTER SPACE, INCLU- 
DING THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES 1967, Articles 
I and Il (hereinafter cited as the Outer Space Treaty); 18 U. S. T. 
2410; T. I. A. S. 6347. 
4. Outer Space Treaty 1967, Article IV. 
5. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer 
Space and Under Water, 1963, Article I, Paragraph 1; Command 
2245; U. K. T. S. 3, (1964); 480 U. N. T. S. 43. 
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1. PROVISIONS RELATING TO NUCLEAR AND OTHER TYPES OF 
WEAPONS IN SPACE 
The objective of Article IV, Paragraph 1 was to eliminate nuclear weapons 
and other weapons of mass destruction from outer space and the celestial 
bodies. It is clear that Paragraph 1 places no restriction on conventional 
weapons, and thus has been termed a clause of "partial disarmament" (6). 
A closer examination of Paragraph 1 also reveals that nuclear weapons 
themselves are not totally barred from space, since the paragraph states 
that parties to the Treaty "undertake not to place in orbit around the 
earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons 
of mass destruction". Thus an intercontinental ballistic missiles (I. C. B. M. ) 
or fractional orbital bombardment systems (F. O. B. S. ) (7) neither of which 
make a full orbit of the earth, are not banned. Nevertheless such sys- 
tems must be regarded as eroding the principle of preventing the militari- 
sation. - of space. 
Although nuclear weapons are clearly prohibited from being placed in orbit 
around the earth, the term "weapons of mass destruction" locks definition, 
though it would seem, at least according to the United States U. N. 
Ambassador A. J. Goldberg and the then Deputy Secretary of Defence C. 
R. Vance, that a weapon that could kill 20-30 persons was not regarded as 
a weapon of mass destruction, unless the weapon was of a bacteriological 
or chemical nature (8). 
6. M. G. MARKOFF, "Disarmament and 'Peaceful Purposes' Provision in 
the 1967 Outer Space Treaty", 4 Journal of Space Law, (1967), pp. 3 
& 4. 
7. A fractional orbital bombardment system travels at approximately 
100 miles above the earth at orbital speed, slowing down period- 
ically to discharge nuclear warheads towards a target, though never 
completing a full orbit before returning to earth. The device is 
only regarded as travelling through space and is thus not controlled 
by the Outer Space Treaty. 
8. As contained in statements prior to the Outer Space Treaty being 
notified by the Senate. HEARINGS ON THE TREATY ON OUTER 
SPACE BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, 
90th CONGRESS, 1st SESSION. 
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It is clear that Article IV, Paragraph 1 bars the installation and stationing 
of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction on celestial bodies. 
However it is not clear whether the term "celestial bodies" includes the 
moon. Since the term "moon and celestial bodies" appears throughout the 
treaty it is thought that the moon is still included on the basis that it 
would make no sense at all to permit the installation of weapons of mass 
destruction on the moon, while prohibiting such installations on other 
celestial bodies (9). In fact Article IV goes a great deal further than just 
barring nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction from the moon 
and celestial bodies, since in Paragraph 2 there is a complete bar on all 
military activities except where military personnel are used in scientific 
research or for any other peaceful purposes. Further, any military facility 
is not necessarily prohibited provided it is "necessary for the peaceful 
exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies" (10). Thus, it would 
seem that as for as the moon and celestial bodies are concerned there is 
an obscure attempt at a policy of complete non-militarisation of space, 
since it would appear that Paragraph 2 is aimed at preventing the testing 
of even conventional weapons, whereas Paragraph 1 is concerned with the 
installation and stationing of particular types of weapons on those bodies, 
namely, nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. 
Clearly important questions must arise as to the interpretation of the 
terms "install" and "station". Thus, at what point is a weapon said to be 
installed? If the term means something more than just placing, then the 
mere presence of a nuclear weapon is not strictly illegal, and it is only 
the testing of such weapons that is illegal. Gorove is of the opinion that 
the term "install" means something more than just placing nuclear weapons 
9. S. GOROVE, "Arms Control in Outer Space", 3 Georgia Journal of 
International Law and Comparative Law, (1973), p. 116. Al-socon- 
tained in Studies in Space Law: its-Challenges and Prospects 
Sig thof f -Leyden, (1977). 10. Article IV, Paragraph 2. 
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on the moon and celestial bodies but implies a degree of permanence (11). 
Looking to the term "station" there would appear to be some doubt as to 
exactly what is meant here - does it mean orbiting or does it mean 
placing a weapon in a position of geostationary orbit above the moon or 
any other celestial body, so that its orbital speed coincides with the 
rotational speed of the celestial body. It would appear that the term is 
interpreted very widely since the U. N. representatives of the U. S. A., 
U. S. S. R. and Great Britain maintained that "stationing" meant "deploy- 
ment" around the moon or any other celestial body (12). Similarly, other 
writers, such as Poulantzas, thought that the term "station" meant every 
manner in which nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction could 
be placed in outer space on celestial bodies (13). 
Puragraph 1 quite evidently restricts nuclear weapons and other weapons 
of mass destruction from being placed in orbit around the earth, and 
either installed or stationed on "celestial bodies", which is interpreted as 
including the moon. By implication therefore there would appear to be no 
restriction on the stationing or use of conventional weapons in space, nor 
on the installation of such weapons or celestial bodies (14). Since there is 
a complete lack of restrictions in the use of conventional weapons, the 
leading space nations have striven to develop operational anti-satellite 
weapons (A. S. A. T. ) capable of destroying, or at least 'blinding' the other's 
observation and attack warning satellites by conventional methods. 
The freedom to use conventional weapons in space nevertheless poses just 
as great of threat to peace as any object carrying nuclear weapons or 
other weapons of mass destruction. This is because both the U. S. A. and 
11. GOROVE, (1973), p. 117. 
12. U. N. Documents A/7221 September 10th, 1968. 
13. N. M. POULANTZAS, "The Outer Space Treaty of January ý7th 
1967, A Decisive Step Towards Arms Control, Demilitarisation of 
Outer Space and International Supervision", 20 R; vue Hellenique de 
Droit International, (1967), p. 66. 
14. roviaing no testing of them takes place on the celestial body. 
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the U. S. S. R. are heavily dependant on satellites for intelligence gathering, 
military communications, weather forecasting, and guidance and navigation. 
Further both super powers rely on satellites in order to monitor and 
verify compliance with arms control agreements. Such is the importance 
of satellites in this role that in the Interim Agreement and Protocol on 
the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at the same time as 
the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems 1972 it was 
agreed that "each party undertakes not to interfere with the national 
technical means of verification of the other Party" (15). Indeed such are 
their importance (though initially the U. S. S. R. objected to the use of 
surveillance satellites (16))that it is reasonable to assume that, without a 
satellite system to monitor compliance with the Outer Space and Test Ban 
Treaties, neither state would have adhered to them (17). Additionally J. 
E. S. Fawcett stated that the problem of adequate inspection "has always 
been a major obstacle to disarmament" (18). 
While the above agreements prohibited the use of A. S. A. T. systems, they 
did not prevent their development. In fact Soviet anti-satellite develop- 
ment is thought to go back as for as 1962 when two satellites had a test 
rendezvous, though this experiment can be put down as being just a 
general experiment to test manoeverability in space. However in 1968, 
and significantly perhaps only one year after the signing of the Outer 
Space Treaty, the U. S. S. R. put into orbit COSMOS 248. A day later 
COSMOS 249 was launched on a rendezvous orbit, was seen to pass rapidly 
by COSMOS 248, and then explode (19). Such experiments were carried 
15.23 U. S. T. 3435; T. I. A. S. 7504; Article V, Paragraph 2. 
16. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/C2/L6 (1963); A/AC 105/C2/L1 (1962). 
17. E. STEIN, "Legal Restraints in Modern Arms Control Agreements", 
66 American Journal of International Low, (1972), p. 263. 
18. J-ý_-: Sý- -F-AWCETT, International 
- 
Law and the Uses of Outer Sp_ace 
Manchester University Press, (1968), p. 33. 
19. H. SCOVILLE and K. TSIPIS, "Can Space Remain- a Peaceful Envir- 
onment? ", The Stanley Foundation, (July 1978), pp. 5 & 6. 
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intermittently until December 1271 when the S. A. L. T. I agreement, which 
provided for the non-interference with reconnaissance satellites, was 
signed. Soviet experiments began again in 1976, possibly in response to 
China placing a reconnaissance satellite into orbit. 
The above facts do not of course mean that the United States has not 
itself been attempting to develop a similar capability, however they have 
limited their efforts to non nuclear, non explosive devices which accom- 
plish their task by colliding with the target vehicle at a speed in excess 
of 17,500 miles per hour (20). Clearly the essential difference in the two 
systems is that the U. S. A. attempts to destroy a reconnaissance satellite 
by the use of a heat seeking satellite scoring a "direct hit", whilst the 
U. S. S. R. manoeuvres its killer satellite close to the target and explodes it, 
thus destroying the target. The capability of the Soviet killer satellites 
has prompted the U. S. A. to "harden" its reconnaissance satellites against 
such an attack. 
In 1978 President Carter proposed to the Kremlin that the U. S. A. and 
U. S. S. R. should agree to forgo weapons which could destroy observation 
satellites (21). The propos al seems not to have been taken up since in the 
unratified Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty 11 1979, there is only a re- 
iteration of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Mis sile Systems 
1972, i. e. 
"For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with 
the provisions of the Treaty, each party shall use national 
technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner 
consistent with generally recognised principles of international 
law. 
Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national 
technical means of verification of the other party operating 
in accordance with Paragraph 1 of this Article. " (22) 
20. R. J. ZEDALIS and C. L. WADE, "Anti-Satellite Weapons and the 
Outer Space Treaty of 1967", California Western International Low 
Journal, (1978), p. 455. 
21. D. (l, UEDHUIS, "The Changing Legal Regime 6f Air and Outer 
Space", International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1978), p. 585. 
22. Article XV. 
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The development of ASAT systems has continued right up to the present 
since Sir Bernard Lovell commented recently that on January 21st, 1981 
the target vehicle COSMOS 1241 was launched, COSMOS 1243, the inter- 
ceptor satellite, being launched on February 2nd, with the aim of des- 
troying the target vehicle. No mention is made as to whether it was 
successful or not (23). 
The main defect with the Soviet ASAT system is that, unlike the U. S. 
system where the interceptor satellite will be launched from an air mobile 
launch platform, which can be flown to a point where the target can be 
reached at a certain time, the interceptor has to wait until a suitable 
launch "window" for a certain target appears, and this may take several 
days (24). It is because of the above defects that the Soviet Union has 
been working in recent years towards an operational directed energy 
weapon in which very highly charged atomic particles are projected at the 
speed of light at a target (25). This is not to assume that the U. S. A. has 
not been involved with this area of research, but just that the U. S. S. R. 
has had a stronger interest in particle beam research; the U. S. A. still 
being at the feasibility study stage. 
Directed energy weapons fall into two categories comprising of high 
energy lasers and particle beam weapons. Since the engagement of these 
types of weapons against targets is virtually instqntaneous in terms of 
actual engagement their potential is phenomenal, particularly against high 
velocity targets such as ballistic or guided missiles and satellites, both of 
which, it is alleged, could eventually be destroyed at a range of 3000 
miles. At present the U. S. A. is more interested in high energy laser 
23. SIR BERNARD LOVELL, How the Battle Lines were Drawn for the 
Space War, The Guardian, March 1? th 1981. 
24. F. ASBECTi, "The Militarisation of Space", 2 Armament and Disarm- 
ament Information Unit Report, (1980), p. l. 
25. G. S. ROBIRS-0-IT "Soviets h for Beam Weaýon", 106 Aviation 
Week and Space Technology, (May 1977), pp. 11 & 16. 
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technology, spending $198.8 millions in 1980, as opposed to $28.5 millions 
in 1980 on particle beam research (26), whereas the U. S. S. R. has tended to 
concentrate more on particle beam systems. 
Before discussing the legal implications of the development of these 
systems it should be stressed that although they are still very much in the 
development stage, and both suffer from fundamental problems ranging 
from technological problems of beam penetration through the atmosphere, 
and beam control and direction over large distances, there are indications 
that these weapons will be operational in the foreseeable future. Addi- 
tionally, though both systems were regarded in the past as being too 
large, immobile and requiring too great amounts of power, they are now 
very much more practical both in terms of size and cost effectiveness 
contrary to post opinions (27). This is established by the fact that the 
U. S. A. has succeeded in destroying a missile with a high energy laser 
mounted in an aircraft. 
The first question that must arise on being presented with the possibility 
of directed energy weapoons being placed in orbit, or on celestial bodies, 
or in space, is that do they fall within the category of "nuclear weapons 
or any kind of weapons of mass destruction", as contained in Article IV,, 
Paragraph 1 of the Outer Space Treaty? In assessing whether such a 
weapon is within Article IV reference must be made to the nature of the 
beam being used. It is suggested by Zedalis and Wade that if the beam 
projected is a result of either the process of fission or fusion then it must 
be regarded as a nuclear weapon (28). It would appear therefore that 
only particle beam weapons would fall into this category since loser 
technology does not depend on the atomic processes of fission and fusion 
for its power. However, because of the high energy required to produce a 
26. Supra Note 24. 
27. Supra Note 24 at p. 2. 
28. ZEDALIS and WADE, (1978), p. 466. 
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loser of the capacity needed to destroy a satellite it is possible that 
nuclear processes may be required in order to produce such a high energy 
laser. Even here it is possible that such a weapon is outside Article IV 
since it may be suggested that a directed energy weapon is only a nuclear 
weapon if the nature of the beam itself is of a nuclear character. This 
is not the case with a laser since this only consists of amplified light, 
however it may be conceivable, unlikely though it may be, that the power 
to produce a destructive beam may need the total capacity of a nuclear 
pov, er station. In such a case would the beam then be considered to be a 
nuclear weapon? If it is the weapon would come within the auspices of 
Article IV, and if not the situation would arise that any high energy laser 
weapon of the type that the U. S. A. is concentrating on would be legal, 
whilst the U. S. S. R. 's particle beam weapon would be considered illegal 
since this operates by particles being charged through either of the two 
nuclear processes described above. It should, however, be borne in mind 
that either system could be regarded as illegal if they cause "superfluous 
injury or unnecessary suffering" contrary to Article 35 (2) of the Protocols 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12th August, 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict of June 1977 
(29). It should also be noted that this provision is not new by any means 
since the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land 1907, Article 23(e) states that it is forbidden to employ arms, 
projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering (30). 
The second question that may be asked of direct energy weapons is that 
is it possible to install such weapons on the Moon or other celestial bodies 
without being in breach of Article IV? Paragraph 1 of Article IV merely 
prevents the installation of "nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons 
29. Command 6927; U. K. Misc. 19, (1977). 
30. Command 5030; U. K. T. S. 9, (1910). 
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of mass destruction" on celestial bodies, and thus it is essential that 
directed energy weapons be defined as to whether they fall into either of 
these categories. It has already been seen above that it is possible that 
particle beam weapons could be. classed as nuclear weapons, whereas high 
energy lasers are not and thus could be deployed quite legally on celestial 
bodies. It is also unlikely that either type of weapon could be classed as 
a weapon of mass destruction, as defined by A. J. Goldberg and C. R. 
Vance (31), since their primary role is an anti-satellite one. Depending 
therefore on how one defines a directed energy weapon there is nothing 
illegal in placing these weapons on celestial bodies, nor in placing them in 
orbit around such a celestial body. With regard to these types of weapons 
the question again must be put as to whether the term "celestial bodies" 
includes the Moon? With regard, firstly, to paragraph 1, if directed 
energy weapons are regarded as non-nuclear then, as already stated, such 
weapons could be put into orbit or installed on or around celestial bodies 
perfectly legally, and there would appear to be prima facie, no reason in 
Paragraph 1 why such weapons could not be placed into orbit or installed 
on the moon (32). If however, directed energy weapons are regarded as 
nuclear weapons then clearly the placing into orbit or the installation of 
such weapons around or on celestial bodies must be regarded as illegal, 
with the resulting problem of defining whether or not the term "celestial 
bodies" includes the moon. The problem is a significant one since if the 
term does exclude the moon there would appear to be no problem in 
either installing a directed energy weapon either on the moon or in orbit 
around it, and proceed to use it against either satellites or earth based 
targets. 
31. Supra Note 8. 
32. Article IV Paragraph 2 does not prevent the placing of weapons on 
the moon or on celestial bodies, but only the "testing of weapons on 
these bodies. However note the possible effect U the clause that 
the "moon and other celestial bodies shall be used ... exclusively for 
peaceful purposes". See below p. -140. 
- 136 - 
It is suggested by Matte that the term "celestial bodies" does not include 
the moon: - 
in accordance with the stricto sensu interpretation of the 
law of treaties, the fact that the expression "the moon and 
other celestial bodies" is used at the beginning of the second 
paragraph of the same article, and also in some other 
articles and more importantly in the title of the treaty might 
mean that the expression "celestial bodies" when used by 
itself should be interpreted as excluding the moon. The 
result of such an interpretation would mean that the instal- 
lation of nuclear weapons on the moon would be permissible" 
(33). 
Not all agree with Matte and J. E. S. Fawcett has stated that: - 
the omission of the moon must either be intentional, or 
an egregious mistake, only to be saved by saying that the 
whole tenor requires that the expression "celestial bodies" in 
that sentence must include the moon. " (34) 
One solution to this problem of interpretation would be Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (35), which entered into 
force on the 27th January 1980, and states: - 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of 
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object 
and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a 
treaty shall comprise in addition to the text ... its 
preamble and annexes ... 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the 
context: - 
a) any subsequent agreement between the parties 
regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the 
application of its provisions. 
b) any subsequent practice in the application of the 
treaty which establishes the agreement of the 
parties regarding its interpretation, 
C) any relevant rules of international law applicable in 
the relations between the parties. 
4. Any special meaning shall be given to a term if it is 
established that the parties so intended. " 
33. N. MATTE, Aeroseace Law, Sweet and Maxwell, (1969), p. 299. 
34. J. E. S. FAWCETT, International Law and the Uses of Outer Space, 
Manchester University Press, (1968), p. 35. Also C. K. WEHRINGER, 
"The Treaty on Outer Space", American Bar Association Journal, 
(1968), pp. 586-587. 
35. U. N. DOC. A/CONF. 29/27 May 22nd 1969; Command 4818; 63 
A. J. I. L. (1969), p. 875. 
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Clearly, by virtue of paragraph 1 above, any provision contained in the 
Outer Space Treaty must be interpreted in its context and in the light of 
its object and purpose, and thus since the purpose of Article IV of the 
treaty is to attempt to demilitarise space, then the moon should be 
interpreted as being included in the term "celestial bodies". Additionally 
since the Vienna Convention Article 31 Paragraph 1 states that treaties 
should be interpreted in their ordinary meaning, on looking at the term 
"celestial bodies" it would appear that the moon is such a body within the 
"ordinary meaning" of that expression. This textual approach thus tends to 
give a satisfactory result as far as Fawcett is concerned. However the 
Vienna Convention also permitted something of a qualification to this 
approach by incorporating a teleological approach within it by allowing 
further reference to the "object and purpose" of the terms of a treaty, 
though only when a "manifestly absurd or unreasonable" interpretation 
would result (36). 
In adopting a teleological approach to the interpretation of the term 
"celestial bodies" difficulties of the type enunciated by Matte (37), could 
easily occur, since Article IV does appear to make a distinction between 
that term and the moon, and the international courts will not give effect 
to the object and the purpose of the treaty if the outcome of this would 
be to override the clear meaning of the text (38). However, the inter- 
national courts, as in the Corfu Channel case (39), do have a discretion in 
taking the teleological approach, in the sense of giving effect to its 
object and purpose, as summed up in the maxim UT RES MAGIS VALEAT 
QUAM PEREAT, in providing a solution. The great danger with this 
approach, in a radical form is of not merely interpreting the treaty but 
36. Ibid, Article 32. 
37. MATTE, (1969), p. 299. 
38. Interpretation of Peace Treaties Case (Second Phase) I. C. J. REPORTS 
(1950), p. 221. 
39. I. C. J. REPORTS (1949), p. 4. 
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actually amending it in order to give effect to what is thought to be the 
correct purpose of the treaty, thus achieving an interpretation not con- 
templated by the parties. Indeed it was stated in the South West Africa 
Cases that such an approach does not warrant an interpretation which 
revises a treaty or operates contrary to the letter or spirit of a treaty 
(40). 
Quite apart from the above methods of interpreting Article IV Paragraph 1 
a further method of interpretation may be used which is normally called 
the "intention of the parties" or "founding fathers" school of interpreta- 
tion, as embodied in Article 31 Paragraph 4 of the Vienna Convention. 
Such a principle of interpretation may include the moon in the "celestial 
bodies" term of Paragraph 1 because the hallowed principle of the Outer 
Space Treaty is that the: 
... use of outer space including the moon and other celestial bodies shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest 
of all countries. " (41) 
Further in the preamble to the treaty it is stated: - 
"The States Parties to this Treaty ... Recognising the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and 
use of outer space for peaceful purposes; believing that the 
exploration and use of outer space shall be carried on for the 
benefit of all people ... " (42). 
Thus, further authority is given to the principle of interpretation as 
contained in Article 31 Paragraph 4, as has the General Assembly Reso- 
lution 1962 (XVIII) (43), and General Assembly Resolution 1884 (44), both 
of which were recalled in the preamble to the Outer Space Treaty, and 
both of which were expressly drafted to prevent the deployment of arms 
in space. Similar authority is found in Article IV Paragraph 2 of the 
Outer Space Treaty itself where there is a requirement that the moon and 
other celestial bodies shall be used for peaceful purposes. 
40. SOUTH WEST AFRICA CASES, 2nd PHASE, I. C. J. Reports (1966) at 
p. 48. 
41. Outer Space Treaty, 1967, Article 1, Paragraph 1. 
42. Preamble to the Outer Space Treaty, 1967. 
43. G. A. RESOLUTION 1962 (XVIII); U. N. DOC. A/Cl/L331 (1963). 
44. G. A. RESOLUTION 1884 (XVIII); U. N. DOC. A/Cl/L34A/RES/1884 
(1963). 
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It would appear therefore that if the three principles of treaty interpreta- 
tion are applied to Article IV Paragraph 1 then the term "celestial bodies" 
would be interpreted so as to include the moon and thus any deployment 
of nuclear weapons on or around the moon would be in contravention of 
Article IV Paragraph 1 and illegal. Thus any directed energy weapons, 
classified as nuclear weapons, placed on or around the moon would be in 
violation of international law (45). 
In the above discussion relating to the use of directed energy weapons in 
orbit around celestial bodies or the moon, and the stationing of such 
weapons on those bodies it was assumed that these weapons were nuclear 
devices. The conclusion drawn from that assumption was that such 
weapons would violate international law if they were placed in orbit, 
installed on celestial bodies (a term which was interpreted as including the 
moon), or stationed in outer space. What would be the position however 
if such weapons were not regarded as nuclear weapons (nor weapons of 
mass destruction)? It is well established that neither the placing in orbit, 
the stationing in space, nor the installation of conventi onal weapons on 
celestial bodies is in violation of international law (46). However it should 
be borne in mind that the preamble to the Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be 
Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious Or To Have Indiscriminate Effects, 
recalls that it is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which 
are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and 
severe damage to the environment (47). If the term "celestial body" is 
correctly held to include the moon then there would appear to be no 
restriction on the use of conventional weapons on the moon. However the 
45. ZEDALIS AND WADE, (1978), p. 466. 
46. MARKOFF, (1976), p. 16. 
47. United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of 
Certain Conventional Weapons: Final Act U. N. DOC. A/CONF. 95/15 
of October 27th 1980. I. L. M. Vol. XIX No. 6, November 1980, p. b23. 
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provisions of Article 1 Paragraph 1 must be read in the light of Paragraph 
2 which declares that: - 
"The moon and celestial bodies shall be used ... exclusively for peaceful purposes ... The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of ANY type 
of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on 
celestial bodies shall be forbidden. " (48) 
The term "install", as stated above (49), would tend to suggest more than 
rrere presence on a celestial body and would tend to imply a degree of 
permanence. If that is the case there would seem to be no objection to 
the temporary placing of a conventional weapon on a celestial body prior 
to it being stationed in outer space or placed in orbit around a celestial 
body. Similarly there would appear to be no objection, at least initially, 
to the building of a conventional A. S. A. T. weapon on a celestial body 
prior to it being stationed in space or placed in orbit around a celestial 
body. It is almost certainly to prevent such an eventuality that Paragraph 
2 declares that "the moon and celestial bodies shall be used ... exclusively 
for peaceful purposes" and forbids "the testing of any type of weapons. " 
Thus while it may appear to be possible to place a conventional weapon 
on the moon it is thought that the provision declaring the moon to be 
used "exclusively for peaceful purposes" will be a bar to this type of 
action, although the actual meaning of this phrase is open to debate and 
will be discussed below. 
A further point of discussion affects Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty 
and that is that Paragraph 1 only deals with nuclear weapons which orbit 
around the earth, are installed on celestial bodies, or are stationed in 
space. As mentioned earlier (50) no reference is made to weapons such 
as I. C. B. M. s which do not complete a full orbit and thus do not come 
48. Article IV Paragraph 2 (emphasis added). 
49. Supra at p. 128- 
50. Supro at p. 127- 
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within Paragraph 1 (51). The requirement to make one full orbit before a 
weapon comes within the treaty has been open to question (52) since there 
is nothing in Article IV Paragraph 1 that requires a full orbit to be made. 
Zedalis and Wade (53) suggested that the proper method to decide whether 
or not an object came within Paragraph 1 should not be based on a 
directional or locational definition (i. e. one that would require a full 
orbit), but on the absence or existence of a time analogy between the 
weapon launched and that of an I. C. B. M. Thus if the length of time 
spent in space is comparable to that of an I. C. B. M. then the use of that 
weapon is permissible. Such a method of assessing the legality of a 
weapon, though it may be consistent with the intentions of the U. S. A. and 
U. S. S. R. in that there was no intention to restrict the use of I. C. B. M. s 
(54), is, it is suggested, impracticable since it is unrealistic to expect 
states to time a missile in order to decide whether or not the nuclear 
weapon launched is a I. C. B. M. or an orbiting weapon. 
Any suggestion that the Outer Space Treaty applies to weapons placed in 
j5cTtial orbit, because of the lack of definition of the term "orbit", is also 
without foundation, since as stated above it was the clear intention of the 
U. S. A. and U. S. S. R. that I. C. B. M. s would be excluded from the provisions 
of the treaty. This may be shown by the fact that prior to the signing 
of the treaty it was disclosed to the United States Congress by Secretary 
of Defence McNamara that the U. S. S. R. had developed fractional orbital 
bombardment system (F. O. B. S. ). In his report to Congress, McNamara was 
questioned as to whether such a weapon violated Article JV Paragraph 1 
and he stated that: - 
51. M. G. MARKOFF, "Disarmament and the 'Peaceful Purposes' Provi- 
sion in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty", 4 Journal of Space Law, 
(1976) p. 4. E. STEIN, "Legal Restraints in-W--c-aern Arms Control 
Agreements", American Journal of International Law, (1972), p. 255. 
52. S. GOROVE "Arms Control Provisions in the Outer Space Treaty: A 
Scrutinising Reappraisal" 3 Georgia Journal of International and 
Comearative Law, (1973), pAT-6. 
53. ZEDALIS and W; ýDE, (1978), pp. 464 & 465. 
54. MATTE, (1969), p. 240. 
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the so called F. O. B. S. would not accomplish a full orbit 
... and was, like ballistic missiles that go through space in 
their trajectories, not covered by the treaty and thus are no 
more than I. C. B. M. s. " (55) 
That the treaty covers weapons which do not complete one full orbit is 
further disputed by reference in the treaty to "station". This term is 
thought to refer to geostationary orbit (56), whereby an object, as already 
stated in Chapte r 1, orbits the earth in a fixed orbit in relation to a 
point underlying the satellite and at the same rotational speed of the 
earth. If this is the case then the orbiting object need never make more 
than one orbit of the earth since it appears to hang above the planet, and 
thus would be outside the ambit of Article IV Paragraph 1. In order to 
prevent this interpretation the treaty expressly forbids the stationing of 
nuclear weapons above the earth. Two additional factors should perhaps 
be noted here; firstly, as already stated, the term "station" is thought by 
Poulantzas (57) to go further than just geostationary orbit, but includes 
every manner in which nuclear weapons might be placed in space or on or 
around celestial bodies, because the actual phrase used in Paragraph 1 is 
... station such weapons in outer space in any other manner" (58). 
Secondly, there would appear to be no restriction on orbiting nuclear 
weapons or weapons of mass destruction around celestial bodies since the 
actual wording relating to orbiting in Paragraph 1 relates only to the 
earth. Two explanations may account for this apparent omission in 
Paragraph 1. Firstly, the placing of such a weapon in an orbit around a 
celestial body other than the earth would be of no practical significance 
at the present time nor in the foreseeable future; and secondly, if the 
wide interpretation of the term "station" as explained by Poulantzas was 
intended then such action would be considered illegal anyway. 
55. Ibid. 
56. GOROVE, (1973), p. 117. 
57. POULANTZAS, (1967), pp. 67-68. 
58. Article IV Paragraph 1. 
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2. THE INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM "PEACEFUL" IN ARTICLE 
IV PARAGRAPH 2 
The second paragraph of Article IV Paragraph 2 states that: - 
"The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all 
States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful pur- 
poses. The establishment of military bases, installations and 
fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the 
conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be 
f orbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific 
research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be 
prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary 
for the peaceful explanation of the moon and other celestial 
bodies shall also not be prohibited. " 
This paragraph contains one of the most controversial aspects of the 
Outer Space Treaty, * in that the term "peaceful" has been given two 
conflicting interpretations. The first interpretation, which is supported by 
the authorities of several Western States, states that the term "peaceful" 
means that activities in space should be of a "non-aggressive" nature (59). 
The effect of this interpretation is that all military non aggressive action 
is permitted, subject to those activities actually prohibited under Article 
IV Paragraph 1. It is the lack of prohibitive measures which is pointed to 
as being evidence, according to this "non-aggressive " theory, that "peace- 
ful" does not mean "non-military". Such an interpretation was adopted in 
the debate on the Treaty's notification by the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations (60). 
The second s. cbool of interpretation takes the term "peaceful" as meaning 
"non-military", and thus precluding all military involvement in space, even 
those concerned with defensive measures. This interpretation takes the 
59. Staff of the U. S. Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space 
Sciences 90th Congress 1st Session, Report on the Treaty on 
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies: 
Analysis and Background Data 1967 p. 26 (in future cited as "Staff 
Report"). Also A. MEYER, "Interpretation of the Term "Peaceful" in 
the Light of the Space Treaty", Proceedings of the 11th Colloquiu 
on the Law of Outer Space, (1969), p. 24. 
60. Treaty on Outer Space, Hearing on Executive Eý Before the Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 90th Congress, 1st Session 
1967, p. 59. 
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diametrically opposing view that no military activities can be conducted on 
the moon and other celestial bodies, except those specifically permissable 
under Paragraph 2, i. e. the use of military personnel for scientific re- 
search. Such a view has predominated mainly in the Soviet Union and in 
the opinions of Soviet writers (61), though not exclusively so (62). How- 
ever it should be noted that Article IV Paragraph 2 alone cannot justify 
such an argument in favour of a ban on military activities in SPACE since 
this area is not included in the paragraph, which relates only to the "Moon 
and other celestial bodies". 
The first school of interpretation refers to several factors as being 
authority for their view. Firstly since Article III of the Outer Space 
Treaty adopts international low and the Charter of the United Nations, 
this is referred to for the meaning of the term "peaceful", and it is 
pointed out that the Charter does not prohibit military activities in 
general but merely outlaws threats to peace, breaches of peace, and acts 
of aggression (63). Secondly, in the view of Markoff, the non-aggressive 
interpretation of "peaceful" lies in the failure of a complete disarmament 
in outer space. He suggests that this failure was in turn based on the 
lack of international control over the development and deployment of all 
arms, whether nuclear or conventional, and that without such controls it is 
unrealistic to attempt to prohibit intercontinental missiles or non-nuclear, 
61. G. P. ZHUKOV "On the Question of the Interpretation of the term 
"Peaceful Uses of Outer Space", Proceedings of the 11th Colloquiu 
on the Law of Outer Space", (196-9T- 
62. C. CHAUMONT "Le Droit De L'Espace", 1970, p. 96, D. GOEDHUIS, 
"General Questions on the Legal Regime of Space in the Inter- 
National Law Association", 50th Report 1962. Both quoted in M. G. 
MARKOFF, "Disarmament and 'Peaceful Purposes' Provisions in the 
1967 Outer Space Treaty", 4 Journal of Space Law, 1976, p. 7 note 
13. 
63. S. GOROVE referring to Article 2 U. N. Charter in "Arms Control 
Provisions in the Outer Space Treaty: A Scrutinising Reappraisal", 3 
Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, (1973), 
- 145 - 
military, space objects (64). The supporters of this definition also point to 
the fact that if the Outer Space Treaty intends to prohibit certain 
activities it should expressly state them. Thus Finch in "Outer Space for 
Peaceful Purposes" states: - 
"It should be noted that when an express prohibition is 
intended, the Treaty clearly does so, such as its prohibition 
against "the testing of any types of weapons" in outer space 
in Article IV. No such similar prohibition is recited against 
military activities per se. The "Treaty must be read as a 
whole ... military personnel are expressly authorised" for 
scientific research or for any other "peaceful purposes". How 
can it now any longer be said in the light of this language, 
that "peaceful purposes" means non-military? " It can only 
mean "non-aggressive". (65) 
The treaty appears then to be quite clear that if military personnel or 
eqy I 
ipment are -used there is no automatic breach of the "peaceful pur- 
poses" provisions as defined by the supporters of the non-aggressive 
theory (66). It follows therefore that only "an attack upon, or stress 
against, the territorial integrity and independence of another state 
violates the peaceful purposes clause (67). Thus because the treaty fails 
to strike out all possible military activity then any suggestion that "peace- 
ful purposes" means anything else but non-aggressive should be regarded as 
erroneous. However Zedalis and Wade state that this approach to justify 
the non-aggressive interpretation fails to point out that because military 
personnel are used for scientific research this does not necessarily imply 
that non-aggressive military activity can be undertaken. The fact that the 
use of military personnel and equipment is permitted only reflects upon 
the nature of the character and not upon the purpose of the undertaking 
(68). This comment is given added authority by Markov in that, 
64. M. G. MARKOFF, "Disarmament and "Peaceful Purposes" Provisions 
in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty", 4 Journal of Space Law, (1976), 
p. 7. 
65. E. R. FINCH, "Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes", 54 American Bar 
Association Journal, (1965), pp. 365-366. 
66. E. GALLOWAY., "nterpreting the Treaty on 0-uter Space", Pro- 
ceedings of the 10th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, (1-96-77, - 
pp. 143 & 145. 
67. A. MEYER, "Interpretation of the Term "Peaceful" in the Light of 
the Space Treaty", Proceedings of the 11th Colloquiurn on the Law 
of Outer Space, 
68. ZECUTLIS and WADE, (1978), p. 472. 
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"The basic criterion for "peaceful" ... is not the civil or 
military status of the crew or of the installations on board a 
space engine, but the real purpose of a given space activity. 
Its goals are to be revealed 'given the specific object of the 
mission as well as by the resulting records. " (69) 
The advocates of the second school of interpretation, that "peaceful 
purposes" means "non-military", also rely on several factors as being in 
support of their interpretation of Article IV Paragraph 2. One method 
used to justify this interpretation is to examine other treaties with analo- 
gous provisions. The most well known of these is the Antarctica Treaty of 
1959 which entered into force in 1961, Article I of which states: - 
Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. 
There shall be prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a 
military nature, such as the establishment of bases and 
fortifications, the carrying out of military manoeuvres, 
as well as the testing of any type of weapons. 
2. The present Treaty shall not prevent the use of military 
personnel or equipment for scientific research or for any 
other peaceful purpose". (70) 
The term "peaceful" in this treaty has been held out as signifying complete 
demilitarisation (71). A similar interpretation is placed on Article 11 of the 
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 1956 (72) which 
states: - 
"The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contri- 
bution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity 
throughout the world. It shall ensure, so for as it is able, 
that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its 
supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further 
any military purpose. " (73). 
The supporters of the "non-military" interpretation see a direct interpre- 
tative connection between these two documents and Article IV Paragraph 2 
69. M. G. MARKOV, "The Juridical Meaning of the Term 'Peaceful' in 
1967 Space Treaty", Proceedings of the 11th Colloquiurn on the Law, 
of Outer Space (19688-T, -p. 34. 
70.402 U. N. T. S. 71; 54 American Journal of International Law, (1960), 
p. 477. 
71. G. GAL, "The Peaceful Uses of Outer Space - After the Space 
Treaty", Proceedings of the 10th Colloquium on the Low of Outer 
Space, (1267), p. 135. - 
72.276 United Nations Treaty Series 3; T. I. A. S. 3873; U. S. T. 1093, 
(1956). 
73. G. GAL, (1967). S. GOROVE, "Distinguishing "Peaceful" from 
"Military" Uses of Atomic Energy: Some Facts & Considerations", 
30 Ohio State Law Journal, (1969), p. 495. 
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of the Outer Space Treaty, so as to provide a solution to the problem of 
the meaning of the term "peaceful". Thus, 
"That "peaceful" signifies, according to the genuine semantic 
sense of the word, "non-military", and not merely "non- 
aggressive" in the language of all newly created international 
agreements, is to be seen in Article 11 of the Statute of the 
Atomic Energy Agency and particularly in Article I of the 
1959 Antarctic Treaty, where the provision "Antarctica shall 
be used for peaceful purposes only" covers a regime of 
complete disarmament and non-militarisation of that area. 
"Any measure of a military nature" (second sentence of 
Article 1) is expressly prohibited. The analogy between this 
text and Paragraph 2 of the 1967 Treaty is obvious. " (74) 
Another factor relied on by the "non-military" school is that it is inconsis- 
tent with Article 31 Paragraph 2 of the Vienna Convention to interpret 
Article IV Paragraph 2 in vacuo from the rest of the treaty. This cons- 
tructional approach to defining the term "peaceful" would seem to require 
some reference to Article I Paragraph 1 of the treaty, which states: - 
"The exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon 
and other celestial bodies shall be carried out for the benefit 
and in the interests of all countries irrespective of their 
degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be 
the province of all mankind". (75) 
Since this article requires that space activities be carried on for the 
benefit and in the interests of all countries it is alleged that although the 
defensive uses of outer space with conventional weapons is not expressly 
prohibited, it must be regarded as contrary to the general principle set out 
in Article 1. In the opinion of several writers (76) the justification for 
such an interpretation is that no military activity could be carried "in the 
interest of all countries" since by its nature it ca n only be in the interest 
of one state, or at best a group of states. Wh ilst it must be said that 
74. M. MARKOFF, "Disarmament and 'Peaceful Purposes' Provisions in 
the 1967 Outer Space Treaty", 4 Journal of Space Law, (1976), 
P. 19. 
75. Outer Space Treaty 1967 Paragraph 1. 
76. MARKOFF, (1976), p. 7; MARKOV, (1968), p. 31; G. P. ZHUKOV, "On 
the Question of Interpretation of the Term "Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space" Contained in the Space Treaty", Proceidings of the 11th 
Colloquiurn on the Law of Outer Space, (19 p. 36-38. 
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anything less than ncn-military would appear to be inconsistent with Article 
1, it must be pointed out that the three fundamental articles of the 
treaty, namely Articles 1,11 and III, which provide the basic principles and 
rules of space law, do not make any reference to the term "peaceful". 
Indeed it is significant to the whole question of the interpretation of the 
term "peaceful" in Article IV Paragraph 2 that during the drafting of the 
treaty an attempt was made to include the term in Article I but failed to 
have the unanimity required (77). Similarly, a further proposal by India to 
widen the area of application of the clause "exclusively for peaceful 
purposes", as contained in Article IV Paragraph 2, to the entire area of 
outer space generally also failed to gain the necessary support, primarily 
because the treaty did not, as already examined, exclude all military 
activities and therefore such an application of the clause would be incon- 
sistent with the rest of the treaty (78). Though the term "peaceful" 
occurs in the preamble there is nothing in that to indicate how the term 
may be interpreted, and anyway in this context it can only be regarded as 
a declaration of intent or expectation in which "everybody shares and 
believes in" (7? ), but has no binding force as a contractual obligation of 
the treaty. 
It has been said that the attempt to have the term "peaceful" included in 
Article 1, and to widen the application of the clause "exclusively for 
peaceful purposes", failed because states could not have assumed such a 
step in isolation from an undertaking to negotiate general disarmament 
measures (80), since in essence this is what they would be doing in taking 
77. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/C2/S. R. 65 (1966), p. 11. 
78. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/C2/S. R. 66 (1966), p. 6. 
79. A. J. GOLDBERG, Ambassador of the United States to the United 
Nations, Hearings on Executive D Before the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, U. S. Senate 90th Congress, 1st Session 1967, p. 6. 
80. U. S. S. R. representative Mr. Mo rozov i n U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/C2/SR66 
1966, pp. 6-7. 
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such action. Any attempt to adopt such a course would have been con- 
trary to the whole tenet of the Legal Sub-Comrrittee of the Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which has never been authorised to take 
any action in the area of general disarmament (81). It would perhaps be 
said that it is because of these restrictions on states that Article I 
Paragraph 1 has been drafted in its present form and thus an attempt has 
been made to formulate the principle of non-military use of space by way 
of reference to the "common interests" provision rather than the term 
"peaceful" in order to avoid any conflict with general disarmament issues. 
Thus the "non-military" military school of interpretation has attempted to 
show that Article I Paragraph 1 really means that space should only be 
used for "peaceful purposes" and that this term in this context excludes all 
military uses of outer space. 
In order to establish the above interpretation of Article I Paragraph 1 the 
"non-military" school rely heavily on the discussions which took place 
between Arthur Goldberg, U. S. Ambassador to the U. N. and the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations in order to obtain theýr consent and 
approval of the signed treaty. In the Legal Sub-Committee, prior to these 
negotations, there had been a proposal by the Indian delegate that the 
clause "the benefit and interests of all countries" in Article I Paragraph 1 
should be removed and placed in the preamble (82) where it would cease to 
form part of any contractual obligation. This proposal was rejected by the 
Legal Sub-Committee, and Article I paragraph 1 was then unanimously 
accepted in the present form. 
By leaving Article I in its original form and rejecting the attempt to 
remove part of it into the preamble must by implication have shown an 
intention to treat the article cis binding under international law. However 
81. MARKOFF, (1976), p. 10. 
82. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/C2/SR63 (1966), p. 7. 
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during the hearings of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
U. S. Ambassador denied that there was any such obligation, stating that 
Article I was "quite general in character" and "intended to be a statement 
of goals and objectives" only. (83) 
To understand the response to these comments by the Senate Committee 
one should be aware of the fact that international law consists of two 
types of provisions - those that are prohibitive and those that are said to 
be dispositive. Prohibitive provisions are proscriptive in their character 
and may permit only certain types of action or prohibit certain types of 
conduct, i. e. they may be of a positive or negative nature. Dispositive 
provisions, however, only establish guides to the aspirations and consensus 
of member states, to be more strictly defined into prohibitive provisions at 
a later stage, though they are not necessarily of a pacturn do contrahendo 
nature. Nevertheless, dispositive provisions if they form part of the body 
of the treaty are regarded as binding, and their violation is regarded as 
illegal (84). Article I Paragraph 1 is regarded as a dispositive provision in 
that it establishes prescriptive guidelines to be followed in the exercise of 
permissible conduct, and thus every state party to the treaty must give 
effect to the principles contained in the article. Thus, any party exploring 
or using outer space will be required to do so "in the interest of all 
countries", and since military activity is regarded as only benefitting one 
country this must be regarded as illegal (85). 
During the meeting of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations several 
members of the committee expressed concern that Article I Paragraph 1 
seemed "vague" (86) and uncertain. The Ambassador then stated that the 
83. Supra note 79 at p. 52. 
84. ZEDALIS and WADE, (1978), p. 478. 
85. A. AMBROSINI, "The Meaning of the Romantic Ennunciations of 
Article 1, Paragraph 1 of the Space Treaty of January 1967", 
Further Outlooks on Space, No. 11 as cited in ZEDALIS and WADE 
( 19 78T, -p-. 'ýf -7 -?. 
86. Supra Note 79. 
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Article I provision was of a non-obligatory nature and that it was only 
intended to be a statement of a general principle that would require 
further discussions before it would be considered as binding rule of inter- 
national law (87). This response by the Ambassador must be regarded as 
erroneous even if Article I Paragraph 1 is interpreted as dispositive, since 
such provisions are still binding on states party to the treaty in that they 
must act in accordance with the provisions albeit statements of general 
principles or aspirations (88). It would seem that the Senate Committee 
also remained unconvinced by the response of the Ambassador and indeed 
seemed to indicate that he had given away a great deal more than he had 
intended to, that is the possible military potential of space. Indeed it was 
stated by Senator Gore as follows: - 
"If Article I were a preamble that would be one thing. But 
it is an article, and a treaty obligation, and I think it brings 
us into an obligation to make the use of outer space avail- 
able to all countries, to treat our use of that for the benefit 
and in the interests of all countries. Indeed that is exactly 
what it says. " (89) 
Ambassador Goldberg in order to support his statement that Article I did 
not confer any obligation on the United States also stated thct this was a 
non self-executing provision. The concept of the self-executing and non 
self-executing provision is not known in English Law, since here the method 
by which a treaty is recognised in domestic law is an attempt to reconcile 
the powers of the executive with those of the legislative. This reconcil- 
iation is required because otherwise it could be possible for the executive 
to alter the domestic low without the need to consult Parliament. Because 
of this treaties subject to ratification are subject to the constitutional 
convention entitled the "Ponsonby Rule" whereby they are laid on the 
tables of both Houses for 21 days prior to ratification (90). Not all 
87. Supra Note 79 at pp. 12 & 35. 
88. Supra Notes 84 & 85. 
89. Supra Note 79 at p. 59. 
90. J. D. B. MITCHELL, Constitutional Law, W. GREEN & SONS, (1968), 
p. 179. 
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treaties require legislation in order to enact the provisions of the treaty, 
and generally speaking it is only those which affect the private rights of 
British citizens, or involve any modification of the common or statute law, 
or impose financial obligations on the Government, or involve the cession 
cf British territory, inter alia, that require enacting legislation. 
The United States concept of self-executing and non self-executing treaties 
is not based on the reconciliation of the powers of the executive and the 
legislative, but on the United States Constitution, which by Article VI 
Paragraph 2 declares that treaties are "the supreme low of the land". 
However while all treaties become part of the U. S. Legal system, the 
courts have declared that certain treaties, i. e. non self-executing ones, 
require legislation in order to be adopted and applied within the domestic 
legal system. Whether a treaty or the provisions of a treaty are self- 
executing or not is found by examining the intention of the signatories and 
any other relevant factors. Thus in SEI FUJII v THE STATE OF CALI- 
FORNIA (91) it was held that the human rights provisions in the Charter 
of the United Nations were not self-executing, whereas the articles con- 
ferring rights and privileges on the United Nations were self-executing. 
In the light of the self-executing and non self-executing doctrine it would 
seem that the Ambassador, by alleging that Article I Paragraph 1 was non 
self-executing, was attempting to reduce, if not extinguish, the binding 
nature of international law on the United States domestic arena. Certainly 
if the article is non self-executing then the American courts will not be 
bound until the relevant legislation is passed. Nonetheless by virtue of the 
Constitution of the United States it is regarded as a binding force. As 
explained by M. Markoff it is: - 
91. Supreme Court of California, 38 CAL. (2d), (1952), p. 718. 
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"The efficacy, not the validity of the norm or its binding 
force, (which) is affected by its non self-executory nature. " 
(92) 
In reply to the Ambassador's comments Senator Gore, who seemed clearly 
unimpressed with the whole handling of the acceptance of the "common 
interests" provision in Article I by the U. S. negotiators commented: - 
"Any article is operable. If this were a preamble it might be 
interpreted in one way, but this is not a preamble. Article I 
is just as operable as Article IV or Article V or Article VII 
and this business of the treaty being non-operable in part and 
operable in other parts, self-executing in part and non self- 
executing in part is ambiguous. " (93) 
After the above debate in the Senate Committee it was proposed that a 
reservation should be adopted on the interpretation of Article I so that any 
possible national interests would not fall into the area of operation of the 
"common interests" expression. This proposal has been interpreted as 
indicating that the United States reserved the right to use outer space for 
"non-aggressive" military activities (94). No official reservation has ever 
been put forward by the United States, primarily because the treaty had 
then been signed, and to do so at that point would have created "very 
substantial" difficulties (95). However the fact cannot be avoided that the 
United States, having realised that it had perhaps given away more than 
was intended, only recognises Article I Paragraph 1 as being a dispositive 
statement of general objectives and aspirations to be considered when 
planning activities in space. 
It would appear therefore that there is a possibility that Article I is 
attempting to prevent any military involvement in space, as endorsed by 
the informal reservation of the United States. It would also appear that 
this reservation has no validity anyway in international law since the 
92. MARKOFF, (1976), p. 13. Emphasis has been added. 
93. Supra Note 79 at p. 33. 
94. MARKOFF, (1976), at p. 14. 
95. MR. D. RUSK, Secretary of State, Ibid Note 79, at p. 37. 
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties makes no provision for such a 
reservation (96), and thus the United States would continue to be bound by 
the provisions of Article 1, assuming that is that they are of an obligatory 
nature. Although the above interpretation of the United States. involve- 
ment with Article I and the ineffectiveness of the reservation may be 
correct, the poor drafting of that Article may give the United States an 
alternative rnethod of avoiding the provision by way of the principles 
contained in the Lotus Case (? 7). In this case it was stated that if no 
principle of international low exists prohibiting a state from asserting 
jurisdiction, then that state may make such an assertion. Applying this 
logic to Article I it could be argued that, because of its lack of clarity, 
non aggressive military activities are not prohibited, arid thus the United 
States is free to involve itself in such activities. While such an argument 
could be founded it is generally regarded as untenable in modern inter- 
national law since it would tend to undermine the whole concept of pacta 
sunt servanda. 
The use by the "non-military" school of Article I Paragraph 1 in the 
interpretation of the term "peaceful" in Article IV Paragraph 2 is convin- 
cing, since it is reasonable to say that the prohibitive provisions of the 
Outer Space Treaty should be read in the context of the dispositive 
provisions in Article I Paragraph 1. Such an approach would be consistent 
with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention which would seem to indicate 
that the treaty should be read as a whole. (98). 
However a rider should be added to this line of interpretation since Article 
IV Paragraph 2 does not state that outer space shall be used for "peaceful 
purposes", but "that the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by 
96. Article 23. 
97. THE S. S. LOIUS, (1927), P. C. I. J. Rep. Ser A, No. 10 J. L. BRIERLY, 
"The Lotus Case", 44 Low Quarterly Review, (1? 28), p. 154. 
98. Vienna Convention of--t-Fe- Law of Treaties 1769 Article 31, Para. 2. 
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all States Parties to the Treaty EXCLUSIVELY for peaceful purposes" (99). 
Thus there is a clear distinction made between the Moor, and celestial 
bodies and deep space and earth orbital space, which would tend to suggest 
that non-aggressive military activity mcy take place in the latter areas 
(100). It has been put forward that the term "peaceful" in this context is 
mant to allow the use of these areas for "defensive" military activities 
(101), and indeed to allege that defensive action in space is illegal could 
be interpreted as being contrary to the right of self defence as contained 
in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
Certainly such an approach would tend to correspond to the different 
levels of intensity to which the expression "peaceful" is put in the treaty. 
Additionally such an approach would relate to the present practice of 
states and the apparent customary rule allowing the use of military non- 
aggressive satellites. It has been stated that such practice of states is 
"irrelevant" and that "no consensus could be presumed on the basis of a 
practice limited to o few states" (102). This must be regarded as unrealis- 
tic since the fact that states have chosen to ignore the non-military 
definition must make it relevant, and provide at the very least a tacit 
consensus on the use of outer space for non-aggressive purposes. Even if 
the term "peaceful" can be interpreted as mecning "non-military" it is 
quite apparent that such an interpretation is unworkable in the present day 
context. The reason for this was summed up very early on by the Soviet 
writer Larionov: - 
"Indeed it is not always possible to draw a line of distinction 
between the exploration of outer space for military and 
peaceful purposes, because a rocket carrier can equally place 
in orbit around the earth a spy satellite, intended for recon- 
noitering ground objectives, and a weather-mapping satellite 
or a civilian telecommunications satellite. " (103) 
99. Emphasis has been added. 
100. With the exception of nuclear weapons etc. as restricted by 
Article IV Paragraph 1. 
101. J. E. S. FAWCETT, International Law and the Uses of Outer 
Space, Manchester University Press, (1968), p. 35. 
102. WAR-KOFF, (1976), p. 14. 
103. V. LARIONOV "The Doctrine of Military Domination in Outer 
Space", International Affairs, (1964), p. 25. 
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The traditional Soviet view that "peaceful" means non-military has undoub- 
tedly undergone a complete change, and over the years their ability to 
criticise the surveillence satellites has been restricted by their approval of 
reconnoissance satellites to monitor compliance with Strategic Arms 
Limitation Treaties. Thus Article IV of the unratified SALT 11 reads: - 
each party shall use national technical means of verifica- 
tion at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally 
recognised principles of international law. " (104) 
Such a change was bound to occur since to suppose that the techniques 
used to detect fish at depths of up to 200 feet would not be employed to 
detect submarines (105) would display extreme naivety. Similarly it would 
be fatuous to argue for the complete demilitarisation of space whilst being 
engaged on "killer satellite" research (106). 
CONCLUSION 
The provisions of the Outer Space Treaty undoubtedly reflects the concern 
of mankind at the need to prevent the spread of the arms race into a new 
environment. In 1973 it was stated that Article IV Paragraph 1 "should be 
hailed as a significant step in this general direction" (107), and while this 
was undoubtedly true, the word "general" in this statement must reflect 
the impace of Article IV in practice. It is also consistent with the above 
statement to state that Article IV mirrors the state of world politics with 
all its suspicions, and the reluctance on the part of the super-powers to 
adopt an attitude of complete disarmament in space. This reluctance may 
be seen in the persistance of these powers, particularly it would seem the 
U. S. S. R. to develop anti-satellite systems. Research on these systems has 
104. SALT Il 79 Dept. State Bull. 23,1777. 
105. E. R. FINCH and A. L. MOORE, "Outer Space Can Help the Peace", 
International LawXer, (1773), p. 897. 
106. ZE-D-TEIS and WADE, (1978), pp. 454 & 455. 
107. S. GOROVE, "Arms Control Provisions in the Outir Space Treaty: A 
Scrutinising Reappraisal", Georgia Journal of International and 
Comparative Law, 1973 p. 123. 
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gone on unrestrained merely because conventional weapons, on the wording 
of Article IV, may be used or stationed in space, and may be put into 
orbit around the Moon, celestial bodies or even the earth it-self. A similar 
attitude is taken with regard to nuclear weapons since there are no 
restrictions on I. C. B. M. s, which because they do not complete a full orbit 
do not fall within the treaty (108). Perhaps most importantly of all is 
that while Article IVI and its raison d'etre - Article I Paragraph 1 pur- 
ports to reserve certain parts of the environment for "peaceful purposes", 
there is no agreement as to the correct interpretation of the term "peace- 
ful" itself. 
The different interpretations of "peaceful" have indeed produced some 
astounding inconsistencies on the part of some observers. Thus, Markoff 
rightly or wrongly appears to point to the fact that the United States 
interpretations of "peaceful" as meaning non aggressive is artificial, and an 
excuse for militaristic adventures in space. He also seems to state that 
the United States interpretation is inconsistent with the proceedings which 
took place before the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 
and the enquiries made of its United Nations Ambassador before the 
Senate Committee as discussed above (109). While pointing out these 
inconsistencies he fails to balance the point to the same extent in that 
the U. S. S. R., while apparently adopting a non-military interpretation of the 
term "peaceful", is in fact openly engaged in research on "killer satellites" 
(110). Further inconsistencies are also pointed out by Jaksetic (111); thus, 
Vereshetin has stated that the Outer Space Treaty provided for the comp- 
lete demilitarisation of the Moon and other celestial bodies, but only partial 
demilitarisation of outer space (112); Zhukov has stated that the principle 
108. lbid at p. 116. 
109. MARKOFF, (1976), p. 8. 
110. ZEDALIS and WADE, (1978), pp. 454 & 455. 
111. E. JAKSETIC, The Peaceful Uses of Outer Spaýe: Soviet Views", 
American University Law Review, (1979), p. 495. 
112. V. S. -7ERESHETIN, "Basic Principles of Space Law", Soviet Yearbook 
of International Law, (1968), p. 125. 
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of the peaceful uses of outer space does not preclude retaliation against an 
aggressor made via outer space, provided it is in accordance with Article 
51 of the Charter of the United Nations (113); Hopkins has stated that the 
use of satellites for military surveillence is aggressive because it threatens 
the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the nation state under 
surveillence (114); finally, Kolosov has stated that satellites may be used to 
ensure compliance with certain treaties such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty of 1772 (115). All these statements are a complete departure from 
the Soviet interpretation of "peaceful" as meaning non-military. Russian 
theory on the peaceful uses of outer space and its practice are clearly 
contradictory. 
In the light of current state practice it is suggested that Article IV of the 
Outer Space Treaty only establishes a dispositive principle in that it lays 
down proscriptive guidelines, that are to be followed when utilising outer 
space. Such a line of thought is particularly more acceptable than the 
suggestion that Article IV establishes a prohibitive principle, when it is 
considered that the Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peace- 
ful Uses of Outer Space was not, in the opinion of Markoff, outhorised to 
take any decision in the field of general disarmament (116). However 
whilst states are supposed to comply with the principles contained in 
Article IV it is clear that no such regard is being paid to the article, and, 
thus it would appear that the non-military interpretation of the article has 
given way to a customary international rule permitting the military use of 
space, supposing such a rule was required anyway because of the restrictive 
area of application of Paragraph 2. Indeed, there could be no other 
113. G. P. ZHUKOV, "American Plans for the Use of Outer Space with 
Aggressive Purposes and the Security of States ", Soviet Yearbook of 
International Law, (1962), pp. 202 & 203. 
114. G. L. HOPKINS, "Legal Implications of Remo te Sensing of Earth 
Resources by Satellite", Military Law Review, (1977), pp. 57,85 & 86. 
115. Y. KOLOSOV, "Space a nternational Low", Intbrnational Affairs, 
(1977), pp. 54 & 58. 
116. MARKOFF, (1976), p. 10. As regards the Moon and celestial bodies 
Article IV would of course be regarded as a prohibitive principle. 
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explanation for the signing of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti- 
Ballistic Missile Systems, which specifically allows a state party the use of 
"national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner 
consistent with genrally recognised principles of international law" (117). 
Perhaps complimenting the above argument is the suggestion that it is 
erroneous to attempt to analyse the provisions of Article IV in isolation 
from the whole question of nuclear strategy. The basis of nuclear strat- 
egic deterrence lies on what has been described as the "balance of power" 
between the United States and the U. S. S. R. In reality this should be 
termed "mutually assured destruction", for the whole basis of nuclear 
deterrence is the threat that any attempt at a pre-emptive strike will be 
met by final and total destruction. That such a method of ensuring peace 
is tenuous to say the very least, and could more forthrightly be described 
as the "balance of terror". In recent years however there has been an 
attempt to mutually limit nuclear weapon research and deployment, but 
this has been hampered by the technical means to verify compliance with 
such delimitation treaties, particularly since the U. S. S. R. has refused to 
allow on-site inspection (118). Thus the Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems 
Treaty, together with the Interim Agreement or! Certain measures with 
respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (119), not only 
sought to limit the number of offensive weapons but also, as stated above, 
sought to secure an undertaking that states could take whatever measures 
within their technical means to verify compliance with the treaties, and 
that no attempt should be made to interfere with those systems. Indeed it 
may be argued that the principle of nuclear deterrence relies on a state's 
ability to show off its weaponry to its rivals' reconnaisance satellites in 
order to deter any pre-emptive action. 
117. Supra Note 22. 
118. E. R. FINCH and A. L. MOORE, "Outer Space Cori Help the Peace", 
International Lawyer, (1? 73), p. 8? 1. 
119. Supra Notý7B_. 
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It is clear that Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty does not purport to 
introduce a complete ban on the military use of space, as suggested in 
some quarters. It is argued that the use of reconnaissance satellites has 
not militarised space but only operated to legalise a specific activity, and 
that "new futuristic military uses are still prohibited" (120). Such an 
argument would appear artificial and erroneous since nowhere in the Outer 
Space Treaty is there any scope for such an interpretation. Further there 
is no reason to suppose that if the A. B. M. Treaty is not renewed the 
super-powers will not consider deploying anti-satellite and anti-ballistic 
missile system, which by implication appear to have been banned by that 
treaty (121). The deployment of such systems, whether in space or 
otherwise, would undoubtedly be a de-stabilising influence on world peace 
(122), particularly when it is considered that these systems could con- 
ceivably comprise of directed energy weapons, certain types of which are 
not regarded as being contrary to the Outer Space Treaty because they are 
not considered as nuclear weapons (123). Undoubtedly if no further 
agreement to restrict the deployment of anti-satellite and anti-ballistic 
missile systems, with particular reference to directed energy weapons, is 
forthcoming then the first state to utilise such a system must dominate 
the use of space. The reason for such concern may be seen by the fact 
that these systems could conceivably destroy a moving missile at a range 
of 3000 miles, and thus satellites, so necessary for the verification of 
attacks, for communications, and for the guidance and control of counter 
strike systems, would be extremely vulnerable. Unfortunately SALT 11 
while amending the Outer Space Treaty by not only prohibiting nuclear 
weapons or weapons of mass destruction from being placed in earth orbit, 
but also developing and deploying systems for this purpose, made no 
attempt to curtail such activities. 
120. ZEDALIS and WADE, (1978), p. 480. 
121. F. ASBECK, "The Militarisation of Space". 2 Armament and Disar- 
mament Information Unit Report, (1980), p. 2. 
122. StockFol-m International Peace Research Institute, Outer Space - 
Battlefield of the Future? (1978). 
123. See Uiscussion on particle beam weapons versus high energy lasers 
above. 
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It is in the light of such possible lack of restrictions and the growing 
concern over recent technological advances that the U. S. A. proposed to the 
U. S. S. R. that talks should begin on the limitation of anti-satellite systems. 
These talks began in Helsinki in 1978 and were followed by discussions in 
Berne the next year. It would appear however that they are unlikely to be 
continued by the new Reagan administration, particularly since the deterio- 
ration of relations with the U. S. S. R. caused by the Afghanistan crisis. The 
aim of the United States in these discussions was to agree to a ban on the 
interference with the national technical means of verification, to prohibit 
attacks on satellites and to attempt to limit anti-satellite systems. The 
agreement was not achieved despite an indication that such an agreement 
was expected to be forthcoming at the Brezhnev-Carter summit meeting at 
Vienna in 1979 (124). The main stumbling block appeared to be that the 
U. S. S. R. in return for such an agreement wanted a moratorium on the use 
of the United States space shuttle which they regarded as having an anti- 
satellite role. 
It is certain that the United States proposal was a genuine step in the 
direction of achieving a complete demilitarisation of space, though one 
which was unlikely to succeed whilst satellites remained the only method 
of verifying compliance with the various arms limitation treaties. This is 
further emphasised by the fact that as from 1982, when the A. B. M. Treaty 
was to be renewed, there would be nothing to prevent the establishment of 
a directed energy weapon in space to be used against ballistic missiles. 
The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 has from the above information undoub- 
tedly failed to keep pace with the technology and complexities of nuclear 
strategy in the present day. It has however served its purpose in providing 
a sound principle that space should be used for peaceful purposes only. 
Because of the failure of the treaty to recognise just- how sophisticated 
124. F. LEY, "Space Law -A New Proposal", 8 Journal of Space Law, (1980), p. 47. 
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satellites were to be become, it is now clear that a new initiative is 
required to update the Outer Space Treaty in order to put it on a modern 
footing. The mechanism by which this has been attempted has come in 
two forms. 
Firstly, it should be recalled that great difficulties had occurred with the 
application of the Outer Space Treaty to the Moon, particularly with 
regard to the question that did the term "celestial bodies" include the 
Moon and vice versa. By virtue of the Agreement Governing the Activities 
of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 1979 (125), both terms 
include the other. Thus, Article I states: - 
"The provisions of this Agreement relating to the moon shall 
also apply to other celestial bodies within the solar system, 
other than the earth, except insofar as specific legal norms 
enter into force with respect to any of these celestial 
bodies. " 
Further the M oon Treaty, as it has become known, also expands and 
clarifies the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty which dealt with the use 
or stationing of weapons either on, in or around the Moon or celestial 
bodies. The treaty also deals with the possibility of any use or threatened 
use of force, or any other hostile act on the Moon or other celestial body. 
Thus Article 3 states: - 
1. The Moon shall be used by all States Parties exclusively 
for peaceful purposes. 
2. Any threat or use of force or any other hostile act on 
the Moon is prohibited. It is likewise prohibited to use 
the Moon in order t, a commit any such act or to engage 
in any such threat in relation to the earth, the Moon, 
spacecraft, the personnel of spacecraft or man-made 
space objects. 
3. States Parties shall not place in orbit around or other 
trajectory to or around the Moon objects carrying 
nuclear weapons on or in the M oon. 
4. The establishment of military bases, installations and 
fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and 
the conduct of military manoeuvres on the Moon shall be 
forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific 
research or for any other peaceful purposes-shall not be 
prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility neces- 
sary for the peaceful exploration and use of the Moon 
shall also not be prohibited. " 
125. U. N. DOC. A/34/664 (1979); 18 I. L. M. 1434, (1979). 
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On December 5th 1979 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 34/68 
without a vote. The Agreement was annexed to that resolution and Was 
opened for signature on December 18th 1979, thus creating indication what 
must be regarded as a substantial expansion of the reciprocal provision in 
Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty 1967. Quite evidently the new 
agreement has avoided the problems associated with the terms "install" and 
"station" and has categorically stated what weapons can or cannot be used, 
and in what circumstances. Perhaps one disappointing feature of the 
treaty is, that while even the threat of a hostile act has been banned on 
the moon and against spacecraft and their personnel, there is only a ban 
on nuclear weapons being placed in orbit or other trajectory around the 
moon and not conventional weapons. It may well be that the drafters 
anticipated that Paragraph 2 would cover the situation where conventional 
weapons were placed in orbit around the moon, but this is certainly not 
clear and in fact the paragraph tends to imply that it only applies to 
threats from weapons stationed or placed on the moon itself. If that is 
the case then it would seern perfectly possible for the conventional types 
of directed energy weapons to be carried aboard spacecraft in the vicinity 
of the moon. Since these types of weapons must grow in importance 
strategically as they become more efficient it would seem that there is a 
serious omission in not barring the uýe of such weapons. One possible 
reason for this omission is the many years it has taken to get the accep- 
tance of the U. S. S. R. for the agreement, and thus rather than attempt to 
introduce a new element and wait several more years the treaty was left 
in its present form. Nevertheless the Moon Treaty is a step forward in 
providing a more coherent set of rules regulating the future use of the 
Moon and its immediate vicinity. 
The adoption of the Moon Treaty was the first rr. echanism by which the 
principles contained in Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty relating to the 
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Moon have been expanded and set on a more modern footing. The second 
mchanism by which an attempt has been made to strengthen the "peaceful 
purposes" provision in the Outer Space Treaty comes in the form of an 
Italian proposal that space should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. 
The proposal was first made in 1978 to the United Nations Special Session 
on Disarmament, when the General Assembly on the suggestion, of inter 
alia, Italy stated that: - 
"In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further 
measures should be taken and appropriate international 
negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the 1967 
Tieaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies. " (126) 
The next year at the General Committee on Disarmament Italy followed up 
the above suggestion by submitting a draft protocol tb the Outer Space 
Treaty of. 1967. Along with the draft protocol was an explanatory memo- 
randum (127) in which Italy discussed how Article IV of the 1967 Treaty 
had failed to keep pace with space technology, in particular the develop- 
ment of "interceptor/destructor" satellites, and other weapons not specifi- 
cally prohibited by the article, such as directed energy weapons. In the 
memorandum Italy also suggested that the most suitable method of inter- 
national security would be to impose a complete ban on all military' 
activities,, though the use of satellites for reconnaissance, surveillence or 
communications purposes would be preserved since these would reinforce 
strategic stability. 
Article I of the draft protocol firstly declares that "outer space, including 
the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be used for peaceful purposes 
only". Thus there is an attempt here to turn space into a de-militarised 
zone as found in Antarctica, and on the Moon and other celestial bodies 
since the M oon Treaty. 
126. Paragraph 80 of the "Programme of Action" in the Final Document 
of the Tenth U. N. Special Session on Disarmament. 
127. U. N. DOC. CD/9 March 26th, 1979. 
- 165 - 
Article I then goes on to state: - 
"States Parties to this Protocol undertake to refrain from 
engaging in, encouraging or authorising, directly or indirectly, 
or in any way participating in any measures of a military or 
other hostile nature, such as the establishment of military 
bases, installations and fortif ications, the stationing of 
devices having the same effect, the launching into earth orbit 
or beyond of objects carrying weapons of mass destruction or 
any other types of devices designed for offensive purposes, 
the conduct of military manoeuvres, as well as the testing of 
any type of weapons. " 
Thus the ban contained in Article IV of the 1967 Treaty is extended to 
cover ALL armaments and not just nuclear weapons, or any other kinds of 
weapons of mass destruction. Article I Paragraph 2 of the Protocol does 
allow the use of military personnel or equipment for scientific research or 
for any other peaceful purposes, which includes participating in systems 
established in order to ensure compliance with disarmament and security 
agreements. 
The Italian initiative in bringing disarmament in space into the general 
disarmament arena has placed it in its proper context. Since, as already 
stated, one reason for the deficiency of the 1967 Treaty in providing for a 
complete demilitarisation of space is that the United Nations Committee 
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space could not take initiatives on matters 
that were considered part of wider issues, particularly those relating to 
disarmament. Whilst this formerly fundamental problem may now be said 
to be solved, the draft protocol itself contains certain deficiencies which 
highlight other serious fundamental difficulties which must be overcome in 
order to control the arms race in space. Firstly, one great problem 
associated with the Outer Space Treaty was that it only outlawed the 
stationing of nuclear weapons in space without recognising that conven- 
tional ASAT/ABM systems (128) could pose just as great a threat to peace. 
However whilst the draft protocol sought to remedy this situation by 
128. i. e. Anti-satellite/Anti-Ballistic Missile systems. 
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banning the stationing of weapons in space, the most modern systems are 
in fact earth based and therefore fall outside this provision, which would 
probably 'only cover space based directed energy weapons. To this argu- 
ment it may be countered that Article I of the draft protocol also bans 
"the launching into earth orbit or beyond of objects carrying weapons of 
mass destruction or any other types of devices designed for offensive 
purposes", however ASAT and ABM systems are, it may be argued, not 
"offensive" weapons but defensive. If this argument is used then it is 
difficult to envisage any treaty that could seek to prevent states from 
developing such systems, since no state could afford to ignore the need for 
such a system as long as there exists a possibility that its own satellites 
could be attacked. 
The second fundamental problem with the draft protocol is the task of 
distinguishing spacecraft with offensive roles from those which are defen- 
sive in character. This problem must not be under-estimated since any 
spacecraft that is capable of being manoeuvred to an in-orbit rendezvous 
could be regarded as a potential ASAT system. Possibly the only feature 
that really classifies such a manoeuvre as being of a military nature is the 
fact that either the interceptor craft explodes on reaching the target, or 
is deliberately manoeuvred on to a collision course. An illustration of the 
problems involved may be seen in relation to the example given earlier of 
the U. S. S. R. 's COSMOS 248 and 249 (129). In that example if COSMOS 
249 had not exploded there would have been no means of distinguishing the 
role of that spacecraft from any other. Undoubtedly the draft protocol 
attempts to extend the Outer Space Treaty by attempting to prohibit the 
development and testing of offensive space systems, however the effective- 
ness of such a prohibition must be queried when it is considered that 
offensive and non-offensive space technology is often identical in nature 
(130). The same is also true of military and civilian developments, and 
129. Supra on p. 1130. 130. F. ASBECK, "The Militarisation of Space", 2 Armament and Disarm- 
ament Information Unit Report, (1980), p. 3. 
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any prohibition of in-orbit rendezvous manoeuvres would almost certainly be 
rejected, especially when one considers that the most promising develop- 
ments in space rely heavily on such manoeuvres. 
One method by which the above two problems to the viability of the 
Italian initiative could be reduced, if not eliminated, would be the estab- 
lishment of an independent disarmament monitoring agency. The creation 
of such an agency was suggested by France (131) and was co-sponsored by 
Italy. In a report presented to the XXXIVth General Assembly on Septem- 
ber 14th 1979 (132), a group of French experts considered that such an 
agency could work provided it had full independence and the support of the 
States concerned in the development and utilisation of space. However 
both the U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R. considered that such an agency was 
unworkable because, for instance, it would be extremely difficult to 
conciliate any decisions of the agency with those of national interests, and 
anyway the cost would be prohibitive (133). 
Undoubtedly then the Italian initiative has brought the issue of disarma- 
ment in space out of the insular atmosphere of the United Nations Com- 
mittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and placed it firmly in the 
general disarmament spectrum. Although this committee achieved a great 
deal in producing the 1967 Treaty and laying down the principles by which 
space should be utilised in the future, it must be said that the difficulties 
involved in getting agreement between the membership has allowed both 
events and technology to pass Article IV of the Treaty by. As already 
stated above the involvement of states in space must be connected with 
the wider issues of general disarmament and the place for this would seem 
to be not only within the United Nations Disarmament Commission but also 
within the General Assembly itself. Unfortunately the prognosis for a 
131. France's initiative is incorporated in Resolution 71/XXXIII of 
December 14th 1978. 
132. U. N. DOC. SMA/WP/5 (1979). 
133. F. LEY, "Space Law -A New Proposal", 8 Journal of Space La (1980), p. 48. 
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multilateral treaty on disarmament in space is not good since the self 
interest of states in such sensitive issues tends to lend, not unnaturally, to 
protracted negotiations. Certainly this has been the record in the Com- 
mittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and would thus be even more 
so within the General Assembly itself. The result of such protracted 
negotiations would no doubt be an agreement that was already outdated. 
The above attitude can be seen in two separate events. Firstly, prior to 
the first session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, an 
international symposium was held on 10-13th May 1979 in New York (134). 
At this symposium, while the majority of participants were in favour of 
the Italian proposal, both a U. S. and an Eastern European delegate sugges- 
ted that because of the negotiations that were then being undertaken by 
the U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R. any decision to start multilateral discussions 
would be premature particularly when there was no precise agreement as 
to what space activities were to be included in the ban. Despite this 
attitude the conference concluded that a review of the Outer Space 
Treaty, and in particular Article IV, which should be amended to include a 
ban on all weapons and any other device that could be used for hostile 
purposes in space was necessary, thus widening the scope of Article IV 
substantially. 
The second event which illustrates the non-committal attitude of certain 
states occurred in New York in July 1979 at the 22nd Session of the 
United Nations Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. In the 
committee the Italian proposal was well received and thus in the draft 
report to the General Assembly it was stated: - 
"The Committee took note of the concern expressed by 
some delegations on the possible extension of the arms 
race to outer space. In this connection, reference was 
made to the proposal tabled by Italy on 26th March 1779 
in the Committee on Disarmament for an additional 
protocol to the 1967 Treaty ... " (135). 
134. Report on the Tenth Annual Conference on United Nations 
Procedures (10-13th May 1979): "Comprehensive Programme of 
Disarmament", The StanleX Foundation, (1979). 
135. U. N. DOC. A/AC 10.5/LI13/ADD5 (TM). 
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Just prior to the final approval of this statement the delegation for the 
U. S. S. R. decided to oppose it on the basis that they had no authority to 
approve such a statement because of an apparent tradition that decisions 
of the Committee must be unanimous. 
On the basis of the above information it would seem that whilst the Italian 
proposal has provided an interesting discussion point on how Article IV of 
the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 should be reformed, it is unlikely to have 
ay significant effect on space related arms control. Clearly the possibility 
of producing a contemporaneous -space treaty which controls the military 
involvement of states in space on a multilateral basis is improbable 
because of the complexities in achieving agreement. It is further improb- 
able when it is also considered that while the majority of the member 
states of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space may reach a consensus, because of the unanimity rule any one state 
can in effect veto that majority decision. It would thus seem that any 
way forward lies in bilateral discussions between the U. S. A. and the 
U. S. S. R., though even here the difficulties involved in achieving agreement 
should not be underestimated, particularly in the present political climate. 
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CHAPTER 4 
REMOTE SENSING AND DIRECT TELEVISION BROADCASTING 
- IN RELATION TO STATE PRACTICE 
Undoubtedly amongst the problems for which the Outer Space Committee 
is attempting to formulate international rules, the two most immediate and 
contemporary issues are those of remote sensing and direct television 
broadcasting. Unlike other problems such as the formulation of the Moon 
Treaty (1), which tended to distort the work of the Committee, both these 
areas are of extreme practical importance to the development of this 
planet, and are already in operation. Since the Outer Space Treaty 1967 
(2) makes no mention of either issue (principally because remote sensing 
only became feasible in 1972) and no other agreements have been reached 
controlling remote sensing and direct television broadcasting, it can be seen 
that the increasing pace of technology is beginning to outstrip the means 
of controlling it. Such a situation is likely to continue whilst the Outer 
Space Committee allows itself to be sidetracked by such hypothetical 
issues as the Moon Treaty. One of the potential benefits of direct tele- 
vision broadcasting includes a vast improvement in global communications, 
which is particularly important when it is understood that three-quarters of 
the world's population live in areas of "primitive communications" (3). 
1. U. N. DOC. A/34/664, (1979), 18 I. L. M. 1434, (1979). 
2. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies, 1967,3 U. S. T. 2410, T. I. A. S. No. 6347. 
3. D. GOEDHUIS, "The Changing Legal Regime (if Air and Outer 
Space", 27 International and Comparative Low Quarterly (July 
1978), p. 586. ' 
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Certainly direct television broadcasting (D. T. B. ) will have an important role 
to play in education and health services throughout the world, particularly 
in third world countries. To a large extent the effects of D. T. B. are for 
the near future., however the benefits of remote sensing satellites are being 
realised now since such satellites are already beginning to contribute to the 
increase in food output, mineral exploration, the monitoring of environ- 
mental pollution, and the exploitation of energy resources. In the near 
future therefore there is unlikely to be very many areas of life not 
involved, to a greater or lesser degree, with these types of satellites. 
Nevertheless these operations are not without their legal problems, caused 
to a certain extent by ideological differences between the West and the 
East, though these have not prevented technological advances in these 
fields and the use of such technology on a world wide basis. 
Undoubtedly some progress has been made in discussions for the setting up 
of legal regimes to cover both D. T. B. and remote sensing, but for the 
most part fundamental differences still exist. In the absence of any 
specific rules therefore, state practice has taken over and adopted the 
general principles embodied in the Outer Space Treaty, though certain 
aspects of these principles have been distorted by the attitude of States in 
the light of the practical use of remote sensing and D. T. B. It is thus 
intended to analyse remote sensing and D. T. B. in turn, assess the legal 
problems associated with each, assess the discussions aimed at producing 
legal rules to solve those problems and how state practice may have 
distorted any principles laid down in the Outer Space Treaty. 
- 172 - 
I REMOTE SENSING 
Remote sensing has been defined as: - 
a methodology to assist in characterising the nature 
and/or condition of phenomena on, above or below the Earth's 
surface by means of observations and measurements from 
space platforms. " (4) 
The means by which remote sensing is achieved is by incorporating sensing 
devices on satellites, which may or may not be in geostationary orbit. The 
first remote sensing satellite to be launched, ERTS-1 (Earth Resources 
Technology Satellite) in July 1972 (5), used three Vidicon television cam- 
eras and a piece of equipment known as a "Multispectral Scanner", which 
obtained information in the red, blue or green spectral ranges of visible 
light and in infra-red light. It also possessed monitors to measure radiant 
energy, laser beams, spectrometers and radar scanning equipment (6). All 
this equipment produced a great deal of information about the earth's 
surface, though in its unprocessed form was of little value until it had 
been interpreted and combined with other pieces of corrobative information 
(7). The processing of the remotely sensed information is carried out at 
the Goddard Space Flight Center, which then transfers the refined infor- 
mation to the Ea rth Resources Observation Systems Data Center in South 
Dakota (8). 
Landsat 1, was put into a polar orbit at an altitude of 496 nautical miles 
which thus allows information to be collected from the same spot at the 
4. M. BOURELY, "Remote Sensing of Earth Resources from Outer 
Space -A European Approach to its Legal Implications", 23 Nether- lands International Law Review, (1967), p. 180 & 183. 
5. J. J. HAHN, "Development awards a Regime for Control of 
Remote Sensing from Outer Space", 12 The Journal of International 
Law and Economics, (1978), p. 421. ERTS-1 &2 later became known 
as Landsot 1&2. Future references refer to it as Landsat 1. 
6. G. L. HOPKINS, "Legal Implications of Remote Sensing of Earth 
Resources by Satellite", 78 Military aw Review, (1978), p. 62. 
7. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/PV155 (1975). 
8. M. A. DAUSES, "National Sovereignty and Remote Sensing of Earth 
Resources by Satellites", Proceedings of the 16th Colloquiurn on the 
Low of Outer Space, (1974), p. 121. 
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same time every 18 days (9). The area viewed by this satellite measured 
115 miles square (10) and it took pictures once every 26 seconds (11). The 
latest satellite, Landsat D launched in 1981, orbits the Earth fourteen 
times a day at an altitude of 570 miles and is able to detect features of 
theirty metres across (12), as opposed to between fifty and eighty metres 
by the earlier satellites (13). The information once collected is trans- 
mitted to one of sixteen ground stations where the information is processed 
and analysed (14). 
According to a United States Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space 
Sciences Staff Report (15) it was stated that the United States remote 
sensing technology was a great deal more advanced than the U. S. S. R. 's, 
which do not tend to stay in space for very long and are not as sophisti- 
cated (16). With the aid of the space shuttle it is anticipated that this 
lead will be increased. Already Landsat D is somewhat out of date since 
the French S. P. O. T. programme, to be launched in 1983, will be capable of 
having a resolution of ten to twenty metres across (17). 
9. D. A. LANDGREBE, "Analysis Research for Earth Resource Infor- 
rn%: tion Systems: Where Do We Stand? ", Advances in Astronautical 
Science, (1973), p. 258. 
10. K. NOZARI, Law of Outer Space, Norstedts, (1973), p. 152. 
11. HOPKINS, (1978), p. 62. Repeated photography is needed for com- 
parison purposes and because of adverse cloud conditions. 
12. NASA Activities, February 1979, p. 16. 
13. Characteristics and Capabilities of Sensors for Earth Resources 
Surveys, 32 U. N. GAOR, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space, U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/204, (1977), at p. 15. 
14. E. M. IFFT AND S. E. DOYLE, "Scientific and Legal Aspects of 
International Co-operation in Remote Sensing", Proceedings of the 
21st Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space (197-9- F, _p. _277T_. 
15. S-ta-TT of Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 
94th Congress, 2nd Session, I Soviet Space Programs, 1971-75, 
Overview, Facilities and Hardware, Manned and Unmanned Flight 
Programs, Bioastronautics, Civil and Military Applications, Projec- 
tions of Future Plane, (1976), p. 377. 
16. Oversight: President's Civilian Space Policy: Hearing Before the 
Committee on Science and Technology. United States House of 
Representatives, 96th Congress, 1st Session, 1979. 
17. The Satellite Probative d'Observation De La Terre (S. P. O. T. ) is to 
be used in researching coastal pollution, min&ral resources and 
terrestial vegetation. H. DESAUSSURE, "Remote Sensing by Satel- 
lite: What Future for an International Regime? ", American Journal 
of International Law, (1977), p. 721. 
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The legal problems that have evolved from the current practice of remote 
sensing operations have arisen principally because of the fact that there 
are no specific rules of international law applying to them. It is however 
erroneous to state that remote sensing is completely unregulated since it is 
now generally accepted that the Outer Space Treaty provided for the basic 
legal regime (18). However since the possibility of remote sensing only 
evolved after the acceptance of the treaty, no part of it applied specifi- 
cally to remote sensing. In general terms though Articles I and III of the 
treaty have laid down the basic rules on the conduct of remote sensing 
activities. Article I states that: - 
"The exploration and use of outer space ... shall be carried 
out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, 
irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific 
development ... " 
In other words the Article imposes an obligation on space nations to 
distribute any benefits derived from their use of outer space (19). Such a 
principle supports the United States position on the free distribution of 
remotely sensed material. 
Article III of the treaty states that: - 
"States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the 
exploration and use of outer space ... in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, 
in the interest of maintaining international peace and security 
and promoting international co-operation and understanding. " 
Thus the Outer Space Treaty, as applying to remote sensing, embraces the 
principles of the United Nations Charter, Article I Paragraphs 2 and 3 of 
which state: - 
(2) To develop friendly relations among nations based 
on respect for the principles of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples, and to take- other 
appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace; 
18. DAUSES, (1974), p. 127. 
19. O. F. BRITAL, "Survey from Space of Earth- Resources", 
Proceedings of the 13th Colloquiurn on the Law of Outer Space 
(1971), PP. 197-99. 
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(3) To achieve international co-operation in solving 
international problems of an economic, social, 
cultural, or humanitarian character ... " 
(20). 
Remote sensing therefore embodies the very principles of the Charter since 
the data collected by such means directly contributes to the solving of 
world economic and social problems. Indeed because of the acceptance of 
the Charter by the Outer Space Treaty, any remote sensing activities must 
be carried out in a manner consistent with the principles embodied in the 
Charter. Nevertheless there is a view that remote sensing, far from 
complying with the Charter, is in fact completely contrary to its principles 
in that it threatens peace because any data may be used for military 
purposes and, further, could be used by advanced western nations to exploit 
the natural resources of the less-developed nations of the world (21). Both 
these allegations will be examined more thoroughly later. 
Other international rules applying to remote sensing satellites are concer- 
ned with the return of space objects to their launching States by states on 
whose territory they may land and on the liability of launching states for 
damage sustained by another state on whose territory a space object may 
land. Both these situations are covered by, firstly, the Agreement on the 
Rescue of Astronauts, The Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space 1968 (22) and, secondly, the Convention' on 
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects 1972 (23). 
However neither agreement deals specifically with remote sensing satellites 
but apply generally to all types of space objects. 
Clearly, therefore, whilst remote sensing is subject to existing international 
law this only applies to the siuation in general terms and fails to address 
20. U. N. Charter Article I Paragraphs 2&3. 
21. DAUSES, (1974), pp. 128-130. 
22. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, The Return of Astronauts 
and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space 1968 6 U. S. T. 
7570 T. I. A. S. No. 6599. 
23. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space 
Objects, 1972,24 U. S. T. 2389, T. I. A. S. No. 7762. 
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itself specifically to the problems created by the teledetection of the earth 
by satellites (24). The present situation is undoubtedly untenable and 
becomes increasingly so as remote sensing gains in importance because of 
world realisation as to the limited natural resources of the earth. The 
legal problems that have arisen so far can be divided into three, categories: 
firstly, there are the legal questions raised as to whether remote sensing 
requires the consent of the state to be sensed: secondly, there are the 
questions raised because of the control of data processing and interpreta- 
tion techniques by a few technologically advanced states; and, thirdly, and 
perhaps the most important area, the questions that have arisen concerning 
the dissemination of processed data gathered from satellites. Some 
observers have reduced these questions into three headings, being respec- 
tively, the "space segment", the "ground segment" and the "user segment". 
(25) 
The f irst problem is in reality an extension of the sovereignty problem as 
discussed in Chapter One, since states who allege that such activities 
should only be undertaken after the consent of the state to be sensed has 
been obtained are basically laying claim to jurisdictional rights in outer 
space. Whilst there is some disagreement as to where airspace and outer 
space ends and begins it does seem that a customary rule of international 
law has arisen which tends to place the boundary at the lowest limit at 
which satellites can sustain their orbit (26). Since Article 11 of the Outer 
24. HOPKINS, (1978), p. 95. Also S. KRAAFT, "In Search of a Legal 
Framework for the Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer 
Space", 4 Boston College of International and Comparative Law 
Review, (19-8-lq-, p. 456. 
25. W. 77UTLIEB, C. DALFEN and K. KATZ, "The Transborder Transfer 
of Information by Communication and Computer Systems; Issues and 
Approaches to Guiding Principles", 68 American Journal of Inter- 
national Law, (1974), pp. 227 & 242. Also E. AMBROSE_T_T_1, __`T`FTe_ 
Relevance oT Remote Sensing to Third World Economic Development. 
Some Legal and Political Aspects", New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics, (19803, p. 569. 
26. See Chapter One of this work. Also HOPKINS, (1978), p. 79. 
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Space Treaty states that "Outer space ... is not subject to national approp- 
riation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any 
other means", it wo uld appear that there is nothing to prevent any state 
from r emote sensing the territory of another. Further since the equipment 
of the United States satellites in particular is only regarded as experi- 
mental then Article I of the treaty also offers protection since it states 
that - 
"There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer 
space ... and States shall facilitate and encourage international 
co-operation in such investigation. " (27) 
While it would seem settled that remote sensing is subject to the principles 
laid down in the treaty, R. F. Stowe raises the question that the degree of 
sophistication of modern divices takes them outside the parameters within 
which the Outer Space Treaty was negotiated. However he counters such 
a question by stating that such a position cannot be justified because of 
pre-treaty multinational participation in remote sensing activities, he points 
out that there has been no support for the view that remote sensing is 
outside Outer Space Treaty within the Legal Sub-Committee of the Com- 
mittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (28). 
Despite Stowe's opinion that there exists no treaty which inhibits the 
practice of remote sensing, there is still disquiet that it may reduce the 
control of a state over the development of its natural resources. It is this 
which is really at the centre of the debate over the use of reMote sensing 
satellites and the information received from them. In fact Palter has 
remarked that - 
What is really at stake is the right of disposal of infor- 
mation concerning natural resources, with widely divergent 
interpretations of state sovereignty at the centre of the 
controversy. " (29) 
27. Paragraph 3. 
, 11 Relating to 28. R. F. STOWE The Development of International- Law Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space", 5 Journal of Space 
Low, (1977), pp. 104-5. 
29. MM. POLTER, "Remote Sensing and State Sovereignty", Journal of 
Space Low, (1976), p. 106-7. 
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Nevertheless, whilst the position that remote sensing satellites are in outer 
space and thus outside the jurisdiction of underlying states, there is a body 
of states who maintain that prior consent to be remote sensed should be 
required. The two leading exponents of this argument are Brazil and 
Argentina, who as early as 1974 (30) identified themselves with this 
position. Other states, principally the developed western nations, have 
rejected such a suggestion arguing that the legality of the situation 
depends not on what is remote sensed but from where it is carried out i. e. 
in outer space. This latter position now seems to be accepted by the 
Legal Sub-Committee provided sufficient safeguards are adopted to protect 
the dissemination of data (31). 
The stance taken by the U. S. S. R. on this question would appear to be 
contradictory since it had declared that the remote sensing of other states 
should be carried out under the auspices of bilateral or multilateral 
treaties (32). However a joint proposal of the U. S. S. R. and France makes 
no mention of any regulations for the acquisition of data (33). The 
U. S. S. R. has also stated that: - 
there is no need for special legal rules to regulate the 
collection of remote sensing data other than those already 
established in international space low. " (34) 
Clearly a complete prohibition on remote sensing without a state's consent 
is unrealistic, not only because of possible technological problems, but also 
bcause of the virtual impossibility of enforcing such a measure, thus 
30. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Draft Principles 
Governing the Activities of States in the Field of Remote Sensing 
of Earth Resources by Means of Space Technology, Argentina and 
Brazil: Working Paper, U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/Cl/1047, (1974). 
31. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/C2/SR. 295 (1978). 
32. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Report of the 
Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee on the Work of its Fifteenth 
Session, U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/216 (1978), Paragraph 38. 
33. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Draft Principles 
Governing the Activities of States in the Field of Remote Sensing 
of Earth Resources by means of Space Technology, France and 
U. S. S. R. Working Paper, U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/C2/L99,1974. 
34. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/219,1978, at p. 61 as contained in Ambrosetti 
(1980), p. 575. 
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leading to a possible divergence between state practice and international 
law. Such a stance might also prevent remote sensing systems from 
coming into operation, to the detriment of the world community. Indeed 
in the face of the tacit acceptance of military "spy satellites" (35) by the 
majority of states it would be absurd to attempt to place restrictions on 
civilian remote sensing projects which might well deprive developing 
countries of the chance of economic and social advancement. It would 
appear that the best strategy for regulating remote sensing lies in control- 
ling the processing and dissemination of data received from sensing activi- 
ties, as raised in the last two questions arising from remote sensing, and 
sometimes referred to as the "ground" and "user segments". (36) 
Undoubtedly such regulation is the chief concern of the developing count- 
ries since it is they who feel that remote sensing could interfere with 
their sovereignty over national resources. The reasoning behind this is that 
if remote sensed data is freely available to other bodies, whether they be 
national or commercial in character.. then they are vulnerable to foreign 
exploitation. Such reasoning has been rejected by some authors, particu- 
larly Hopkins who correctly argued that remote sensing satellites are 
merely data gatherers and cannot capitalise on the results of their findings 
- that must be done by people on the ground (37). Further no one dis- 
putes the fact that a state possesses rights of national sovereignty over its 
natural resources since the United Nations General Assembly Resolution on 
Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources 1803 (1962) in Paragraph 6 
and 7 states that: - 
6. "International co-operation for the economic development 
of developing countries ... shall be such as to further 
their independent national development and shall be based 
upon respect for their sovereignty over their natural 
wealth and resources; 
35. GOTLIEB, DALFEN and KATZ, (1974), p. 240. 
36. Ibid at p. 227 & 242. 
37. HOPKINS, (1978), p. 82. 
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7. Violation of the rights of peoples and nations to sove- 
reignty over their natural wealth and resources is cont- 
rary to the spirit and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations and hinders the development of inter- 
national co-operation and the maintenance of peace. " (38) 
However the fact of the matter is that companies armed with detailed 
information from remote sensing sources are put in a favourable bargaining 
position when discussing explorative and exploitative concessions with a 
developing country. In reply to this it is stated that the leading remote 
sensing notion, the United States, makes all remotely sensed material 
freely accessible, and in fact actually informs a remotely sensed state of 
any promising information (39), thus giving that state the opportunity to 
protect its interests (40). Such protection might be carried out by the 
sensed state at the negotiation stage, by making itself aware of the data, 
and failing that by using various sanctions against the company in question, 
ending with the ultimate sanction of nationalisation (41ý. Such sanctions 
are not available however . against 
"indirect exploitation". There are 
several examples of this but one type was described by 1. M. Pikus: - 
"If a particular notion's economy is heavily dependent upon 
the sale of a certain agricultural commodity on the world 
market, it is possible that a world-wide knowledge of the 
existence of oversupply of that commodity would produce an 
undesirable effect on prices. There is a converse to that 
proposition which would demonstrate a desirable effect on 
prices if the presence of an abnormally small supply were 
known. " (42) 
In the view of Hopkins such a suggestion gives too much sophistication to 
remote sensing since a 'whole variety of different types of information are 
required in order to exploit an economic situation in this way and remote 
sensing only provides additional information (43). 
38. G. A. Resolution 1803 (XVII). G. A. O. R., 17th Session Supp. 17, p. 15, 
(1962). 
39. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/C2/SR. 233, (1975), pp. 61-65. 
40. HOPKINS, (1979), p. 83. 
41. e. g. ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL CASE, I. C. J. Rep., (1962). 
42. I. M. PIKUS, "Possibility of Technical Control over Resources Sur- 
veying From Space", Proceedings of the 16th Colloquium on the Law 
of Outer Seace, (1974), p. 147. 
43. FTURKINS, (1? 78), p. 84. 
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Thus the size of the part remote sensing plays in assessing the influencing 
pessures on commodity markets is open to question. 
Nevertheless, in spite of the sanctions which developing countries can use 
against commercial entities seeking to exploit the natural resources of 
those countries (44) and, in spite of the way in which the importance of 
remotely sensed data is played down, many developing nations prefer to see 
restrictions placed on the dissemination of such material. It is here that 
the whole area becomes exceedingly complex since there is no agreement 
as to the degree of restrictions that should be placed on the dissemination 
of remotely sensed information. On the other hand there is the broadly 
Western viewpoint that adopts the free open data theory that prefers to 
allow all states access to any information obtained by way of remote 
sensing. A further complication is the view that raw, unprocessed data is 
in fact a completely different product from the jefined, processed data, 
since here the sensing state by virtue of its refining input acquires an 
interest in the end product (45). 
The basis of the objections of developing countries lies in the fact that 
while the United Nations has confirmed the sovereign rights of states over 
their natural resources in such resolutions as the United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources 
1962, (46) and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 1975 
(47), there has been no confirmation of rights of sovereignty over natural 
resources information. This approach by the developing nations may be 
summed up in the words of the Nigerian delegate at the Legal Sub- 
44. The single largest user of remotely seated information was industry 
of which mineral and mining companies formed the largest group. 
BATTELLE LABORATORIES RESEARCH REPORT, SURVEY OF 
USERS OF EARTH RESOURCES. REMOTE SENSING DATE, 1976 
P. 19. 
45. C. Q. CHRISTOL, "Remote Sensing and International Law", Annals of 
Air and Space Law, (1980), p. 394. 
46. G. T-. Resolution 1803 (XVII), 17 G. A. O. R. Supp. No. 17, (1962), p. 15. 
47. G. A. Resolution 3281, (XXX) 29 G. A. O. R. Supp. No. 31, (1975), 
p. 50; U. N. DOC. A/9946 (1975). 
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Committee meeting of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space in 1978 (48) when he stated that: - 
"... countries should have a right to determine how the 
information on their natural resources should be disposed of. " 
(49) 
The proponents of the restrictive data theory tend to fall into two 
distinct groups. The most restrictive group consists of several Latin 
American countries, whose position was initially put forward by Argentina 
(50). This group proposes that any remote sensing activity relating to 
natural resources would require the consent of any state to be remotely 
sensed. The main problem with this position is that it may be tantamount 
to the banning of remote sensing since, from their technical aspects, 
satellites cannot discriminate between political boundaries (51) and there- 
fore the requirement of consent could preclude the use of such satellites. 
However it is unlikely that such a state of affairs would occur since the 
technology to detect whether or not a state is being sensed does not exist 
and therefore it is likely that the states with the technology would simply 
ignore any restrictions. The Brazilian draft treaty of 1974 contained a 
provision that: - 
"States Parties are entitled to take measures in accordance 
with international law, to protect that territory and maritime 
areas under their jurisdiction from remote sensing activities 
for which they had denied their consent. " (52) 
Such retaliation, even if the developing country had the technology and 
weapon systems to be able to destroy a remote sensing satellite, must be 
regarded -as an illegal extension of national sovereignty into space and 
contrary to the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. (53) 
48. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/C2/SR295 (1978). 
49. Ibid, Para. 33, as contained in E. AMBROSETTI, (1980), p-580. 
50. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/C2/L73, June 26th 1970. 
51. M. LEIGH, "United States Policy of Collecting and Disseminating 
Remote Sensing Date", in N. M. MATTE and H. DeSAUSSURE, 
Editors, Legal Implications of Remote Sensing fiýorn Outer Space 
(1976), p. -J-49. 
52. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/122 (1974), Article 4. 
53. See also R. F. STOWE's view, supra. 
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The more moderate position of those in favour of the restrictive data 
theory is that a sensed state should have the right to determine how and 
what data should be disseminated. This position has been taken up princi- 
pally by the U. S. S. R. and France, who in a working paper in 1974 (54) 
proposedthat each state had an inalienable right to dispose of their natural 
resources and of information concerning those resources (55). Further they 
proposed that: - 
"A State which obtains information concerning the natural 
resources of another State as a result of remote sensing 
activities shall not be entitled to make it public without the 
clearly expressed consent of the State to which the natural 
resourced belong or to use it in any other manner to the 
detriment of such a State. Documentation resulting from 
remote sensing activities may not be communicated to third 
parties, whether Governments, international organisations or 
private persons, without the consent of the State whose 
territory is affected. " (56) 
The only exception to this may be found in Paragraph 5C where the 
working paper allows for free transfer of information relating to natural 
disasters or phenomena likely to be detrimental to the environment gener- 
ally. A similar set of proposals to restrict the dissemination of remotely 
sensed information was put forward by Chile, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. 
Additionally these states proposed that a sensed state should have the right 
to prior access to information concerning its own resources (57). 
Western nations, particularly the United States, reject the whole principle 
of the restrictive data theory, preferring the open data theory. Under this 
all states whether sensed or the sensing will have free access to any 
information gathered by remote sensing satellites (58). The supporters of 
this theory also point out that the Outer Space Treaty supports remote 
sensing activities, as already discussed above, and that this clearly refutes 
54. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/133, Annex IV, June 6th 1974, U. N. DOC. A/AC 
105/C2/L99. (1974). 
55. Paragraph 2. 
56. Paragraph 56. 
57. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/C2/SR295 (1978), Paragraphs 33,37-38. 
58. POLTER, (1976), p. 105-106. 
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any rights of states to be sensed to require the sensing state to request 
their consent before being subject to the scrutiny of a satellite. Further 
supporters of the open data position maintain that the free dissemination 
of information is more likely to increase a sensed state's control over its 
natural resources rather than to diminish it (59). It is also felt that a 
restricted approach can only lead to a wider gap between the technological 
advanced countries and the developing countries (60). 
The United States is an undoubted supporter of the open data system 
because of its own domestic legal requirements, to be found in its Freedom 
of Information Act (61), which allows U. S. citizens to have access to 
sensed data. The commitment to this ideal is so strong in fact that it has 
been decided by the Supreme Court of the United States that individuals 
cannot prevent the release of government documents by legal action (62). 
Additionally as early as 1958 in the National Aeronautics aný Space Act 
(63) the United States, through NASA, is obliged to make data available to 
both military and civilian organisations as part of its objective to utilise 
its activities in the furtherance of peaceful and scientific purposes (64). It 
may be maintained therefore that the U. S. is legally, politically and 
philosophically bound to the unrestricted dissemination of remotely sensed 
material to its own citizens, who may subsequently pass that information 
to other states. 
It has already been stated that the restricted data approach by developing 
countries is an attempt at claiming sovereign rights over information 
regarding their -natural res ources (65). To a certain extent this approach 
could be justified, but in relation to remotely sensed information these 
sovereign rights are being extended by restricting the competency of the 
59. United States Mission to the United Nations Press Releases. U. S. U. N 
- 10 (75). 
60. STOWE, (1977), p. 106. Also LEIGH, (1976), p. 149. - 
61.5 U. S. C. 552, (1976 and Supp. 1979). 
62. CHRYSLER CORPORATION v BROWN, 440 U. S. 281, (1979),. as 
contained in AMBROSETTI, (1980), p. 582. 
63.42 U. S. C. 2451-2477, (1976). 
64. Ibid 2451 (C) 4&6, (1976). 
65. Supra Note 48 & 49. 
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sensing state to use that material. Such an extension is of further repug- 
nance when it is considered that the sensing state also has an interest in 
the data in that it has not only acquired the data by virtue of its own 
technology but also interpreted that data into intelligible information. In 
relation to this the United States has stated., in the Legal Sub-Committee 
of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, that: - 
"The exercise of control over information about these res- 
ources ... is an extraterritorial extension of sovereignty" (66) 
which the Government of the United States cannot accept. " 
(67) 
Clearly the main principle of the restrictive theory is to impose one's 
sovereignty on another state -a principle that must be completely contrary 
to the whole concept of national sovereignty anyway. Moreover the reality 
of the whole situation must reveal its absurdity, since, to use Hopkins' 
example, how can the U. S. S. R. possibly direct the U. S. A. 's data centre at 
Sioux Falls, South Dakota as to whether it may release remotely sensed 
data on the U. S. S. R. or not? (68). Certainly it is difficult to accept such 
an interference when one considers that the U. S. S. R., in both its own 
original draft of legal principles governing remote sensing (69) and the 
combined draft with France (70) stated that: - 
"States ... shall ... respect the Sovereignty of other States. " (71) 
To a certain extent Principle 2 of the 1974 U. S. S. R. draft of legal prin- 
ciples tends to contradict itself in terms of its effect since it goes on to 
state that: 
"States ... shall respect the sovereignty of other States and, in particular, their inalienable right to control their own 
natural resources as well as information concerning such 
issues. " 
66. Supra Note 57. 
67. AMBROSETTI, (1980), p. 582. 
68. HOPKINS, (1978), p. 97. 
69. U. S. S. R. Preliminary Draft of Legal Principles To Be Applied by 
Stdtes Utilising Space Technology in Exploring th'e Resources of the 
Earth. U. N. DOC. A/AC 1051111, (Feb. 1973). 
70. Working Paper of France and U. S. S. R. on Draft Principles Governing 
Activities of States in the Field of Remote Sensing of Earth 
Resources by Means of Space Technology. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/133, 
(June 1974), Annex IV U. N. DOC A/AC 105/C2 L99, (May 1974). 
71. Ibid Note to Principle 2. 
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Thus if one accepts that by using its own technology to acquire data and 
to apply additional technology to interpret it that the U. S. A., for example, 
has a right to exercise sovereignty over at least part of the information, 
then it would seem, according to Principle 2, that it has inalienable right 
to control that information - if it so wishes. 
The effect of imposing restrictions on the dissemination of processed 
information from remote sensing satellites must be to devalue the effec- 
tiveness and benefits of such techniques to such an extent that states will 
cease such operations except for their own purposes. It is far more likely 
that this will lead to other less developed nations becoming disadvantaged 
and discriminated against than by the free dissemination of information. 
Further, because of the regional nature of the information received, to be 
effective each neighbouring state should not attempt to develop remote 
sensing restriction (even if they could impose them), since this may make 
any analysis distorted. Thus, for instance, if India found that the growth 
of deltas at the mouth of their rivers was substantial enough to cause 
flooding or climatic changes then it may wish to examine the reasons for 
such growth. By examining satellite photographs of Nepal it may be found 
that the effect of deforrestation would be to render the earth layer 
susceptible to rain and river erosion, thus creating the movement of large 
deposits of earth down to the coast so forming the deltas. Clearly such 
an analysis may be difficult to arrive at without several years study of the 
region if Nepal was able to refuse to allow its territory to remotely 
sensed. It must be accepted therefore that environmental and resource 
problems can only be solved on both a global and regional basis by an open 
regime for remote sensing and that a restrictive approach by one country 
could seriously limit the effectiveness of remote sensing, thus curtailing 
the efforts of other nations (72). 
72. HOPKINS, (1978), p. 98. 
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A further reason for the adoption of the open data theory is that it equips 
developing nations with the technical knowledge to make use of remotely 
sensed information. Thus for instance, until 1975 "scientific and research 
projects in progress using Landsat 1 data have taken place in 55 countries 
and in at least five major international organisations" (73). The use of 
Landsat 2 has been similarly organised and even before its launch studies 
involving investigators from 45 countries were proposed (74). Similar 
proposals were also made in connection with Landsat 3. Further the 
U. S. A. has made no secret of its willingness to train personnel, particularly 
in developing countries, in how to interpret remotely sensed information so 
that the best use can be made of the technology (75). Undoubtedly this 
technological transfer would put developing countries on a par with the 
more advanced states, particularly with regard to remote sensing, though 
not necessarily exclusively to this area. The acquisition of such techno- 
logical know-how is particularly important to third world countries, which 
have tended in recent years to shift their economic policies towards the 
development of natural resources in the light of the failure of imported 
manufacturing industries to improve the social and economic lot of the 
population generally and substantial trading deficits (76). Since the acqui- 
sition of the technology to participate in remote sensing 'activities could 
play a fundamental part in the national economic planning of many coun- 
tries, particularly those in the third world, it would seem unfortunate that 
this might be jeopardised by -a too hawkish adoption of a restrictive data 
policy. 
Despite the fact that the United Nations has been actively involved in 
discussions to regulate remote sensing since 1969 it has thus so far failed 
73. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/P. V. 155 (1975), p. 5. 
74. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/P. V. 146, (1975), pp. 54-55. 
75. J. J. HAHN., "Developments Towards a Regime for Control of 
Remote Sensing from Outer Space", Journal of 'International Law 
and Economics, (1978), p. 442. 
76. AM BROS E IT-T-1, (1980), p. 577. 
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to produce a satisfactory treaty on the subject, though there have been 
numerous proposals from member states. Such lack of progress has not 
therefore been due to a lack of drafting by the members of the Commit- 
tee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, but more to the wide ranging 
positions of its members on this subject. 
The task of attempting to provide for international co-operation in this 
field began in December of 1969 when the Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) was requested to investigate such a 
possibility by the General Assembly (77). This job was given to the 
Scientific and Technical Committee of the COPUOS who began to consider 
this new technology in April 1970. The first proposal for an agreement on 
remote sensing was submitted by Argentina in that year (78), and though it 
was reviewed by the Committee it failed to make an impact, principally 
because the Committee still had other work to complete. Nevertheless the 
Committee made recommendations to COPUOS who duly reported these to 
the General Assembly, who in turn requested the committee to set up a 
working group on earth resources surveying by satellites (79). Consequently 
in 1971 the Committee set up the "Working Group on Remote Sensing of 
the Earth by Satellites" (80). From its inception the working group was, 
primarily concerned with the technical and scientific aspects of remote 
sensing, but by 1973 the legal implications of the technology began to 
appear and culminated in the U. S. S. R. submitting a preliminary draft of 
legal principles to be applied by states using space to explore the resource 
of the earth (81). This Soviet draft was not discussed within the Working 
Group and neither was it discussed within the Legal Sub-Committee, to 
77. U. N. General Assembly Resolution 2600 (XXIV), (1969). 
78. Draft International Agreement on Activities, Carried Out Through 
Remo te Sensing Satellite Surveys of Earth Resources, U. N. DOC. 
A/AC 105/C2/L73 (1970). 
79. U. N. General. Assembly Resolution 2733 (XXV), (1970). 
80. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105195, July 19th, 1971. 
81. U. N. DOC. A/AC 1051111, February 14th, 1973. 
- 1.89- 
which it was also submitted, because of lack of time (82). However after 
the Legal Sub-Committee had submitted its report to the full meeting of 
the COPUOS in 1973 it was specifically requested to spend part of its 
next session discussing the legal implications of remote sensing (83). In 
1974 the Working Group noted that with regard to the legal implications of 
remote sensing, the Legal Sub-Committee not only had the item on its 
agenda but that it had now received five different sets of proposals on the 
legal aspects of remote sensing, from the U. S. S. R. (84), Canada (85), 
Argentina (86), Brazil (87), and France (88), together with a joint proposal 
submitted by the U. S. S. R. and France (89). 
From this time the Legal Sub-Committee began to dominate the remote 
sensing arena and during its 1975 Session created a new Working Group to 
consider the legal implications of remote sensing. During this session a 
further proposal was submitted jointly by Brazil and Argentina, which 
replaced the two earlier and separate proposals submitted by them (90). In 
addition to this the United States submitted a working paper on the 
development of additional guidelines on remote sensing of the natural 
environment of the earth from outer space (91). 
During the 1975 session the Working Group recognised that the proposals 
submitted could be attributed to three camps - France and the U. S. S. R., 
Argentina and Brazil, and the United States. From these different propo- 
sals five common elements could be found: - 
82. G. J. MOSSINGHOFF and L. D. FUQUA, "United Nations Principles on 
Remote Sensing: Report on Developments 1270-1980", 8 Journal of 
Space Law, (1980 ), p. 106. 
83. U. N. A/AC 1051115, Annex. 111, April 27th, 1973. p. 14. 
84. Supra Note 81. 
85. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/Cl/W. 411-6, (28th November 1975). 
86. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/133, Annex IV, June 6th, 1974, pp. 1-3. 
87. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/133, Annex IV, June 6th, 1974, pp. 3-5. 
88. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/133, Annex IV, June 6th, 1974, pp. 5-6. 
89. U. N. D0C. A/A-C 105/133, Annex IV, June 6th, 1974, pp. 9-10. 
90. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/Cl/1047, (1974). 
91. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/147, Annex 111, March 11th, 1975, p. 2. 
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(a) that remote sensing was to be conducted for the benef it and 
in the interests of mankind, 
(b) that remote sensing was to be carried on in accordance with 
international law, including the Charter of the United Nations 
and the Outer Space Treaty, 
(c) that benefits could be obtained from remote sensing by all 
countries given an adequate level of international co-opera- 
tion, particularly on a regional basis. 
(d) that States undertaking remote sensing activities should 
encourage international participation, 
(e) that remote sensing activities should be used to promote the 
environmental protection of the earth. (92) 
During the 1976 Session these five elements were formulated into five 
corresponding draft proposals, together with a further sixth element that 
"States participating in remote sensing programmes should make available 
technical assistance in that area to other interested states on mutually 
agreed terms" (93). In addition to this draft proposal three new elements 
were identified: 
(a) that co-ordination and co-operation between states with 
regard to remote sensing be carried out by the United 
Nations, 
(b) that States engaged in remote sensing should make available 
as soon as possible any indications of an impending natural 
disaster to states that may be affected as well as interested 
international organisations 
(c) that the using of information gleaned from remote sensing 
activities should not be used to the detriment of other states 
(94). 
92. U. N. DOLAAC 105/147, Annex 111, March 11th 1 1975, p. 2. 93. U. N. DOC. A/AC 1051171, Annex III, May 28th, 1976, p. 2. 
94. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/171, Annex III, May 28th, 1976, p. 3. 
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During this session the working group also turned its attention to the 
establishment of a common vocabulary of terms to be used in relation to 
remote sensing activities though no decisions were come to. However this 
had the effect of influencing the Scientific and Technical Committee of 
the COPUOS to assess and adopt a structural analysis of the operational 
sequences involved in remote sensing, i. e. data acquisition (satellites and 
command stations); data reception (antennae and receivers); data pre- 
processing (recording); data storage and dissemination (archiving and 
reproduction); data analysis (interpretation); information utilisation (95). 
From this breakdown the Scientific and Technical Committee proceeded to 
define "data" and "information", which they re-named 'primary data' and 
'analysed information'. 'Primary data' was defined as: - 
those data which are acquired by satellite borne remote 
sensors and transmitted from a satellite either by telemetry 
in the form of electro-magnetic signals or physically in any 
form such as photographic film or magnetic tape, as well as 
the pre-processed products derived from those data which may 
be used for later analysis. " (96) 
Thus 'primary data' would refer to data acquisition, data receptiory data 
pre-processing ---and, data storage--arid 
dissenýination -above . 
(97) 'Analysed 
information' was defined as - 
11... the end product resulting from the analytical process 
performed on the primary data combined with data and 
knowledge obtained from sources other than remote sensing 
satellites. " (98) 
Thus the term 'analysed information' would refer to data analysis and 
information utilisation as stated above (99). 
Also in 1977 the Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee received a 
working paper from the Soviet Union which submitted that remote sensing 
data should be classified in terms of spatial resolution as follows: - 
95. U. N. DOC. A/AC 1051195, March 1st, 1977, pp. 8 & 9. 
96. lbid at p. 9 Definitions based on proposals submitted by Sweden U. N. 
DOC. A/AC 105/Cl/L95, (1977). 
97. lbid at p. 10. 
98. lbid Note 95. 
99. lbid Note 95 at P. 10. 
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"- 'Global' information., with spatial resolution ranging from 
several hundred metres to several kilometres, and covering 
distances ranging from several hundred kilometres to 2,000 - 3,000 kilometres. 
- 'Regional' information, with spatial resolution ranging from 
50-100 to 300-500 metres, and covering distances ranging from 
180-200 to 600-800 kilometres. 
- 'Local' information, with spatial resolution ranging from 
several metres to 30-50, and covering distances of less than 
150-180 kilometres. " (100) 
However in the Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee's report it was 
stated that no agreement could be reached on this concept nor on the 
numerical values ennunciated for each category (101). 
During the 1977 meeting of the Legal Sub-Committee the Soviet Union 
again urged for the adoption of the concept of classifying data by reason 
of spatial resolution. Under such a concept it was suggested that any 
resolutions of less than 50 metres would require the consent of the state 
to be remotely sensed (102). However no agreement appeared to have been 
reached in this area. 
The Working Group of the Legal Sub-Committee in the 1977 meeting re- 
examined the five draft principles of 1976 and added a further five draft 
principles to those. However many words and phrases contained in those 
new principles were bracketed signifying a lack of consensus on those 
bracketed areas. Also included was a principle submitted by Mongolia 
which was unnumbered and entirely bracketed and stated that States should 
respect the principle of full and permanent sovereignty of all States and 
peoples over their wealth and natural resources, as well as their inalienable 
right to dispose of those natural resources (103). 
100. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/Cl/L94, February 15th, 1977. 
101. Supra Note 95. 
102. BIN CHENG, "Legal Implications of Remote Sensing from Space", 
Proceedings of an International Conference on Earth Observation 
from Space and Management of Planetary Resources-, -ff-? 78), -p. 606. 
103. LTN-. DOC. A/AC 105/C2/L107, (1977). 
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The 1977 meeting of the COPUOS recommended that the Legal Sub- 
Committee should accept the definitions of 'primary data' and 'analysed 
information' and adopt them into the draft Principles document (104). 
However it also noted that the Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee had 
discussed the issue of spatial resolution. Seeing that no agreement had 
been reached on the concept they agreed that a study should be made on 
the subject and its application for discussion at the next session (105). 
This study (106) was made by the Secretariat with the aid of the Committe 
on Space Research, International Council on Scientific Unions (COSPAR) 
and was discussed by the Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee at its 
1978 Session, in which several conflicting views on the subject become 
apparent. 
The report of the 1978 session of the Scientific and Legal Sub-Committee 
revealed two discussion points on the subject of spatial resolution. The 
first concerned the need for such a classification, and here some delega- 
tions were of the opinion that there was no scientific basis for such a 
classification, whilst some thought that although such a classification could 
not be made solely on spatial resolution basis such a classification could be 
adopted, provided other types of parameter were also taken into account. 
Moreover other delegations thought that such a classification was unneces- 
sary whilst others considered it to be an important method of classifying 
remotely sensed data (107). 
The second discussion point was concerned with the dissemination of 
primary data and analysed information. Here there were some seven 
differing views expressed, as follows: 
104. U. N. DOC. A/32/20, August 9th, 1977, p. 9. 
105. Ibid. 
106. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/204, (1977). 
107. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/216, March 6th, 1978, pp. 7 &. 8. 
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(1) Certain delegations were of the opinion that a sensing state 
possessing primary data finer than a certain resolution about 
a sensed state should not disseminate such information 
without the consent of that State. 
(2) The U. S. S. R. and certain other delegations suggested that the 
spatial resolution limit in (1) above should be 50 metres, 
above which there should be free dissemination. Below this 
the economic and/or defence interests of the sensed States 
might be affected. 
(3) The United States in reply to (2) above noted that their 
Skylab programme produced photographs with a resolution of 
15 to 20 metres, which were distributed on the same basis as 
the Landsat programme i. e. freely and openly, and were not 
aware of any problems having arisen from that situation. 
(4) Some delegations thought that primary data ought to be 
disseminated openly irrespective of its resolution and that all 
States should have equal access to that information. 
(5) Some delegations felt that primary data or analysed infor- 
mation ought to be accessible to the sensed State before it 
was disseminated to any third parties. 
(6) Other delegations felt that the dissemination of primary data, 
as well as analysed information to third parties should not be 
detrimental either economically or otherwise to the sensed 
States. 
(7) Finally the United States, together with some other delega- 
tions, felt that analysed information was the work of the 
analyser and therefore could not be treated in the same way 
as primary data (108). 
As a result of the above views the Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee 
found itself, not surprisingly, unable to agree on any recommendations for 
the classification of data by way of spatial resolution, nor as to how such 
a classification could be made. Nevertheless it suggested that the studies 
carried on by the Secretariat, in association with COSPAR, should be 
continued in order to gather further information on how such a classifica- 
tion might be found. 
During the 1978 session the Working Group of the Legal Sub-Comrrittee 
incorporated the definitions of 'primary data' and 'analysed information' 
into the draft Principles document, together with a definition of 'remote 
sensing of the earth', though these were included on the understanding that 
there was no final agreement of these definitions (109). Since these 
108. Ibid. 
109. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/218, Annex 111, April 13th, 1978, p. 5. 
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definitions were introduced as Principle I there was a re-vamping of the 
other Principle numbers. During this session the Working Group added six 
more draft principles, though again through lack of agreement these 
principles were entirely bracketed. 
The 1979 session of the Working Group of the Legal Sub-Committee was 
spent mainly in considering various proposals from the U. S. S. R., the U. S. A., 
Rournania, and a joint proposal from Rournania and Iraq. However it also 
saw fit to remcve the brackets from the words 'primary' and 'analysed' in 
Principle 1, though the reservation as to requiring final agreement on these 
terms still remoined in the form of a footnote. The Working Group also 
undertook a certain amount of time in re-numbering certain of the prin- 
ciples set out in the draft Principles document (110). 
A', - the 1979 session of the full COPUOS meeting it was stated that whilst 
progress had been made in formulating draft principles, there were never- 
theless certain outstanding issues which had to be finalised before the 
document on draft Principles could be closed (111). It there fore recom- 
mended that the Secretariat, along with COSPAR, should continue to 
gather information relating to the different classifications of data (112). 
Following from this the Scientific and Jechnical Committee in its 1980 
session also continued to examine methods of classifying remctely sensed 
data. However no agreement could be reached and delegates views' varied 
between suggesting that data could be classified into the uses for which 
the data could be used, to the view that there were no objective reasons 
for categorising data into rigid categories (113). 
In the 1980 mEeting of the Legal Sub-Committee, the Working Group 
ccnsidered those principles or., "hich no tentative agreement had been 
110. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/240, Annex 1, April 10th, 1979, pp. 7-1 1. 
111. U. N. DOC. A/34/20, August 14th, 1979, p. 7. 
112. Ibid at p. 5. 
113. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/267, February 15th, 1980, p. 10. 
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reached, i. e. Principles I, VIII, IX, XII, XIV, XV and XVII. Agreement was 
eventually reached on ra revised Principle VII which related to the use of 
primary data and/or analysed information in notifying other States of 
impending natural disasters or assisting them in dealing with such disasters 
(114). However the term "natural disaster" was to be subject to further 
discussion (115), though a tentative definition was reCCF. Ed by bringing a 
representative of the Office of the United Nations Disaster RE-lief Co- 
ordinator (UNDRO). This representative indicated that UNDRO did not 
consider a definition of this term necessary, thcL: gh where it was necessary 
the definition used by the League of Red Cross Societies could be used. 
On that basis the Working Group suggested that the term "natural disaster" 
should mean "... an extreme or violent act of nature". However the view 
was also expressed that a footnote to the principle should be included, 
which stated that "a natural disaster means a sudden event which catas- 
trophically affects a large number of people". (116) 
The Working Group of the Legal Sub-Corr. mittee made no progress in 
formulating principles in connection with the dissemination of data and the 
classification of remote sensing based on spatial resolution. In fact this 
lack of progress was brought up in the full COPUOS meeting of that year 
when some concern "'cs expressed at that lack of progress. One delegate 
expressed the view that the Cornimittee, together with the Legal and 
Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee was not proceeding as fast as it 
could go because of the fact that it had failed to consider the rriciny 
different roles of remote sensing satellites, from MEteorclogical to surveil- 
lence satellites, (117). N-i-vertheless the COPUOS urged the Legal Sub- 
Committee to carry on with this work at its next meeting. 
114. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/271, Annex 11, April 10th, 1980, p. 9. 
115. Ibid. 
116. Ibid. 
117. U. N. DOC. A/35/20, August 7th, 1980, p. 6. 
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In 1981 two working papers were submitted to the Legal Sub-Committee 
(118). The first from Columbia relating to Principle 1 and 15 of the 
existing Draft Principles. In Principle 1 Columbia suggested that "remote 
sensing of the Earth means an exploratory function which is performed by 
satellites, or by means of airborne platforms and other aeronautical or 
ballistic devices". (119) It was stated that by such methods "microscopic 
remote sensing" produced "information" that could be freely disseminated. 
However "microscopic remote sensing" could also take place on condition 
that the data or information acquired would only "be used and/or communi- 
cated to third parties only with the express consent of the State within 
whose jurisdiction the area which has been the subject of remote sensing 
or analysis is situated" (120). The definition of primary data remained the 
same., however, the definition of analysed information was expanded to 
incorporate "any intellectual or material product resulting from the evalu- 
ation performed on the primary data" (121). Columbia also proposed a 
revision of Principle 15 which related to the disclosure of sensed data and 
information. This stated that a sensing State would be prohibited from 
communicating to third parties "information on specific natural resources or 
agricultural crops in any other State or country which has been the subject 
of remote sensing without obtaining its prior consent" (122). 
The second working paper was put forward by Mexico and was entitled 
"Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth, its Natural Resources 
and its Environment" (123) and contained 17 Principles. The Mexican draft 
tended to focus on the criteria required before a sensing state might 
engage in the remote sensing of a foreign State. Thus, for instance, a 
118. U. N. DOC. WG/RS(1981)/WP. 2; U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/288 Annex 1, 
20th April, C. Q. CHRISTOL, The Modern International Law of Outer 
S ace, Pergamon Press, (1982)ý-p--. 749. 
119.1 1. 
120. Ibid. - 121. Ibid. 
122. Ibid. 
123. U. N. DOC. WG/R(1981)/WP2; U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/288, Annex 1, 
April 20th 1981, p. 13. 
- . 
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sensing State would have to give "advance notification" to a sensed State 
(124), consult with the sensed state on the request of that State (125), 
provide "preliminary information and final results and conclusions" to the 
sensed State (126), and would be prohibited from disclosing its findings 
without the approval of the sensed State (127). Further the draft extended 
wealth and natural resources sovereignty to include "economic activity" 
(128) and placed a duty on States to pursue a process of peaceful settle- 
ment of disputes until a "solution" to the dispute was found (129). 
The Mexican draft clearly did nothing to bring the two opposing views 
together by tending to favour the closed position rather than the open data 
approach. However, even though the draft imposed severe restrictions on 
remote sensing activities, it did acknowledge the right to remote sense per 
se. Further, whilst the document did nothing to alleviate the tensions that 
had emerged in the Legal Sub-Committee, it must be regarded as an 
important and concerted attempt to modify the previous draft Principles of 
the Sub-Committee, which had remained largely unaltered since 1979. 
The text of the Draft Principles (130) at present contains seventeen draft 
principles (131) the majority of which are bracketed, either wholly or in 
part, indicating disagreement as to those areas. To date the vast majority 
of the principles have not been resolved and it would seem that an inter- 
national treaty on this area is just as remote as it was in 1972 when the 
first remote sensing satellite was launched (132). Such a view holds 
124. Ibid, Principle 12. 
125. lbid, Principle 13. 
126. lbid, Principle 14. 
127. Jbid, Principle b. 
128. lbid, Principle 16. 
129. lbid, Principle 17. 
130. Text of Draft Principles with Respect to Remote Sensing of the 
Natural Resources of the Earth and its Environment as contained in 
the Report of the Legal Sub-Committee on the Work of its 1980 
Session. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/271, Annex 11, April 10th, 1980, pp. 7- 
11. 
131. See. -Appýfridii . 11L, 132. HAHN, (1978, p. 424. 
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particular credence when it is further considered that the disagreements in 
question are based on fundamental divergencies of views and not merely on 
a lack of communication (133). However unless some sort of compromise 
is reached the COPUOS will continue to study reports of the Legal and 
Scientific Sub-Committees and to initiate even more studies in its present 
'long-winded' and convoluted fashion, without producing a concrete founda- 
tion on which to base a United Nations role. Certainly this would seem to 
be the direction that the proceedings in the COPUOS were taking since in 
1981 no further progress was made, and in fact one may be dismayed to 
find that even at this late stage new criteria were introduced by Columbia 
and Mexico (134). Nevertheless the Committee observed that many States 
were actively engaged in the planning and establishment of remotely 
sensing receiving stations and the development of remote sensing satellites. 
Further, because of the use being made of remote sensing satellites by the 
space resource nations the attention of the Committee was drawn to the 
need for an "institutional framework to ensure equitable access at reason- 
able cost" (135). 
Whilst progress on the above issues within the Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space is dependent on the active desire and political will of 
states to accomplish the necessary compromises, it is unrealistic to expect 
states to curb their remote-sensing activities until such a position is 
reached. In fact it is fortunate for the global community that the failure 
of the Committee to find a solution to the issues of remote sensing that 
states participating in such activities have not been inhibited by the lack 
of progress, but have rather established the ground rules for remote sensing 
by way of bilateral treaties and state practice. 
133. MOSSINGHOFF & FUQUA, (1980), p. 118. Also S. P. KRAFFT "in 
Search of a Legal Framework for the Remote Sensing of the Earth 
from Outer Space", 4 Boston College of International and Compara- 
tive Law Review, (1981), p. 467. 
134. Supra Note TT8-& 123. 
135. U. N. DOC. A/36/20, (1981), p. 19. 
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Undoubtedly bilateral agreements are already laying down such a body of 
customary international rules that doubts must exist as to whether COPUOS 
is capable of producing legal rules that are capable of keeping pace with 
the technological changes taking place in space exploration and utilisation 
(136). Indeed Bueckling has questioned the whole usefulness of broad based 
treaties, such as that envisaged by the COPUOS in relation to remote 
sensing, on the basis that not only do they lack enforcement measures, but 
also on the basis that highly technical legal questions are hidden beneath 
generalised concepts and platitudinous phraseology (137). 
It is the failure of the United Nations, and the COPUOS especially, to 
reach a consensus on remote sensing that has spurred the development of 
bilateral treaties in this field since many states now feel that teledetection 
will continue despite the legal and political uncertainties in which it 
operates. Further there is evidence to suggest that because these treaties 
are more modest in their aims, states are more likely to agree on their 
contents (138). Indeed there are instances in which certain states while 
adopting a restrictive data approach within the COPUOS, have negotiated 
an open data stance in a bilateral agreement. Brazil is typical of this 
position since it had adopted the restrictive data approach of the U. S. S. R. 
within the United Nations. In 1973, however, it negotiated a bilateral 
agreement with the United States whereby it adopted an "open data policy 
comparable to that of NASA and the other U. S. agencies participating in 
the program such that catalogues of all data processed, as well as the data 
themselves are made publicly available as soon as practicable to the 
136.1. VLASIC, "Remote Sensing of the Earth by Satellites", Inter- 
national Manual of Space Law, (1979), p. 334. (Editors N. JKS--EN- 
TULIYANA and R. LEES). 
137. A. BUECKLING, "The Strategy of Semantics and the 'Mankind' 
Provisions of the Space Treaty", 7 Journal of Space Low, (1979), 
p. 17-18,22. 
138. KRAFFT, (1981), p. 474. 
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domestic and international community" (139). This agreement was extended 
in M arch 1976 and again in M ay 1976 (140). Similar agreements to the 
above have been concluded by the U. S. A. with Canada, Italy, Chile, India, 
Zaire and latterly negotiations took place in 1980 with the people's Rep- 
ublic of China (141). 
139. BRAZIL: Memorandum of Understanding Between Brazilian Institutio 
De Pesquaisas Espaciais and the United States National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration, April 6th 1973,24 U. S. T. 898,901 
T. I. A. S. No. 7600. 
140. T. I. A. S. No. 8391 and T. I. A. S. No. 8393. 
141. New York Times, January 25th 1980, p. 1 as quoted in S. P. KRAFFT 
(1981), p. 472. The agreement with Zaire (i. e. the Memorandum of 
Understanding Concerning Direct Access by a Zairian Ground Station 
to Data Generated by U. S. Earth Resources Technology Satellite 
(ERTS) and Availability to the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration of the Data So Acquired (January 31st 1975) I. L. M. 
VOL. XV No. 1, p. 1475, January 1976), although not the first agree- 
ment to be negotiated by NASA for access to ERTS data, was 
according to the footnote on p. 1475 of the International Legal 
Materials entry above to be used as a model for future negotiations. 
Thus the agreement with India (Memorandum of Understanding 
Concerning Access by an India Ground Station to NASA's LANDSAT 
Satellites and Availability to the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration and Others of Data Acquired. With Related Note 
(January 3rd 1978) I. L. M. VOL. XCII No. 3 May 1978), T. I. A. S. 9074. 
Extended on April 19th 1982); Indonesian (Agreement Relating to the 
Establishment and Operation of. a LANDSAT System (July 30th 1981) 
I. L. M. VOL. XX No. 6 1981); Canada (Agreement Regarding a Joint 
Program in the Field of Experimental Remote Sensing from Satel- 
lites and Aircraft (May 1971). This was extended on November 6th 
1980 after being earlier amended and extended (T. I. A. S. 7125 and 
T. I. A. S. 8247); CHILE (Memorandum of Understanding Concerning 
Direct Access by a Chilean Ground Station to Data Generated by 
NASA LANDSAT satellites and Availability to the National Aero- 
nautics and Space Administration of the Data So Acquired (Septem- 
ber 8th 1975) I. L. M. VOL. XV No. 1 January 1976) the European Space 
Agency (Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Use of the 
European Space Agency's EARTHNET System to Receive and 
Process the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's 
LANDSAT Data (October 8th 1978). This was extended on June 17th 
1982. I. L. M. VOL. XXI No. 5 1982), all used the same basic model. 
Thus all such bilateral agreements contain a simiar clause requiring 
an open data policy as can be seen above in the Brazilian text. 
The agreements also contain provisions as to the training and 
exchange of technical personnel and the free distribution of general 
information to the public. Generally the agreements last four years 
after which they may be extended by mutual agreement. Further 
the state operating the ground station must finance the project 
themselves though no doubt the U. S. A. will give aid in the building 
of the installation just as, according to the agreement, it supplies 
all necessary antennae and technical back up facilities. 
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From the point of view of developing states there is also a further funda- 
mental reason for negotiating bilateral agreements since in making such an 
agreement it gives them the opportunity to acquire advanced technology 
and more importantly the training that goes with it. Undoubtedly this is in 
the interests of the U. S. A. since it requires ground stations to collect data 
and also by giving adequate training in the use 9f the technology increases 
the quality of the data and therefore its value. To the devloping state it 
gives much needed aid but also reduces the chances of their being exploited 
by the use of remotely sensed information by other states or commercial 
interests (142). 
The bilateral agreements entered into by the United States undoubtedly 
established it as the leader in remote sensing (143) and it is because of 
this lead it was able to lay down the criterial on which to base its activi- 
ties. Since these activities have been acknowledged not only by those 
states party to the above agreements, but also by those participating in 
remote sensing experiments initiated by the United States, that it may be 
said that a rule of customary international law allowing remote sensing 
activities has been established. 
Whether or not a rule of customary international low is established may be 
based on the following factors: - 
(a) Concordant practice by a number of States with reference to 
a type of situation falling within the domain of international 
relations. 
(b) Continuation or repetition of the practice over a considerable 
period of time, 
(c) Conception that the practice is required by, or consistent 
with, prevailing internationa. 1 law, 
142. IFFT and DOYLE, (1979), p. 276. 
143. HAHN, (1978), p. 442. 
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(d) General acquiescence in the practice by other states (144). 
With reference to these criteria, Hopkins considers that the state practice 
of the United States, with regard to remote sensing, has established a right 
in international law to orbit remote sensing satellites without the consent 
of underlying states because that practice has been accepted not only in 
bilateral agreements, but also by the participation of states in evolving the 
use of such practice and the general acquiescence of those and other 
states in those activities. Moreover in attempting to establish that a rule 
of international customary law exists or not it should be noted that the 
144. D. A. PAM 27-161-1, para. 11. A. 1, p. 8, as cited in HOPKINS (1978), 
p. 79 Such a definition of customary international low, while in some 
aspects is accurate, is nevertheless simplistic. Generally inter- 
national custom is defined by Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice "as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law". Further in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case 
(I. C. J. Reports (1951) p. 191) Judge Read stated that, "Customary 
international law is the generalisation of the practice of States". 
B. I. Brownlie in Principles of Public International Law (pp. 6-11) also 
provides that international customary law requires four major 
elements: duration, uniformity, generality of the practice, opinion 
juris et necessitatis. Whilst the first three broadly fall into the 
same mould as the first three elements enunciated in the text 
above, the fourth, opinio juris et necessitatis, goes a great deal 
further than a mere "general acquiescence" since it maintained in 
the Statute of the International Court that there must be "a 
general practice ACCEPTED AS LAW". There is therefore a psycho- 
logical element involved which requires a sense of legal obligation 
and not mere usage. Both in the Lotus Case (SER A, No. 10, p. 28) 
and in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (I. C. J. Reports (1969) 
p. 3) the International Court was strict in requiring proof of opinio 
juris. In the latter case it was stated (I. C. J. Reports (1969) p. 43): - "Although the passage of only a short period of time is 
not necessarily, or itself, a bar to the formation of a 
new rule of customary international law on the basis 
of what was originally a purely conventional rule, an 
indispensable requirement would be that within the 
period in question, short though it might be, State 
practice, including that of States whose interests are 
spcially affected, should have been both extensive and 
virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked; 
- and should moreover have occurred in such a way as 
to show a general recognition that a RULE OF LAW 
OR LEGAL OBLIGATION IS INVOLVED". 
By the use of the term "general acquiescence" there would seem to 
be implied usage rather than a legal obligation which is required in 
order to establish a rule of customary international law. 
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U. S. S. R., the chief proponent of the restrictive data theory, has itself been 
a party to several bilateral agreements with regard to remote sensing (145) 
and has in the past declared an intention to produce a remote sensing 
system in order to survey a number of resources (146). 
It would appear therefore that whilst the U. S. S. R. accepts the Outer 
Space Treaty, this treaty is more closely aligned to the open data theory 
insomuch as its very broad terms will allow. In adopting the restrictive 
data approach the U. S. S. R. is not attempting to provide a consistent legal 
regime but to impose a protectionist approach in that it regards remote 
sensing as a threat to its ideological purpose. Undoubtedly in its bilateral 
agreements the U. S. S. R. has attempted to be consistent with the restrictive 
data approach and in its 1977 working paper the U. S. S. R. offered to co- 
operate with states participating in such agreements in conducting remote 
surveys and providing them with the data (147). The U. S. S. R. declared 
that these agreements would be "on the basis of equality and in accordance 
with international law with due regard to the inalienable right of States to 
exercise permanent sovereignty over their natural resources including the 
right to dispose of their own natural resources and of information concerning 
them" (148). Additionally the U. S. S. R. promises not to make the information 
gleaned from these surveys available to other states (149). 
Whilst these declarations by the U. S. S. R. are consistent with its restrictive 
data position there are, what can only be described as inconsistent under- 
tones; since, firstly, as Hahn points out (150) the last promise was limited 
to "data with a ground resolution of 50 metres" or better and interpreted 
information on natural resources (151). Thus the U. S. S. R. was making no 
145. e. g. with Bulgaria - U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/125 (1974),. p. 12. More 
recently agreements have been concluded with several Eastern 
European Countries U. N. DOC. A/C 1/31/3 (1976), pp. 2-3. 
146. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/C. I. /S. R. 176 (1972), p. 10. 
147. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/C. I. /L96 (1977). 
148. Ibid. 
149. Ibid. 
150. HAHN, (1978), p. 456. 
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guarantees as regards data with a ground resolution of less than 50 metres. 
However by restricting the data to interpreted information this could 
mean that the U. S. S. R. has the last say in what information would be 
transferred, whereas if the sensed state was given the primary data and 
the expertise to interpret it far greater use may be made of the infor- 
mation, possibly to the detriment of its neighbours or the U. S. S. R. itself. 
It is such a situation that the open data avoids since allowing information 
to be freely transferred no sensed state becomes subject to any other, 
except insofar as it chooses to ignore a piece of information to its own 
detriment. In fact it is debateable whether the U. S. S. R. 's approach is 
contrary, at least in principle, to the various United Nations resolutions 
regarding sovereignty over natural resources. Secondly, the working paper 
is silent as to remotely sensed material received on non-signatory states, 
and since it hardly seems likely that the U. S. S. R. will -simply switch off its 
satellites as they pass over such states or develop a satellite capable of 
differentiating between such states, there would appear to be an inconsis- 
tency here with its restrictive data approach, together with its principle of 
respect for national sovereignty. Thirdly, by involving itself with bilateral 
agreements there may be an acknowledgement of the likely failure of the 
multilateral treaty within the United Nations, thereby increasing the 
likelihood of the remote sensing issues to be settled by the establishment 
of customary international law. 
Because of the increase in the use of bilateral agreements to regulate the 
aplications of remote sensing it would seem more and more likely that this 
activity will become subject to customary international law rather than by 
some miltilateral treaty drawn up specifically to deal with remote sensing. 
Such a position may be justified on two grounds in that the politically 
charged atmosphere within the United Nations is not conducive to the 
151. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/C. 1/L96, (1977) as cited in HAHN, (1978) 
p. 456. 
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establishment of such a treaty, and also since no state has objected to 
remote sensing per se this would tend to promote and establish a system 
of regulation based on custom and usage, though within the broad terms of 
the Outer Space Treaty. The role of the United Nations would therefore 
seem to be changing from the role of supervisor to that of monitor (152) 
and it is suggested by at least one commentator that in the absence of a 
multilateral treaty, the United Nations should adopt a position of encour- 
aging regional co-operation whilst confining its own activities to the solving 
of specific legal problems as and when they arise (153). Further the 
United Nations should attempt to limit its role to the provision of an 
administrative system to aid the promulgation of remotely sensed material. 
Nevertheless it is a disturbing feature of the United Nations that it is 
becoming less able to assert itself as the governing body of activities in 
outer space generally and when it does achieve this position by way of 
multilateral treaties state practice tends to distort the provisions in order 
for the practical application of new technologies to be realised. This 
problem is becoming apparent not only with regard to existing legal issues, 
but also in respect of possible future issues as may be seen in relation to 
direct broadcast satellites. 
II DIRECT SATELLITE BROADCASTING 
Direct satellite broadcasting (D. B. S. ) has been defined by Gotlieb and 
Dalfen as "the transmission of messages directly to the houses or commun- 
ities of the general public via artificial space satellites" (154). In many 
respects this problem area of space law is very similar to that of remote 
sensing in that its regulation is in the process of following the same 
152. HAHN, (1978), p. 457. 
153. KRAFFT, (1981), p. 476. 
154. A. GOTLIEB and C. DALFEN, "Direct Satellite Bwadcasting: A Case 
Study in the Development of the Law of Space Communications", 
7 Canadian Yearbook of International Low, (1969), p. 33. 
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tortuous and convoluted path. Discussions on the subject have been taking 
place since 1968 when the COPUOS established a Working Group to look 
into the problems of this new technology, though the subject had been 
included on the agenda of the COPUOS and had been discussed technically 
in the I. T. U. prior to this date (155). 
Though the initial discussions in the Working Group occurred just after the 
approval of the Outer Space Treaty in 1967, this treaty did not deal 
specifically with D. B. S. in any way but merely established general legal 
principles governing outer space. Undoubtedly certain articles, namely I 
and II, were applicable to D. B. S. in that they referred to freedom of use 
and the non-acquisition of territory in space, however the treaty restricted 
itself to activities in outer space and not those which have a direct effect 
on the earth, such as D. B. S. and remote sensing, even though they carry 
wide political implications. 
The present conventional method of transmitting broadcast signals is based 
on a "point to point" system across the surface of the earth, from land 
station to land station (156). Where satellites are used their role is really 
one of distributor to enable the signals to be transmitted over large 
distances or to avoid the interference of certain types of obstacles e. g. 
mountain ranges, rather than as broadcaster. These types of satellites have 
a low transmission power and therefore require sophisticated receiving 
stations (157). Direct broadcast satellites, however, are situated in geo- 
stationary orbit and have a high transmission power, so that they may 
broadcast directly into home receivers (158). It is considered that such 
satellites substantially reduce the cost of setting up a television system 
since expensive land stations do not need to be constructed in anything like 
155. J. FREEMAN, "Toward the Free Flow of Information: Direct Tele- 
vision Broadcasting via Satellite", 13 The Journal of International 
Law and Economics, (1979), pp. 336 & 337. 
156. B. I. EDELSON, '"C; Tobal Satellite Communications", Scientific Ameri- 
can, (1977), pp. 58-73. 
157. _FF7rHEMAN, (1979), p. 331. 
158. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/83 Annex 111, (1970). 
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the same numbers (159). Further these systems, because of their ability to 
cover large geographical areas, are able to broadcast to a far greater 
number of people, thus such systems are particularly attractive to developing 
countries where cost and the ability to transmit to a large audience over a 
wide area is particularly important. Indeed D. B. S. is less attractive to 
developed countries because of the existence of conventional systems. 
Nevertheless it is the developing countries who are most in favour of the 
strict regulations of D. B. S., even though it is they who will benefit more 
than any others, both economically, educationally and probably medically. 
D. B. S. systems come in two basic forms - those that broadcast to ý com- 
munity receivers from where the broadcast is re-transmitted to private 
receivers, and those that broadcast directly to private receivers. It is the 
latter which promotes the most controversy since here there is no control 
as to what is actually broadcast (160). 
The legal problems that have arisen out of direct broadcasting have their 
roots in the fact that this type of broadcasting covers an extremely large 
geographical area, and it is considered by at least one commentator on the 
subject that three satellites placed in different segments of a geostationary 
orbit could saturate ninety percent of the earth's surface (161). The 
ability to cover such a wide area creates the situation that programmes 
broadcast by one state may be beamed into countries with entirely different 
social, economic and political cultures; such programmes therefore could do 
irreparable harm to these states, though it may of course bring considerable 
benefits. The legal problems created may be said to threefold; firstly, 
there is the problem of spillover of broadcasts from one state to another; 
159. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/147 Annex 11 (1975); U. N. DOC. A/AC 1051117 
Annex 11 (1973). 
160. N. M. LESKO, "Legal Implications of Direct Satellite Broadcasting - The U. N. Working Group", 6 Georgia Journal of International and 
Comparative Law, (1976), p. 565. 
161. M. A. DAUSES, -"Direct Television Broadcasting by Satellites and 
Freedom of Information", 3 Journal of Space Law, (1? 75), p. 5?. 
- 2'09 - 
secondly, the problems relating to the free flow of information by direct 
broadcast satellites into adjoining states and the impact on the national 
sovereignty of those states, and, thirdly, the problems arising out of the 
requirement of prior consent to direct broadcast by states which will be 
affected by such transmissions. All three of these problems have been 
raised before the Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites of the 
Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space. 
With regard to the first problem it has already been mentioned that 
because of the wide distribution of transmission signals it is inevitable that 
some degree of spillover will occur from the intended area of transmission. 
The main fear associated with this is that, whilst it is accepted that some 
degree of spillover is unavoidable, some states may use this as an excuse 
to project propaganda into the overspill area. The Working Group has 
stated this problem as giving rise to the necessity "to elaborate criteria on 
a universally accepted basis to define what was and what was not unavoid- 
able spillover inn order to avoid possible problems of interpretation on this 
point" (162). In order to solve the problem of spillover being used for 
propaganda purposes several states have drafted proposals that in cases of 
unavoidable spillover, the state or broadcaster responsible should consult 
with the state subject to that spillover though no mention is made as to 
what the aims of such consultation will be (163). 
Undoubtedly it is the second problem relating to the free flow of infor- 
mation and its relationship to national sovereignty that has caused the 
162. Report of the Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites on the 
Work of its Fifth Session, U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/127, (1974), p. 16. 
163. Soviet Draft on Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial 
Earth Satellites for Direct Television Broadcasting, Article VII, U. N. 
DOC. A/AC 105/W. G. 3 (v)/CRP. 1 (1974); Canadian Draft Principles 
Governing Direct Television Broadcasting by Satellites Article VII 
U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/W. G. 3/L4, (1974); Argentine Proposal Article 
XIV U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/W. G. 3 (v)/CRP. 3. (1974). 
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greatest debate. The U. S. S. R. has always maintained that a state has a 
right to determine what should be broadcast to and received by its popu- 
lation, whilst the United States has always maintained that the Outer Space 
Treaty provides for the free use of outer space which would include direct 
satellite broadcasting (164). Further many third world countries are fearful 
over the use of direct broadcast satellites since there is a feeling that this 
could undermine their cultural independence (165). Since the U. S. A. and 
the U. S. S. R. are now technically advanced enough to develop D. B. S. tech- 
nology and put it into operation, the third world countries' misgivings are 
not without foundation. In addressing oneself to the problem of the 
cultural subversion of third world states it should also be borne in mind 
that this can occur in a perfectly innocent inadvertent manner, since 
simple advertising portraying a certain way of life may have that effect. 
In fact virtually all possess some element of opinion or bias because this is 
in the nature of the writer and/or the producer of the programme (166). 
This problem is very difficult to rationalise and solve since both leading 
space nations point to some international agreement backing up their 
opinion. Thus the United States cite the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights Article 19 as justifying their stance. This states that: - 
11... everyone has the right to freedom to hold opinions 
without interference and to seek, receive and impart infor- 
mation and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers. " 
(167) 
While Article 19 gives a great deal of support to the United States position 
there is a flaw in its argument since the United States has not adopted the 
Declaration. 
164. Supra Note 2, Article 1. 
165. LESKO, (1976), p. 567. 
166. R. ERRERA, "Problems Raised by the Content of Television Pro- 
grams Transmitted by Telecommunication Satellites", The Inter- 
national Law of Commun ications, (1971), p. 88. 
167. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G. A. RESOLUTION 217 (111), 
U. N. DOC. A/810, (1948), Article XIX. 
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Similarly the U. S. S. R. looks to the United Nations General Assembly 
Propaganda Resolution of 1947 which states that: - 
"The General Assembly 
Condemns all forms of propaganda, in whatsoever 
country conducted, which is either designed or likely to 
provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach 
of the peace, or act of agresssion (168) 
as backing up its position on direct broadcasting. A point in favour of the 
Soviet position is that the preamble to the Outer Space Treaty itself refers 
to this provision (169). whilst this provision relates fundamentally to 
political propaganda, in its draft proposals governing the use of space for 
direct television broadcasting (170) the Soviet Union extends this to include 
cultural propaganda. Whether one accepts the Soviet extension or not, it 
would seem to be certain that the principles relating to political propa- 
ganda would on the whole cause little dispute (171), though it would be 
debateable as to whether cultural propaganda is necessarily part and parcel 
of political propaganda anyway. 
In order to solve this problem it is clear that some common ground must 
be found between freedom of information and national sovereignty. In the 
pesent mood of the COPUOS and its Legal Sub-Committee this would seem 
to be unlikely and to state otherwise would tend to ignore the fact that 
these bodies have come a long way since the early days of space law 
negotiations when there was marked evidence of the spirit of co-operation 
combined with respect for national sovereignty. Nevertheless the Argen- 
tinian Draft states in Article 13 that: - 
the principle of freedom of information and the free flow 
of communications is not incompatible with the adoption of 
additional principles designed to harmonise the rights of 
states and to protect the economic, social and cultural values 
of their peoples. " (172) 
168.1947 Anti-Propaganda Resolution, G. A. RESOLUTION 110, U. N. 
DOC. A/519 (1947). 
169. Supra Note 2 Preamble. 
170. Supra Note 163. 
171. LESKO, (1976), p. 567. 
172. Supra Note 163. 
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The third problem which has emerged from the fact that direct broadcast 
satellites cover wide geographical areas arises mainly out of a proposal 
contained in Article V of the Soviet Draft which states that: - 
11... States may carry out direct television broadcasting by 
means of artificial satellites to foreign States only with the 
express consent of the latter. " (173) 
It is thought that the term 'express consent' here is ambiguous since it 
does not specify whether positive consent is required (174), or whether an 
explicit refusal to allow a broadcast is the criteria (175). Further there is 
no mention as to whether the consent given relates to all programmes 
broadcasted or to individual programmes only (176). 
Two major problems exist with the idea of prior consent. Firstly because 
direct broadcast satellites cover such wide geographical areas, the consent 
of several states would be required and the withdrawal of that consent by 
any one state could not only prevent transmission but ultimately render the 
whole system useless. Secondly the requirement of prior consent could 
cause considerable domestic problems within some states. Of particular 
note here is the United States since control over broadcasting would be 
contrary to its entrenched principle of freedom of speech. Further since 
the Outer Space Treaty provides that States should bear international 
responsibility for activities in Space (177), this would mean that the United 
States government would be required to limit the activities of private 
enterprise - an action that would appear to be contrary to the fundamental 
philosophy of the United States. 
One method of solving the above problems would be to organise inter- 
national agreements on a regional basis, grouping states of largely similar 
173. Supra Note 163, Article V. 
174. GOTLIEB and DALFEN, (1969), p. 54. 
175. Report of the Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites on the 
Work 'in its Second Session, U. N. DOC. A/AC 105166 (1971), as 
contained in LESKO, (1976), p. 570. 
176. J. D'ARCY, "Direct Broadcast Satellites and Freedom of Informa- 
tion", The International Law of Communications, (1971), p. 167. 
177. Supra Note 2 Artic-FTV1. 
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political and cultural backgrounds. This would tend to arnke the refusal of 
consent more improbable, though not of course impossible. As Lesko points 
out even this has its limitations because of the likelihood of overspill into 
a state not within that regional group (178). 
Just as for remote sensing, the negotiations for the control of direct 
broadcast satellites have been somewhat prolonged, since as early as 1959 
the I. T. U. discussed the possibility of space communications. The opinions 
within this varied from a position of complete freedom to a position of a 
complete ban (179). The former category originally comprised of both the 
U. S. S. R. and the U. S. A., as a result the I. T. U. was able to allocate a 
number of narrow frequency bands for the experimental use of direct 
broadcasting (180). From the I. T. U. the discussion of direct broadcasting 
shifted to the COPUOS of the United Nations where discussions took place 
in 1966 when the United Arabic Republic proposed a complete ban on 
direct broadcasting, with the U. S. S. R. supporting this position thereby 
reversing its original stance (181). 
Following the proposal of the United Arab Republic the question of direct 
broadcasting was postpon ed until after the passing of the Outer Space 
Treaty, which failed to lay down any basic provisions relating to either 
remote sensing or direct broadcasting. However the treaty did es tablish 
the principle of freedom of use (182) subject to international law (183). 
Once the Outer Space Treaty had been completed the COPUOS again 
turned its attention to discussing the issues of direct broadcasting, cul- 
minating in 1968 in the setting up of a Working Group on Direct Broadcast 
by the General Assembly (184). The terms of reference of the Working 
178. LESKO, (1976), p. 571. 
179. J. E. GALLOWAY, "The Politics and Technology of Satellite Com- 
munications", LEXINGTON, (1972), p. 75. 
180. FREEMAN, (1979), p. 337. 
181. Ibid. 
182. Outer Space Treaty 1967 Article 1. 
183. Ibid Article 111. 
184. G. A. RESOLUTION 2453,23 U. N. G. A. O. R. SUPP. No. 18; U. N. 
DOC. A/7218 (1968). 
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Group was "to study and report on technical feasibility as well as social, 
cultural, legal and other implications" of direct broadcasting (185). At the 
second session of the Working Group all but the United States were in 
favour of some form of control in order to protect the social, cultural, 
legal and political integrity of individual states (186). 
In 1972 two major documents on direct broadcasting appeared. The first 
came out of discussions within UNESCO and was entitled the "Declaration 
of Guiding Principles on the Use of Satellite Broadcasting for the Free 
Flow of Information, the Spread of Education and Greater Cultural Ex- 
change" (187). The Declaration supposedly supports the principle of the 
free flow of information, but in fact on closer examination it requires 
states to reach prior agreements before broadcasts are transmitted (188). 
Further the Declaration accepts the rights of states to protect their 
cultural integrity (189) and to control the content of educational pro- 
grammes (190). However the Declaration is of less importance than might 
be at first thought since it is not binding on member states and secondly, 
a large number of members abstained from the vote thereby precluding a 
consensus of the international community (191). 
The second major document to appear in 1972 was the Soviet Draft 
Convention Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for 
Direct Television Broadcasting (192), which was introduced in the U. N. 
General Assembly, along with a resolution calling for the establishment of 
a treaty on direct television broadcasting by the COPUOS and its Legal 
Sub-Committee (193). Undoubtedly the Soviet Draft Convention was mainly 
185. Ibid. 
186. FREEMAN, (1979), p. 339. 
187. U. N. DOC. A/AC 1051109, (1973). 
188. Ibid Article IX Paragraph 1. 
189. Ibid Article VII Paragraph 2. 
190. Ibid Article VI Paragraph 2. 
191. K. QUEENEY, "Direct Broadcast Satellites and tH United Nations", 
Sijthoff and Noordhoff (1978), pp. 125-133. 
192. U. N. DOC. A/8771 (1972). 
193. U. N. DOC. A/8730 (1972). 
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concerned with the need for prior "express consent" (194), though this was 
not defined. Further, certain types of broadcast were prohibited and 
declared to be unlawful, a state being able to enforce those provisions by 
"the means at its disposal" (195), though again this was not defined but 
does not appear to rule out military intervention. The Draft Convention 
does not mention the principle of free flow of information. 
The resolution of the U. S. S. R. calling for the drawing up of an international 
treaty on direct television broadcasting by the COPUOS was passed by 102 
votes to 1, the sole dissenter being the United States who objected to any 
form of regulation. The United States based its position on the fact that 
the resolution did not recognise the positive advantages of direct broad- 
casting, but concentrated on the negative aspects in that direct broad- 
casting, inter alia, was an "external interference with sovereignty" (196). 
Secondly, the United States argued that since the technology was still very 
young, to negotiate such a treaty was premature. The United States 
therefore argued a 'wait-and-see' attitude in order to assess the impact 
direct broadcasting would make since it might never get beyond a regional 
form (197). Thirdly, the United States alleged that the resolution made no 
mention of the principle of freedom of speech, and finally, violated the 
principle of free flow of information provisions in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (198). 
Shortly after the passing of the above resolution the Soviet Union intro- 
duced an amended version of their Draft Convention entitled Principles 
Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for Direct 
Television Broadcasting ("Soviet Draft") (199). The new Draft Principles 
194. Supra Note 192, Article V. 
195. Supra Note 192, Article IX (1). 
196. U. N. DOC. A/PV 2059-2093 (1976), pp. 4 & 5. 
197. Ibid. 
198. G. A. RESOLUTI ON 217 (111), 3 U. N. GAOR 74, ' U. N. DOC. A/810 
(1948) Art. XIX a s contained in FREEMAN, (1979), p. 344. 
199. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/WG 3(v)/CRPI and CORRI, (1974). 
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was very much the same as the Draft Convention and still required 
express consent (200). Further, militaristic, racist and culturally damaging 
programming was still illegal (201) and spillover was still restricted (202). 
However there were two major differences in that the list of prohibited 
activities was deleted and, secondly the remedies provision was watered 
down so that only lawful action could be taken by an offended state 
(203). This document, with its twelve principles, has changed very little 
since 1977 and has been debated widely within the COPUOS. 
Also in 1972 a joint Draft Principles was submitted by Canada and Sweden 
though this is less restrictive than the Soviet Draft (204). Since this 
document only requires prior consent (205) rather than "express consent" it 
is argued by Freeman (206) that this may be regarded as a weaker stan- 
dard since it is possible that consent may be implied here. The Canadian 
and Swedish Draft Principles also goes further in that it expressly pre- 
serves both national sovereignty and the free flow of information (207). 
Another difference between this and the Soviet draft is that this draft 
does not attempt to limit or prohibit specific types of broadcasting, and 
thus does not open itself up to possible interpretative difficulties in this 
area. 
In 1974 the United States itself produced a set of draft principles (208) in 
which it attempted to promote the wide advantages of direct television 
broadcasting and that it should be regarded not only as a medium for the 
exchange of technological information, but also as a method by which 
differing viewpoints may be interchanged (209). The U. S. Draft therefore 
200. Ibid Article V. 
201. Ibid Article IV. 
202. Ibid Article V. 
203. Ibid Article IX. 
204. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/WG3/L4, (1973). 
205. Ibid Article V. 
206. FREEMAN, (1979), p. 345. 
207. Supra Note 204 Article 11. 
208. United States Draft Principles on Direct Broadcast Satellites, 
U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/W. G. 3(v)C. R. P. 2 (1974). 
209. lbid Article VIII. 
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makes no mention of any requirement to obtain prior consent and places no 
restrictions on the type of information that may be transmitted. The U. S. 
Draft also tends to reject the more formal requirement of prior agree- 
ments in order to solve the problem of spillover, preferring that consul- 
tations only should take place in order to solve such problems (210). The 
U. S. Draft is thus in contradistinction to the Soviet Draft in that it allows 
for the free flow of information whilst not mentioning prior consent; 
conversely, the Soviet Draft requires prior consent while not mentioning the 
free flow of information. 
In 1975 the Outer Space Committee drew up a set of draft principles 
which drew on the documents submitted by the U. S. S. R., Canada and 
Sweden, and the U. S. A. known as the Draft Principles on Direct Television 
Broadcasting (211). The Draft Principles follows a very similar format to 
the Draft Principles on Remote Sensing in that areas of contention are 
contained within brackets until agreement is reached. In 1980 the Draft 
Principles contained some thirteen discussion points to be included in whole 
or in part in any fugure treaty (212). The three most contentious issues 
relate to the 'duty and right to consult', 'consultation and agreements 
between States' and 'programme content'. The principle under the 'duty 
and right to consult' states: - 
"Any state requested to do so by another State should 
promptly enter int consultations with the requesting State 
concerning any matter arising. from those activities in the 
field of international direct television broadcasting by satel- 
lites that are likely to affect the requesting State, and such 
consultations should be conducted with due regard to the 
other principles in this document. " 
This principle is contentious because it places an obligation on a state to 
consult where spillover is likely. The problem associated with this proposal 
210. lbid Article X. 
211. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/218, Annex 11, (1978). 
212. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/271 Annex 1, (1980), pp. 6-11. 
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is that it does not state what form those consultations should take nor as 
to what conclusion such consultations should come to. Further because of 
the uncertainty of other draft principles it is not possible to say with what 
regard those consultations should be based on. 
The second -principle that is the centre of substantial disagreement is 
concerned with 'consultation and agreements between States'. It is this 
principle which is the main stumbling block to the satisfactory conclusion 
of discussions. This principle originally stated that: - 
"A direct television broadcasting service by means of artificial 
earth satellites specifically directed at a foreign State, which 
shall be established only when it is not inconsistent with the 
provisions of the relevant instruments of the International 
Telecommunications Union, shall be based on appropriate 
agreements and/or arrangements between the broadcasting and 
receiving States or the broadcasting entities duly authorised 
by the respective States, in order to facilitate the freer and 
wider dissemination of information of all kinds and to en- 
courage co-operation in the field of information and the 
exchange of information with other countries. " 
Whilst this principle purports to pay lip service to the concept of the free 
flow of information, it still contains provisions requiring prior consent - 
a concept which the United States has consistently argued against in that 
it is incompatible with the free flow concept. In 1975 the United States 
marginally altered its position by stating before the United Nations that a 
state wishing to undertake satellite broadcasting should be under two types 
of obligations: - 
Inform states within the intended reception area that 
it intends to establish a broadcasting system; and 
(2) Enter into consultation on any matter concerning the 
broadcasting system in the event that an intended 
receiving state makes a request for such consultation 
(213). 
However whilst the U. S. A. stated that it could accept the requirement of 
consultation if couched in the above form, it did not actually table a 
213. J. FREEMAN "Direct Broadcast Developments dnd Directions: The 
National Sovereignty and Cultural Integrity Positions", 74 American 
Societ4 of International Law Proceedings, (1980), p. 3f-5, -u--n'2-er 
Te-marks by Stephen Bond. 
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motion to that effect until 1979 (214). The United States justified such an 
approach on the grounds that no state would undertake direct satellite 
broadcasting against another state which was unhappy about such broad- 
casts. Further it is unlikely that programme sponsors would take part in 
broadcasts where such a situation existed. More particularly it is unreal- 
istic to advertise products where they are not available. The United 
States also stated that any disputes could be resolved merely by consulta- 
tion, though a number of states were not convinced by this argument. 
The next approach of the United States really followed a United Kingdom 
proposal in 1977 (215), in that a state engaged in DBS had to comply with 
the I. T. U. Regulations laid down in the 1977 World Administrative Radio 
Conference in that it had to adhere to the radio frequencies allocated to 
it. It was further stated in the Legal Sub-Committee in 1980 that para- 
graph 1 of the principles was unnecessary because of Radio Regulations 
6222 (formerly 428A) (216) which stated that: - 
"In devising the characteristics of a space station in the 
broadcasting satellite service, all technical means available 
shall be. used to reduce, to the maximum extent practicable, 
the radiation over the territory of other countries unless an 
agreement has been previously reached with such countries. " 
As in response to the working paper submitted by the United Kingdom in 
1980 (217), several states including the U. S. S. R. rejected the idea that the 
I. T. U. regulations could replace paragraph 1. This attitude was adopted 
because, although these states accepted that the I. T. U. regulations do 
apply, broadcasts would be still technically possible should a state choose 
to ignore those regulations. Further it was thought that the regulations 
may not cover all the aspects of direct television broadcasting. Finally it 
was stated that because DBS interferes with national sovereignty then the 
problem should be solved on a political basis (218). This basis undoubtedly 
214. lbid at p. 316. 
215. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/C2/AR 269 (1977), p. 7. 
216. WARC, 1971. 
217. U. N. DOC. WG/DBS/1980/WP 4, (1980). 
218. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/271, (1980). 
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restricts the United States ability to reach a compromise and appears to 
have dealt a blow to their hopes of having suggested a solution to the 
problem in a technical manner. Thus the problem of the 'consultation and 
agreements' principle remains to be solved. It may be argued however 
that by attempting to reach a compromise the United States has stepped 
down from its position of maintaining a completely unregulated DBS 
regime. To a large extent though such a position may be unrealistic 
anyway since in all other forms of communication such as books, mail and 
records restrictions are the norm (219) and therefore the arguments of the 
United States against restrictions must be weakened considerably. Further, 
in practice in the final analysis an unregulated, free flow of information 
principle would simply be prevented by jamming by the receiving state, as 
in the cases of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe. 
The present draft principle on 'consultation and agreement' reads as 
follows: - 
(A direct television broadcasting service by means of 
artificial earth satellites specifically directed at a 
foreign State, which shall be established only when it 
is not inconsistent with the provisions of the relevant 
instruments of the Inter-national Telecommunications 
Union, shall be based on appropriate agreements and/or 
arrangements between the broadcasting and receiving 
States or the broadcasting entities duly authorised by 
the respective States, in order to facilitate the freer 
and wider dissemination of information of all kinds and 
to encourage co-operation in the field of information 
and the exchange of information with other countries). 
2. (For that purpose a State which proposes to establish 
or authorise the establishment of broadcasting service 
by means of artificial earth satellites specifically 
directed at a foreign state shall without delay notify 
that State of such intention and shall properly enter 
into consultations with that State if the latter so 
requires. ) 
3. (No such agreements and/or arrangements shall be 
required with respect to the overspill of the radiation 
of the satellite signal within the limits established 
under the relevant instruments of the International 
Telecommunications Union. ) 
219. M. E. PRICE, "The First Amendment and Television Broad- 
casting by Satellite", 23 U. C. L. A. Low Review, (1976), p. 890-2. 
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No such agreements and/or arrangements or 
consultations shall be required with respect to 
the overspill of the radiation of the satellite 
signal within the limits established under the 
relevant instruments of the International Tele- 
communications Union). 
Delete paragraph 3). 
This principle shall not apply with respect to the 
overspill of the radiation of the satellite signal 
within the limits established under the relevant 
instruments of the International Telecommun- 
ications Union). (220) 
The third major contentions issue within the Draft Principles relates to 
'programme content'. This draft principle states: - 
"(States or their broadcasting entities which participate in 
direct television broadcasting by satellite with other States 
should co-operate with one another in respect of program- 
ming, programme content, production and interchange of 
programmes. ) 
(The broadcasting of 
countries other than 
basis of appropriate 
concerned). 
advertising, direct or indirect to the 
the country of origin should be on the 
agreements between the countries 
(Notwithstanding the foregoing, States undertaking activities in 
direct television broadcasting by satellites should in all cases 
exclude from the television programmes any material which is 
detrimental to the maintenance of international peace and 
security, which publicises ideas of war, militarism, national 
and racial hatred and enmity between peoples, which is aimed 
at interfering in the domestic affairs of other states or which 
undermines the foundations of the local civilisation, culture, 
way of life, traditions or language). (221) 
The United States has considered this principle to be too vague and 
therefore open to abuse, however it is thought that most Western European 
states would accept such a principle, since they tend to accept state inter- 
vention in broadcasting anyway (222), though it is questionable whether 
such restrictions would be tolerated if they applied to domestic broadcasts 
which happened to spillover into a neighbouring state. 
220. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/271 Annex 1, (1980), pp. 6-11. 
221. Ibid. 
222. FREEMAN, (1980), p. 317. 
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Nevertheless the majority of developing countries feel that control of 
direct broadcasting by way of prior consent and consultation is needed to 
protect their cultural integrity, whilst strictly speaking this could be 
achieved merely by agreeing on the content of programmes for direct 
broadcasting. This particular line of argument may therefore be a com- 
promise solution between prior consent and the concept of the free flow of 
information. The effect therefore of a set of content criteria would be to 
allow the free flow of information subject to that information complying 
with certain criteria. The usefulness of such a provision is 'twofold'. 
Firstly, direct broadcasting would not be subject to lengthy negotiations to 
reach agreements with several states; and secondly, the direct broadcasting 
station would be aware of the limitations imposed on its programme 
content and make such changes as appear necessary to comply with the 
content criteria. 
Undoubtedly the difficulties of drafting a set of content criteria cannot be 
underestimated but in the face of the present differences within the 
COPUOS over the prior consent principle, there would seem to be nothing 
to lose in pursuing such a line of negotiations. It would be unrealistic also 
to assume that no consultations with other states would be required, since 
it is only reasonable that those nations which display anxieties over certain 
programmes in relation to their cultural integrity must be consulted in 
order to deal with any misgivings over the content of particular direct 
broadcast programmes. 
Such a process can only serve to promote international co-operation since 
to a large extent conflict would be reduced, disputes being settled on the 
basis of co-operation and self-regulation. Nevertheless such an approach is 
not finding its way within the Working Group because of a lack of consen- 
sus as to the need for the regulation of programme content (223). 
223. United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 
Report of the Legal Sub-Committee on the Works of its Nineteenth 
Session (10th March - 3rd April 1980), U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/271 Annex 1 (1980). 
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In 1981 the Legal Sub-Committee again re-established the Working Group 
on D. T. B., although it now restricted its activities to two areas - the 
Principles of "State Responsibility" and "Consultation and Agreements 
between States". However no concrete conclusions were agreed on and the 
Working Party merely acted as an arena for the discussion of various 
points of view. The lack of progress appeared to originate from the fact 
that the Working Party was still somewhat chastened and shocked by the 
widely divergent positions taken during the 1980 discussions (224). 
Undoubtedly the most important development of 1981 was the submission 
of the twelve country working paper on April 3rd to the Legal Sub- 
Committee entitled.. "Elaboration of Draft Principles Governing the Use by 
States of Artificial Earth Satellites for Direct Television Broadcasting" 
(225). The twelve nations consisted of Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
Columbia, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Mexico, Niger and Venezuela. The 
document itself consisted of a preamble and 10 draft principles, all of 
which had been discussed in one form or other within the Working Group 
or the Legal Sub-Committee. One major difference between the 1981 
twelve nation draft and the draft considered by the 1980 Legal Sub- 
Committee was that the 1981 draft made no reference to the Principles 
dealing with "Programme Content". 
The draft Principle on the "Duty and Right to Consult", presented as the 
seventh Principle in the draft of the group of 12, constituted a major 
alteration to the previous sub-committee drafts. Originally the previous 
drafts merely called for prompt consultations between all states concerning 
any matter arising from D. T. B. activities that were likely to affect the 
requesting State. The new draft Principle was a great deal more complex 
224. CHRISTOL, (1982), p. 697. 
225. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/C2/1-131,3rd April 1981; U. N. DOC. A/AC 
105/228 Annex IV, 20th April 1981, p. 1; U. N. DOC-A/36/20, Annex II 
(1981), p. 20. 
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in that it was founded on the idea that States involved in broadcasting and 
receiving had to have an "established" service with each other. Those 
States and others either receiving or broadcasting "within the same ser- 
vice" were, on the request of a receiving State to a broadcasting State, to 
take part in consultation regarding their D. T. B. activities (226). Further 
any such consultations were not to prejudice other consultations which the 
broadcasting and receiving State "may undertake with any other State on 
that subject" (227). 
Great differences also exist between the proposal of the group of 12 
concerning "Consultation and Agreements between States", and the proposal 
contained in 1980 draft of the Legal Sub-Committee. The new proposal 
contained in draft Principle 10 stated that: - 
"A State which intends to establish or authorise the establish- 
ment of an international direct television broadcasting satellite 
service shall without delay notify the proposed receiving State 
or States of such intention and shall promptly enter into 
consultation with any of those States which so requests. " (228) 
This form of the Principle uses the term "intends" rather than "proposes", 
and substitutes the phrase "the proposed receiving State or States" for the 
term "Foreign State". Thus the new version of the Principle requires 
consultation with any of those "States" so requesting as opposed to a 
"State", if it were to request such consultations (229). The effect of this 
could be to curtail bilateral agreements in favour of regional agreements. 
Paragraph 2 of the revised "Consultation and Agreements between States" 
Principle stated that D. T. B. "shall only be established after the conditions 
set forth in paragraph 1 above have been met and on the basis of the 
agreements and/or arrangements in conformity with the relevant instru- 
ments of the International Telecommunication Union and in accordance with 
226. U. N. DOC. A/36/20, (1981), p. 22. 
227. Ibid. 
228. Supra Note 225, at p. 22. 
229. CHRISTOL, (1982), p. 702. 
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these principles" (230). This provision made some minor changes, such as 
stating that future agreemnts on D. T. B. would have to be "in conformity 
with" rather than not being "inconsistent" with the relevant instruments of 
the I. T. U. However this draft Principle omitted to include the objective, 
contained in the original draft, allowing "the freer and wider dissemination 
of information of all kinds and to encourage co-operation in the field of 
information and the exchange of information with other countries" (231). 
This principle would not therefore appear to encourage the principle of the 
free flow of information. 
The new draft Paragraph 2 would appear to lay down the principle that 
three requirements had to be fulfilled before D. T. B. could be operated. 
Firstly, there had to be prior consultations with receiving states as laid 
down in Paragraph 1; secondly, there had to be compliance with the rules 
and regulations of the International Telecommunication Union, including 
Regulation 6222; thirdly, there had to be compliance with the terms of the 
proposed principles (232). 
A further feature of the draft Principle on "Consultation and Agreements 
between States" is that it made no mention of the need to -facilitate . 
"the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds and to 
encourage co-operation in the field of information and the exchange of 
information and the exchange of information with other countries" as 
contained in Paragraph 1 of the Sub-Committee's draft of 1980 (233). Also 
if one considers Paragraph 3 of the new draft principles it reads: - 
"With respect to the UNAVOIDABLE overspill of the radiation 
of the satellite signal, the relevant instruments of the I. T. U. 
shall be exclusively applicable. " (234) 
230. Supra Note 225 at p. 23. 
231. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/288 (Annex 11,20th April, 1981), p. 6. 
232. CHRISTOL, (1982), pp. 702-3. 
233. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/271 Annex 1, (1980), pp. 6-11. 
224. Supra Note 225 at p. 23. 
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This constituted a major departure from the 1980 draft Principles in that 
the need for agreements or consultation had been specifically eliminated 
in cases of overspill which nevertheless complied with the relevant instru- 
ments of the I. T. U. (235). Further the use of the word "unavoidable" 
emphasised the difference between overspill and D. T. B. specifically designed 
for reception in a Foreign State. According to Christol the effect of 
these two changes is to reflect the views of those States in favour of 
controls on the free dissemination of information and the imposition of 
constraints on international broadcasting (236). Indeed he points out that a 
large proportion of the 12 states are equatorial which for various reasons 
have produced a document that serves their own national interests (237). 
Nevertheless at the end of 1981 the draft Principles remained the same as 
the 1979 and 1980 documents. 
It would have appeared therefore that the negotiations for an international 
agreement in the field of direct broadcasting had reached an impasse, 
however on December 10th 1982 the "Group of 12's" draft principles 
document was adopted by the General Assembly under the title "Principles 
Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International 
Direct Television Broadcasting" (238). The voting for the Resolution was 
107 in favour, with 13 against and a further 13 abstentions, though it 
should be noted that all but one (U. S. S. R. ) of the leading space nations 
were opposed to the Resolution, which would perhaps indicate the diver- 
gence between the Resolution 37/92 and the preceding negotiations that 
had taken place in the Legal Sub-Committee. Nevertheless the Group of 
12 took the view that its set of Principles could prepare a way to an 
international convention on D. T. B. and this view was supported by other 
States. Thus, the issue come to be placed on the agenda of the General 
Assembly (239). 
235. CHRISTOL, (1982), p. 702-3. 
236. CHRISTOL, (1982), p. 703. 
237. Ibid. 
238. U. N. DOC. A/RES/37/92,4th Feb. 1983; (1983) XXII I. L. M. 451. 
239. C. Q. CHRISTOL, "Prospects for an International Legal Regime for 
Direct Television Broadcasting", International & Comparative Law 
Ounrtt-rly "OnrO ... 
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In the discussions in the Special Political Committee in November 1982 the 
differences between the different sets of Principles were expressed both 
substantively and procedurally. 
On the substantive issues it was argued by the opposers to the Group of 12 
that attention should have been paid to the "international legal responsi- 
bility of States regarding the content of broadcasting and of the require- 
ment of prior consent of 'receiving States' through a non-prejudicial 
reference to whatever international law requires on these matters" (240). 
It was argued that the proposed Resolution called for prior agreements or 
arrangements dealing with content and prior consent on a level for beyond 
existing technical and I. T. U. conceived restrictions, and anyway would be 
contrary to international law in that States would have to act in breach of 
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in that such a 
principle would give States an "unconditional veto over this form of 
broadcasting" (241). 
Procedurally it was argued by the United States representative that the 
adoption of Resolution 37/92 had left the traditional use of the consensus 
process within COPUOS in complete disarray and that the referral of 
issues still under negotiation to the General Assembly simply to obtain a 
majority vote would be unrewarding (242). He also stated that the con- 
sideration of the issue was premature in the light of the earlier intensive 
negotiations which had resulted in "substantial progress toward a consensus" 
(243). 
Summing up it can be. seen that the Group of 12's draft Principles, now 
expressed in General Assembly Resolution 37/92, places, not surprisingly, a 
for greater emphasis on the sovereign rights of States than had the draft 
240. U. S. /U. N. Press Release, 22nd Nov. 1982, No. 140(82), p. 2. 
241. lbid at p. 2. CHRISTOL, (1985), pp. 145-146. 
242. U. N. DOC. A/AC 105/C. 2/L131; U. N. DOC. A/AC -105/288, Annex 4, 
p. 1,20th April 1981; U. N. DOC. A/36/20, p. 4 (1981). 
243. Supra Note 240 at p. l. 
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of the Legal Sub-Committee. Further the Resolution enhances the vote of 
the I. T. U. since it mandates that an international D. T. B. service should 
only be established when it conforms to the relevant instruments of the 
I. T. U. It should also be stated that whilst Principle 10 on "Consultations 
and Agreements between States" does not expressly establish a requirement 
of prior consent on the part of the receiving State it is clear that good 
faith negotiations are required during which a potentially receiving State 
would be able to raise the objection of non-consent (244). 
The Group' of 12 had argued that they had taken the matter to the 
General Assembly in 1982 because D. T. B. had become operational in some 
countries already, that it had far-reaching and critical implications, that 
commercial interests were already assessing the potentialities of D. T. B. and 
that the early establishment of principles for international D. T. B. would 
advance the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter (245). 
Initial reactions, as far as the last point is concerned, suggests the oppo- 
site since the distribution of votes and the fact that Resolution 37/92 is of 
a non-binding status would tend to indicate that the international regulation 
of D. T. B. has still a long way to go before finally being put to bed. 
CONCLUSION 
It would appear from analysing the issues of remote sensing and direct 
television broadcasting that in the arena of outer space, the United 
Nations and particularly the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space is becoming less able to legislate effectively on new developments. 
The undoubted reason for this is the uncompromising ideological differences 
between the East and West and the failure to sustain the spirit of co- 
operation formally present in the drafting of the Outer Space Treaty. 
244. CHRISTOL, (1985), p. 149. 
245. Ibid. 
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While it is useful to have discussions within the various bodies dealing with 
these two issues in order to delineate the problems relating to each 
individual question, the fact remains that in the absence of a moratorium 
the leading space nations will continue to develop their expertise and 
operations in these particular fields. Certainly the present negotiations 
will not prevent the establishment of direct satellite broadcasting systems, 
nor of the continued use of remote sensing systems. It thus seems highly 
likely that the law will develop through state practice and bilateral 
agreements until a body of customary international law develops. The use 
of bilateral agreements may be of particular benefit to third world coun- 
tries since, within the present negotiations, they are torn between protecting 
their own national integrity whilst at the same time participating in the 
undoubted benefits that these two developments of outer space offer. By 
negotiating bilateral agreements they not only establish their national 
identity but also participate in those benefits - the best of both worlds. 
The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in the face of such 
developments would be reduced to a mere discussion and monitoring body, 
prevented from taking a participative role by virtue of apparent irrecon- 
cilable ideologies. It may be the case that the United Nations should 
abandon its attempts at reaching multilateral solutions but should concen- 
trate on developing an administrative role to ensure that the benef its 
reaped from remote sensing and direct satellite broadcasting be dissem- 
inated as widely as possible within the world community. By taking on this 
role and encouraging regional agreements under the auspices of existing 
international space law a way may be found to reconcile the present 
difficulties and possibly allow for the future drafting of multilateral 
treaties, which at present are proving so elusive. Even if this is feasible 
the effectiveness of such treaties, in the light of the apparent distortion 
of present treaties by state practice, must be seriously (5pen to question. 
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APPENDIX 
TREATY OF PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES 
The States Parties to this Treaty, 
1967 
Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of 
man's entry into outer space, 
Recognising the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the 
exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, 
Believing that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried on 
for the benefit of all peoples irrespective of the degree of their economic 
or scientific development, 
Desiring to contribute to broad international co-operation in the scientific 
as well as the legal aspects of the exploration and use of outer space for 
peaceful purposes, 
Believing that such co-operation will contribute to the development of 
mutual understanding and to the strengthening of friendly relations between 
States and peoples, 
Recalling Resolution 1962 (XVIII) entitled "Declaration of Legal Principles 
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space", which was adopted unanimously by the United Nations General 
Assembly on 13 December 1963, 
Recalling Resolution 1884 (XVIII), carrying nuclear weapons or any other 
kinds of weapons of mass destruction or from installing such weapons on 
celestial bodies, which was adopted unanimously by the United Nations 
General Assembly on 17 October 1963, 
Taking account of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 110 (11) of 3 
November 1947, which condemned propaganda designed or likely to provoke 
or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of 
aggression, and considering that the aforementioned resolution is applicable 
to outer space, 
Convinced that a Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in 
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies, will further the purposes and principles of the Charter of 
the United Nations, 
Have agreed on the following: 
- 23-11 - 
Article I 
The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other 
celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of 
all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific devel- 
opment, and shall be the province of all mankind. 
Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free 
for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on 
a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there 
shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies. 
There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, including 
the moon and other celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate and encour- 
age international co-operation in such investigation. 
Article Il 
Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject 
to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or 
occupation, or by any other means. 
Article III 
States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and 
use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in 
accordance with international low, including the Charter of the United 
Nations, in the interest of- maintaining international peace and security 
and promoting international co-operation and understanding. 
Article IV 
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the 
earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons 
of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station 
such weapons in outer space in any other manner. 
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to 
the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military 
bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons 
and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be for- 
bidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any 
other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment 
or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other 
celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited. 
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Article V 
States Parties to the Treaty shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind 
in outer space and shall render to them all possible assistance in the event 
of accident, distress, or emergency landing on the territory of another 
State Party or on the high seas. When astronauts make such a landing, 
they shall be safely and promptly returned to the State of registry of their 
space vehicle. 
In carrying on activities in outer space and on celestial bodies, the astro- 
nauts of one State Party shall render all possible assistance to the astro- 
nauts of other States Parties. 
States Parties to the Treaty shall immediately inform the other States 
Parties to the Treaty or the Secretary-General of the United Nations of 
any phenomena ihey discover in outer space including the moon and other 
celestial bodies, which could constitute a danger to the life or health of 
astronauts. 
Article VI 
States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for 
national activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial 
bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or 
by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are 
carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present 
Treaty. The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including 
the moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorisation and con- 
tinuing supervision by the State concerned. When activities are carried on 
in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, by an 
international organisation, responsibility for compliance with this Treaty 
shall be borne both by the international organisation, and by the States 
Parties to the Treaty participating in such organisation. 
Article VII 
Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching of 
an object into outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, 
and each State Party from whose territory or facility an object is launched, 
is internationally liable for damage to another State party to the Treaty or 
to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on 
the earth, in air space or in outer space, including the moon and other 
celestial bodies. 
Article VIII 
A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into 
outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, 
and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial 
body. Ownership of objects launched into outer space, including objects 
landed or constructed on a celestial body, and of their component parts, is 
not affected by their presence in outer space or on a ce'lestial body or by 
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their return to the earth. Such objects or component parts found beyond 
the limits of the State Party to the Treaty on whose registry they are 
carried shall be returned to that State, which shall, upon request, furnish 
identifying data prior to their return. 
Article IX 
In the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other 
celestial bodies,, States parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the 
principle of co-operation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their 
activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, 
with due regard to-the corresponding interests of all other States Parties 
to the Treaty. States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer 
space, including ! he moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct explora- 
tion of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse 
changes in the environment of the earth resulting from the introduction of 
extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall adopt appropriate 
measures for this purpose. If a State party to the Treaty has reason to 
believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its nations in outer 
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially 
harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful 
exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial 
bodies, it shall undertake appropriate international consultations before 
proceeding with any such activity or experiment. A State party to the 
Treaty which has reason to believe than an activity or experiment planned 
by another State Party in outer space, including the moon and other 
celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities 
in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and 
other celestial bodies, may request consultation concerning the activity or 
experiment. 
Article X 
In order to promote international co-operation in the exploration and use 
of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in conformity 
with the purposes of this Treaty, the States parties to the Treaty shall 
consider on a basis of equality and requests by other States Parties to the 
Treaty to be afforded an opportunity to observe the flight of space objects 
launched by those States. 
The nature of such an opportunity for observation and the conditions under 
which it could be afforded shall be determined by agreement between the 
States concerned. 
Article XI 
In order to promote international co-operation in the peaceful exploration 
and use of outer space, States Parties to the Treaty conducting activities 
in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, agree to 
inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations as well as the public 
and the international scientific community, to the greatest extent feasible 
and practicable, of the nature, conduct, locations and results of such 
activities. On receiving the said information, the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations should be prepared to disseminate it immediately and 
ef fectively. 
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Article XII 
All stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the moon and 
other celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of other States 
Parties to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity. Such representatives shall 
give reasonable advance notice of a projected visit, in order that approp- 
riate consultations may be held and that maximum precautions may be 
taken to assure safety and to avoid interference with normal operations in 
the facility to be visited. 
Article XIII 
The provisions of this Treaty shall apply to the activities of States Parties 
to the Treaty in the Exploration and use of outer space, including the 
moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by 
a single State Party to the Treaty or jointly with other States, including 
cases where they are carried on within the framework of international 
inter-governmental organisations. 
Any practical questions arising in connection with activities carried on by 
international inter-governmental organisations in the exploration and use of 
outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be resolved 
by the States Parties to the Treaty either with the appropriate international 
organisation or with one or more States members of that international 
organisation, which are Parties to this Treaty. 
Article XIV 
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State 
which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance 
with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time. 
2. This Treaty shall be subject, to ratification by signatory States. 
Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited 
with the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United 
States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments. 
3. This Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of 
ratification by five Governments including the Governments designated as 
Depository Governments under this Treaty. 
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposi- 
ted subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into 
force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or 
accession. 
5. The Depositary Governments sh. all promptly inform all signatory and 
acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each 
instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of its 
entry into force and other notices. 
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments 
pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
- 235 - 
Article XV 
Any State Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. 
Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party to the Treaty 
accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the 
States Parties to the Treaty and thereafter for each remaining State Party 
to the Treaty on the date of acceptance by it. 
Article XVI 
Any State Party to the Treaty may give notice of its withdrawal from the 
Treaty one year after- its entry into force by written notification to the 
Depositary Governments. Such withdrawal shall take effect one year from 
the date of receipt of this notification. 
Article XVII 
This Treaty, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish 
texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the 
Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be 
transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the 
signatory and acceding States. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this 
Treaty. DONE IN .......... at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the .... day of ....... one thousand nine hundred and ...... 
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A PPEND IX 
AGREEMENT GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES ON THE MOON 
AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODTE--S-, --1779 
The States Parties to this Agreement, 
Noting the achievements of States in the exploration and use of the moon 
and other celestial bodies, 
Recognising that the moon, as a natural satellite of the earth, has an 
important role to play in the exploration of outer space, 
Determined to promote on the basis of equality the further development of 
co-operation among States in the exploration and use of the moon and 
other celestial bodies, 
Desiring to prevent the moon from becoming an area of international 
conflict, 
Bearing in mind the benefits which may be derived from the exploitation 
of the natural resources of the moon and other celestial bodies, 
Recalling the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies, (1) the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of 
Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, (2) the 
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 
(3) and the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer 
Space, (4), 
Taking into account the need to define and develop the provisions of these 
international instruments in relation to the moon and other celestial 
bodies, having regard to further progress in the exploration and use of 
outer space, 
Have agreed on the following: 
Article I 
1. The provisions of this Agreement relating to the moon shall also 
apply to other celestial bodies within the solar system, other than the 
earth, except in so far as specific legal norms enter into force with 
respect to any of these celestial bodies. 
2. For the purposes of this Agreement reference to the moon shall 
include orbits around or other trajectories to or around it. 
3. This Agreement does not apply to extraterrestrial materials which 
reach the surface of the earth by natural means. 
1. Resolution 2222 (XXI), annex. (6 I. L. M. 386, (1967) 
2. Resolution 2345 (XXII), annex. (7 I. L. M. 149, (1968) 
3. Resolution 2777 (XXVI), annex. (10 I. L. M. 965, (1971) and 
11 I. L. M. 250, (1972) 
4. Resolution 3235 (XXIX), annex. (14 I. L. M. 43, (1975) 
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Article II 
All activities on the moon, including its exploration and use, shall be 
carried out in accordance with international law, in particular the Charter 
of the United Notions, and taking into account the Declaration on Principle 
of International Low concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, (5) adopted 
by the General Assembly on 24 October 1970, in the interests of main- 
taining international peace and security and promoting international co- 
operation and mutual understanding, and with due regard to the correspon- 
ding interests of all other States Parties. 
Article III 
1. The moon shall be used by all States Parties exclusively for peaceful 
purposes. 
2. Any threat or use of force or any other hostile act or threat of 
hostile act on the moon is prohibited. It is likewise prohibited to use the 
moon in order to commit any such act or to engage in any such threat in 
relation to the earth, the moon.. spacecraft, the personnel of spacecraft or 
man-made space objects. 
3. States Parties shall not place in orbit around or other trajectory to 
or around the moon objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of 
weapons of mass destruction or place or use such weapons on or in the 
moon. 
4. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, 
the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres 
on the moon shall be forbidden. Theuse of military personnel for scien- 
tific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. 
The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration and 
use of the moon shall also not be prohibited. 
Article IV 
1. The exploration and use of the moon shall be the province of all 
mankind and shall be carri ed out for the benefit and in the interests of all 
countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific develop- 
ment. Due regard shall be paid to the interests of present and future 
generations as well as to the need to promote higher standards of living 
and conditions of economi c and social progress and development in accor- 
dance with the Charter of the United Nations. 
2. States Parties shall be guided by the principle of co-operation and 
mutual assistance in all their activities concerning the exploration and use 
of the moon. International co-operation in pursuance of this Agreement 
should be as wide as possible and may take place on a multilateral basis, 
on a bilateral basis or through international intergovern mental organisations. 
5. Resolution 2625 (XXV), annex. 
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Article V 
1. States Parties shall inform the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations as well as the public and the international scientific community, to 
the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of their activities concerned 
with the exploration and use of the moon. Information on the time, 
purposes, locations, orbital parameters and duration shall be given in 
respect of each mission to the moon as soon as possible after launching, 
while information on the results of each mission, including scientific 
results, shall be furnished upon completion of the mission. In the case of 
a mission lasting more than thirty days, information on conduct of the 
misson, including any scientific results shall be given periodically at thirty 
days' intervals. For missions lasting more than six months, only significant 
additions to such information need be reported thereafter. 
2. If a State Party becomes aware that another State Party plans to 
operate similtaneously in the same area of or in the same orbit around or 
trajectory to or around the moon, it shall promptly inform the other State 
of the timing of and plans for its own operations. 
3. In carrying out activities under this Agreement, States Parties shall 
promptly inform the Secretary-General, as well as the public and the 
international scientific community, of any phenomena they discover in 
outer space, including the moon, which could endanger human life or 
health, as well as of any indication of organic life. 
Article VI 
1. There shall be freedom of scientific investigation on the moon by 
all States Parties without discrimination of any kind, on the basis of 
equality and in accordance with international law. 
2. In carrying out scientific investigations and in furtherance of the 
provisions of this Agreement, the States Parties shall have the right to 
collect on and remove from the moon samples of its mineral and other 
substances. Such samples shall remain at the disposal of those States 
Parties which caused them to be collected and may be used by them for 
scientific purposes. States Parties shall have regard to the desirability of 
making a portion of such samples available to other interested States 
Parties and the international scientific community for scientific inves- 
tigation. States Parties may in the course of scientific investigations also 
use mineral and other substances of the moon in quantities appropriate for 
the support of their missions. 
3. States Parties agree on the desirability of exchagging scientific and 
other personnel on expeditions to or installations on the moon to the 
greatest extent feasible and practicable. 
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Article VII 
1. In exploring and using the moon, States Parties shall take measures 
to prevent the disruption of the existing balance of its environment 
whether by introducing adverse changes in that environment, by its harmful 
contamination through the introduction of extra-environmental matter or 
otherwise. States Parties shall also take measures to avoid harmfully 
affecting the environment of the earth through the introduction of extra- 
terrestrial matter or otherwise. 
2. States Parties shall inform the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations of the measures being adopted by them in accordance with para- 
graph 1 of this article and shall also, to the maximum extent feasible, 
notify him in advance of all placements by them of radio-active materials 
on the moon and of the purposes of such placements. 
3. States Parties shall report to other States Parties and to the 
Secretary-General concerning areas of the moon having special scientific 
interest in order that, without prejudice to the rights of other States 
Parties, consideration may be given to the designation of such areas as 
international scientific preserves for which special protective arrangements 
are to be agreed upon in consultation with the competent bodies of the 
United Nations. 
Article VIII 
1. States Parties may pursue their activities in the exploration and use 
of the moon anywhere on or below its surface, subject to the provisions of 
this Agreement. 
2. For these purposes States Parties may, in particular: 
(a) Land their space objects on the moon and launch them from 
the moon; 
(b) Place their personnel, space vehicles, equipment, facilities, 
stations and installations anywhere on or below the surface 
of the moon. 
Personnel, space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations and installations 
may move or be moved freely over or below the surface of the moon. 
3. Activities of States Parties in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 
of this article shall not interfere with the activities of other States 
Parties on the moon. Where such interference may occur, the States 
Parties concerne d will undertake consultations in accordance with article 
15, paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Agreement. 
Article IX 
1. States Parties may establish manned and unmanned stations on the 
moon. A State Party establishing a station shall use only that area which 
is required for the needs of the station and shall immediately inform the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations of the location and purposes of 
that station. Subsequently, at annual intervals that State shall likewise 
inform the Secretary-General whether the station continues in use and 
whether its purposes have changed. 
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2. Stations shall be installed in such a manner that they do not impede 
the free access to all areas of the moon by personnel, vehicles and 
equipment of other State Parties conducting activities on the moon in 
accordance with the provisions of this Agreement or of article I of the 
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. 
Article X 
1. States Parties shall adopt all practicable measures to safeguard the 
life and health of persons on the moon. For this purpose t hey shall regard 
any person on the moon as an astronaut within the meaning of article V of 
the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explora- 
tion and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies and as part of the personnel of a spacecraft within the meaning of 
the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and 
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space. 
2. States Parties shall offer shelter in their stations, installations, 
vehicles and other facilities to persons in distress on the moon. 
Article XI 
1. The moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of 
mankind, which finds its expression in the provisions of this Agreement and 
in particular in paragraph 5 of this article. 
2. The moon is not subject to national appropriation by any claim of 
sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means. 
3. Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon, nor any part 
thereof or natural resources in place, shall become property of any State, 
international, intergovernmental or non-governmental organisation, national 
organisation or non-governmental entity or of any natural person. The 
placement of personnel, space vehicles equipment, facilities, stations and 
installations on or below the surface of the moon, including structures 
connected with its surface or subsurface, shall not create a right of 
ownership over the surface or of the subsurface of the moon or any areas 
thereof. The foregoing provisions are without prejudice to the international 
regime referred to in paragraph 5 of this article. 
4. States Parties have the right to exploration and use of the moon 
without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance 
with international law and the terms of this Agreement. 
5. States Parties to this Agreement hereby undertake to establish an 
international regime, including appropriate procedures, to govern the 
exploitation of the natural resources of the moon as such exploitation is 
about to become feasible. This provision shall be implemented in ý: ac=idz 
ance with article 18 of this Agreement. 
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6. In order to facilitate the establishment of the international regime 
referred to in paragraph 5 of this article, States Parties shall inform the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations as well as the public and the 
international scientific community, to the greatest extent feasible and 
practicable, of any natural resources they may discover on the moon. 
7. The main purposes of the international regime to be established 
shall include: 
(a) The orderly and safe development of the natural resources of 
the moon; 
(b) The rational management of those resources; 
(c) The expansion of opportunities in the use of those resources; 
(d) An equitable sharing by all States Parties in the benefits 
derived from those resources, whereby the interests and 
needs of the developing countries, as well as the efforts of 
those countries which have contributed either directly or 
indirectly to the exploration of the moon, shall be given 
special consideration. 
8. All the activities with respect to the natural resources of the moon 
shall be carried out in a manner compatible with the purpose specified in 
Paragraph 7 of this article and the provisions of article 6, paragraph 2, of 
this Agreement. 
Article XII 
1. States Parties shall retain jurisdiction and control over the personnel, 
vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations and installations on the moon. The 
ownership of space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations and installations 
shall not be affected by their presence on the moon. 
2. Vehicles, installations and equipment or their component parts found 
in places other than their intended location shall be dealt with in accor- 
dance with article 5 of the Agreement on Rescue of Astronauts, the 
Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer 
Space. 
3. In the event of an emergency involving a threat to human life, 
States Parties may use the equipment, vehicles, installations, facilities or 
supplies of other States Parties on the moon. Prompt notification of such 
use shall be made to the Secretary-General of the United Nations or the 
State Party concerned. 
Article XIII 
A State Party which learns of the crash landing, forced landing or other 
unintended landing on the moon of a space object, or its component parts, 
that were not launched by it, shall promptly inform the launching State 
Party and the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
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Article XIV 
1. States Parties to this Agreement shall bear international respon- 
sibility for national activities on the moon, whether such activities are 
carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and 
for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the 
provisions set forth in this Agreement. States Parties shall ensure that 
non-governmental entities under their jurisdiction shall engage in activities 
on the moon only under the authority and continuing supervision of the 
appropriate State Party. 
2. States Parties recognise that detailed arrangements concerning 
liability for damage caused on the moon, in addition to the provisions of 
the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explora- 
tion and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies and the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by 
Space Objects, may become necessary as a result of more extensive 
activities on the moon. Any such arrangements shall be elaborated in 
accordance with the procedure provided for in article 18 of this Agreement. 
Article XV 
1. Each State Party may assure itself that the activities of other 
States Parties in the exploration and use of the moon are compatible with 
the provisions of this Agreement. To this end, all space vehicles, equip- 
ment, facilities, stations and installations on the moon shall be open to 
other States Parties. Such States Parties shall give reasonable advance 
notice of a projected visit, in order that appropriate consultations may be 
held and that maximum precautions may be taken to assure safety and to 
avoid interference with normal operations in the facility to be visited. In 
pursuance of this article, any State Party may act on its own behalf or 
with the full or partial assistance of any other State Party or through 
appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United 
Nations and in accordance with the Charter. 
2. A State Party which has reason. 7 to believe that another State Party, 
is not fulfilling the obligations incumbent upon it pursuant to this Agree- 
ment or that another State Party is interfering with the rights which the 
former State has under this Agreement may request consultations with that 
State Party receiving such a request shall enter into such consultations 
without delay. Any other State Party which requests to do so shall be in 
such consultations shall seek a mutually acceptable resolution of any 
controversy and shall bear in mind the rights and interests of all States 
Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be informed of 
the results of the consultations and shall transmit the information received 
to all States Parties concerned. 
3. If the consultations do not lead to a mutually acceptable settlement 
which has due regard for the rights and interests of all States Parties, the 
parties concerned shall take all measures to settle the dispute by other 
peaceful means of their choice appropriate to the circumstances and the 
nature of the dispute. If difficulties arise in connection with the opening 
of consultations or if consultations do not lead to a mutually acceptable 
settlement, any State Party may seek the assistance of the Secretary- 
General, without seeking the consent of any other State Party concerned, 
in order to resolve the controversy. A State Party which does not maintain 
diplomatic relations with another State Party concerned shall participate. in 
such consultations, at its choice, either itself or through another State 
Party or the Secretary-General as intermediary. 
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Article XVI 
With the exception of articles 17 to 21, references in this Agreement to 
States shall be deemed to apply to any international intergovernmental 
organisation which conducts space activities if the organisation declares its 
acceptance of the rights and obligations provided for in this Agreement and 
if a majority of the States members of the organisation are States Parties 
to this Agreement and to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities 
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies. States members of any such organisation 
which are States Parties to this Agreement shall take all appropriate steps 
to ensure that the organisation makes a declaration in accordance with the 
foregoing. 
Article XVII 
Any State Party to this Agreement may propose amendments to the 
Agreement. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party to 
the Agreement accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a 
majority of the States Parties to the Agreement and thereafter for each 
remaining State Party to the Agreement on the date of acceptance by it. 
Article XVIII 
Ten years af ter the entry into force of this Agreement, the question of 
the review of the Agreement shall be included in the provisional agenda of 
the General Assembly of the United Nations in order to consider, in the 
light of past application of the Agreement, whether it requires revision. 
However, at any time after the Agreement has been in force for five 
years, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as depository, shall, at 
the request of one third of the States Parties to the Agreement and with 
the concurrence of the majority of the States Parties, convene a conference 
of the States Parties to review this Agreement. A review conference 
shall also consider the question of the implementation of the provisions of 
article 11, paragraph 5, on the basis of the principle referred to in para- 
graph 1 of that article and taking into account in particular any relevant 
technological developments. 
Article XIX 
1. This Agreement shall be open for signature by all States at United 
Nations Headquarters in New York. 
2. This Agreement shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. 
Any State which does not sign this Agreement before its entry into force 
in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any 
time. Instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
3. This Agreement shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following 
the date of deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification. 
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4. For each State depositing its instrument of ratification or accession 
after the entry into force of this Agreement, it shall enter into force on 
the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of any such instrument. 
5. The Secretary-General shall promptly inform all signatory and 
acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each 
instrument of ratification or accession to this Agreement, the date of its 
entry into force and other notices. 
Article XX 
Any State Party to this Agreement may give notice of its withdrawal from 
the Agreement one year after its entry into force by written notification 
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Such withdrawal shall 
take effect one year from the date of receipt of this notification. 
Article XXI 
The original of this Agreement, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, 
French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited 
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send certified 
copies thereof to all signatory and acceding States. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by 
their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement, opened for 
signature at New York on 
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A PPEN DIX 
TEXT OF DRAFT PRINCIPLES 
WITH RESPECT TO REMOTE SENSING 
OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES OF THE EARTH-T-ITD-ITS ENVIRONMENT 
AS CONTAINED IN THE REPORT OF THE LEGAL SUBCOMMITTEE 
ON THE WORK OF ITS 1980 SESSION 
(U. N. Doc. A/AC. 105/271 (10 April 1980), Annex II, pp. 7-11) 
Principle I 
For the purpose of these principles with respect to remote sensing of the 
natural resources of the earth and its environment: 
(a) The term "remote sensing of the earth" means "remote 
sensing of the natural resources of the earth and its environment". 
(b) The term "primary data" means those primary data which are 
acquired by satellite-borne remote sensors and transmitted from a satellite 
either by telemetry in the form of electromagnetic signals or physically in 
any form such as photographic film or magnetic tape, as well as pre- 
processed products derived from those data which may be used for later 
analysis. 
(c) The term "analysed information" means the end-product 
resulting from the analytical process performed on the primary data as 
defined in paragraph (b) above combined with data and/or knowledge 
obtained from sources other than satellite-borne remote sensors. 
Principle II 
Remote sensing of the earth from outer space and international co-opera- 
tion in that field (shall) (should) be carried out for the benefit and in the 
interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or 
scientific development, and taking into consideration, in international co- 
operation, the particular needs of the developing countries. 
Principle III 
Remote sensing of the earth from outer space (shall) (should) be conducted 
in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United 
Nations and the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in 
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies, and the relevant instruments of ITU. 
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Principle IV 
1. States carrying out programmes for remote sensing of the earth from 
outer space (should) (shall) promote international co-operation in these 
programmes. To this end, sensing States (should) (shall) make available to 
other States opportunities for participation in these programmes. Such 
participation should be based in each case on equitable and mutually 
acceptable terms due regard being paid to principles ... 
2. In order to maximize the availability of benefits from such remote 
sensing data, States are encouraged to consider agreements for the estab- 
lishment of shared regional faciliýies. 
Principle V 
Remote sensing of the earth from outer space (should) (shall) promote the 
protection of the natu ral environment of the earth. To this end States 
participating in remote sensing (should) (shall) identify and make available 
information useful for the prevention of phenomena detrimental to the 
natural environment of the earth. 
Principle VI 
States participating in remote sensing of the earth from outer space 
(should) (shall) make available technical assistance to other interested 
States on mutually agreed terms. 
Principle VII 
1. The United Nations and the relevant agencies within the United 
Nations system should promote international co-operation, including technical 
assistance, and play a role of co-ordination in the area of remote sensing 
of the earth. 
2. States conducting activities in the field of remote sensing of the 
earth (shall) (should) notify the Secretary-General thereof, in compliance 
with article XI of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of 
States in the Exploration and use of Outer Space, including the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies. 
Principle VIII 
Remote sensing of the earth from outer space should promote the protection 
of mankind from natural disaster. To this end, States which have identified 
primary data from remote sensing of the earth and/or analysed information 
in their possession which would be useful in helping to alert States to 
impending natural disasters, or in assisting States to deal with natural 
disasters should, as promptly as possible, notify those States affected or 
likely to be affected of the existence and availability of such data and/or 
information. Such data and/or information should, upon request, be dis- 
seminated as promptly as possible. 
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Principle IX 
Taking into account the principles 11 and III above, remote sensing data or 
information derived therefrom (shall) (should) be used by States in a 
manner compatible with the legitimate rights and interests of other States. 
Principle X 
States participating in remote sensing of the earth either directly or 
through relevant international organisation (shall) (should) be prepared to 
make available to the United Nations and other interested States, particu- 
larly the developing countries, upon their request, any relevant technical 
information involving possible operational systems which they are free to 
disclose. 
Principle XI 
(States (shall) (should) bear international responsibility for (national) activi- 
ties of remote sensing of the earth (irrespective of whether) (where) such 
activities are carried out by governmental (or non-governmental) entities, 
and (shall) (should) (guarantee that such activities will) comply with the 
provisions of these principles. ) 
Principle XII 
A sensed State (shall) (should) have timely and non-discriminatory access to 
primary data obtained by remote sensing of the earth from outer space, 
concerning its territory, on (agreed) reasonable terms and (no later than) 
(before) access is granted to any third State. (To the greatest extent 
feasible and practicable, ) this principle shall also apply to analysed 
information. ) 
Principle XIII 
( (A State which intends to conduct remote sensing of the earth from 
outer space shall give advance notification to the States whose territory 
will be sensed. ) (A State (intending to conduct) (conducting) remote 
sensing activities of the earth from outer space shall notify the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations and (upon request) the States whose terri- 
tory is intended to be covered by such activities (to the fullest extent 
feasible and as soon as practicable) of the intended launch, (nature of the) 
mission, duration and coverage of such activities. The Secretary-General 
shall publish information thus received. ) ) 
Principle XIV 
(A State carrying out remote sensing of the earth (shall) (should) without 
delay consult with a State whose territory is sensed upon request of the 
latter in regard to such activity, (in particular dissemiiýation of date and 
information, ) in order to promote international co-operation, f riendly 
relations among States and to enhance the mutual benefits to be derived 
from this activity. ) 
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Principle XV 
(States carrying out remote sensing of the earth shall not, without the 
approval of the States whose territories are affected by these activities, 
disseminate or dispose of any data or information on the natural resources 
of these States to third States, international organisations, public or private 
entities. ) 
Principle XVI 
(Without prejudice to the principle of the freedom of exploration and use 
of outer space, a's set forth in article I of the Treaty on Principles 
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, remote sensing of 
the earth (should) (shall) be conducted with respect for the principle of 
full and permanent sovereignty of all States and peoples over their own 
wealth and natural resources (with due regard to the rights and interests 
of other States and their natural and juridical persons in accordance with 
international law) (as well as their inalienable right to dispose of their 
natural resources) (and of information concerning those resources) ). 
Principle XVII 
(Any dispute that may arise with respect to the application of (activities 
covered by) these principles (shall) (should) be resolved by prompt consul- 
tations among the parties to the dispute. Where a mutually acceptable 
solution cannot be found by such consultations it (shall) (should) be sought 
through other (established) (existing) procedures for the peaceful means of 
settlement of disputes mutually agreed upon by the parties concerned. ) 
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